On the Doctrines of War; or A Distinction Between Aggression and Defence
Clarification of Terms
As with any piece of writing, extensive or otherwise, it is critical to clarify the terms to be used, the manner in which they will be used, and their relevant meaning (to the text and its objective). Therefore, before a discussion of War can proceed, I must do my due diligence in this regard. Further, insofar as this writing is concerned with an analytical approach, the discussion of the terms in themselves is of even greater importance. Therefore, insofar as the form the presuppositions of any argument I might present, they are owed at least as much, and in this case more, consideration than the un-annexed argument itself. In this manner, let us proceed into the concepts to be considered in turn.
War
The first concept requiring discussion is that of ‘war’. This is to be expected given that it is, in itself, the cornerstone of the whole piece. Therefore, let us consider this concept in itself, that is, without reference to the later concepts into which it is to be synthesised.
Firstly, it is important to note that the concept of war, as with all concepts, is neither fixed nor immutable. Rather, it is one of a dynamic nature, one which different cultures, societies, and histories have understood and conceptualised in a multitude of ways, sometimes even differently within a single society of narrative. This is simply to say that the definition of war will vary depending on the context. This in itself is, of course, a hinge concern in all linguistics and is thus not to be remedied by this humble writing. Rather, all I have the room and understanding to do is to assert (as a tyrant does) a definition of what I mean by ‘war’ and to then sustain it for (at least) the duration of this piece:
War is traditionally understood as a state of organised, armed conflict between two or more groups or nations. The latter of which is involved in the more modern conception of war (that is, as a violent international struggle, that is, a conflict between nations). This is the essence of what I express when I mark war. Alongside the essence of a concept however, there are also the incidental properties which connote but (necessarily) do not require the presence of that concept, so too is it in this case. The accidental properties of war are many, but let me name a few extremely common (indeed essential to some thinkers) examples:
War may involve the use of military force. By military I mean the armed forces or other organisations responsible for the defence of a country or the prosecution of the prior concept. In the broadest sense, to use an anarchist conception, they are the enforcers of the state’s monopoly on violence. By force I mean the use of physical power or coercion to achieve a particular outcome or objective. Therefore, by military force I mean the use of physical power by the armed delegates of state violence.
War may involve the deployment of weapons and tactics designed to achieve strategic or political objectives.
War may involve a high degree of violence and destruction. By violence I mean the use of force or power, whether actual or threatened, against oneself, another person, or a group or community, which results in harm, injury, or destruction. In this, I also include non-physical forms of harm, such as psychological, emotional, or economic violence.
With this out of the way, let me make a number of further remarks relevant to this paper:
From a purely philosophical perspective, the concept of war raises, indeed has historically raised, a number of pressing questions relating to ethics, morality, and human nature. To raise just one instance relevant to this writing: A key debate in the philosophical literature concerns whether war can ever be justified. In this, many scholars, perhaps the dominant opinion, particularly the dominant historical opinion, assert that war can be justified in certain circumstances, typically as a supposed act of self-defence (Defence-by-proxy, or the concept of a ‘Defensive War’) or in order to prevent greater harm. Others, notably religious thinkers (mostly historical) go further, arguing that even particular wars of aggression can be justified (Exemplified by Jihad and The Crusades). Against such views, still many thinkers take a dominantly more modern opinion in arguing that war (particularly wars of aggression) can never be justified, as this inevitably leads to death and destruction on both sides and/or violates the basic principles of human morality and dignity (Kant 2016).
On the sociological side, as previously mentioned, a separate but equally important question concerns the cause of war itself. Put one way, it asks this: Is war an inevitable feature of human society, perhaps of human nature, or is it something that can be prevented or abolished? On this thinkers in camps like the realists and proto-realists (ie. Hobbes and Machievelli) argue that war is a fundamental aspect of human nature, and that it is unlikely to ever be eliminated entirely. Others, particularly those dominant in the Enlightenment period and the idealist schools of diplomacy, but also in some radical camps (ie. The Marxists) assert that war is a product of specific historical and social conditions, and thus can be prevented or minimised through the implementation of certain policies and institutions.
Further still, in the non-philosophical realms, war often has profound political and social implications. It is no accident that many of the most radical periods in cultural change occur in or around great wars (ie. The Roaring 20’s, Post-Revolution France and US, Post-WW2 Europe, Revolutionary Russia). In this regard, although primarily approached as a tool of statecraft, that is, to achieve political or strategic objectives, any discussion of it must also recognise its radical social and cultural effects; in shaping national identity, memory, and the collective consciousness of societies.
Finally, the language of war and around war is a topic that, in itself, could have (and has had) many works dedicated to it. Language used to describe war often reflects and shapes the values and beliefs of the societies involved in such conflicts, and can have a powerful impact on public opinion and attitudes towards war. The narratives that emerge from wartime experiences can reveal interesting insights into the nature and expression of power, particularly in periods of intense turbulence amidst the ever-dynamic structures that compose our hive-mind like societies which, taken as a whole, have no small part in shaping our own narratives.
To put all this shortly, the concept of war is a complex and multifaceted one that raises a range of philosophical, political, and social questions. It is important for us to carefully analyse the concept, including the implication of its actualisation, in order to deepen our understanding of this complex phenomenon and its impact on the world we live in.
Aggression
Aggression as a concept that has been studied extensively by scholars from various fields, including biology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. At its most basic level, aggression can be defined as any behaviour intended to cause harm or injury (though not necessarily actually causing harm) to another person or object. Though this definition is quite simple; it hides the true complexities relating to the causes, kinds, and manifestations of aggression which are far more nuanced than an initial gaze may suggest.
If we are to begin with a consideration of the kinds or ‘species’ of aggression, I would like to suggest that they are threefold: (1) instrumental, (2) hostile, and (3) relational.
Certainly. There are different ways to categorise types of aggression, but one way is to distinguish between three broad categories: instrumental, hostile, and relational aggression.
Instrumental aggression refers to aggression that is aimed at achieving a specific goal or objective, such as obtaining resources or achieving dominance over others. In other words, in this species, aggression is a tool, often one of many all at use, and as a tool is merely incidental, that is, subordinate to the ultimate end. This species of aggression is often planned and deliberate, frequently involving the use of a calculated magnitude or concentration of force and coercion. Examples of instrumental aggression might include stealing, cheating, or engaging in aggressive behaviour to gain social status or influence, particularly when one’s other avenues of intrigue (ie. deception) are insufficient.
Hostile aggression, to contrast, is aggression primarily motivated by anger, frustration, or a desire to cause direct harm or pain to others. Unlike instrumental aggression, hostile aggression is not aimed at achieving a specific goal or objective, outside the aggression itself. That is to say, hostile aggression is self-referential, considering itself as the goal of its own actions. Typically, this form of aggression is of a reactive, impulsive or emotionally responsive nature, particularly to perceived threats or provocations. Examples of hostile aggression might include physical fights, verbal insults, or bullying.
Finally, relational aggression is a type of aggression that is focused on damaging or manipulating social relationships. This is certainly the most subtle species of the three and more directly connected to other forms of intrigue. In many instances, it is hard even to demarcate a specific incidence of this aggression as it is often indirect, relying on avenues like gossip, exclusion, or other forms of social sabotage. Relational aggression is often used by individuals who want to gain power or control over others, or who feel threatened by others in their social group.
Of course, it is important to note that these categories of aggression are not always mutually exclusive, and that individuals may exhibit different types of aggression depending on the situation or context.
Moving thus to the causes of aggression, they are practically limitless, however it will be sufficient here to categorise them into 3 strains: biological, psychological, and social aggression.
The first, perhaps oldest way to understand aggression is from a biological perspective. Evolutionary biologists, for example, often suggest that aggressive behaviour can be viewed as an adaptive response that helps individuals to survive and thrive in their environment. Prima facie this is because aggressive behaviour can help individuals to establish dominance, protect their territory, and secure resources necessary for survival. For example, aggression may help a predator to hunt and kill prey, or it may help a male animal to establish dominance over other males and secure a mate.
The second, newer perspective, is that of a psychological explanation, whereby aggression results from the expression or culmination of the sublimation of negative emotions such as anger, frustration, and fear. These emotions can lead individuals to engage in aggressive behaviour as a means of expressing their feelings or resolving interpersonal conflicts. Psychological theories of aggression typically highlight the role of learning and conditioning in the development of aggressive behaviour, suggesting that exposure to aggressive models or reinforcement for aggressive behaviour can increase its likelihood. For example, a child who grows up in a violent household may learn that aggression is an acceptable means of resolving conflicts or obtaining what they want.
Finally, the most modern perspective, that of a social understanding, posits that aggression can be seen as a product of socialisation processes and cultural norms. For example, some cultures may view aggressive behaviour as an acceptable means of resolving conflicts or protecting one's honour, while others may view it as inappropriate or even illegal. Additionally, social factors such as poverty, social inequality, and discrimination can contribute to feelings of frustration and anger that may lead to aggressive behaviour. For example, a person who experiences discrimination or marginalisation may feel angry and frustrated, which may lead them to engage in aggressive behaviour as a means of expressing their feelings.
Aggression can be further broken down into subtypes based on its manifestation. Verbal aggression involves the use of words or language to harm others, while physical aggression involves the use of physical force or violence. Indirect aggression involves the use of covert or subtle means to harm others, such as gossip or social exclusion. Each of these subtypes of aggression can be further divided into specific behaviours or actions that are used to cause harm. Here it is important to note that aggression is not always a negative or harmful behaviour. In some cases, aggression can be used to defend oneself or others from harm, or to stand up against injustice or oppression. For example, a person who engages in nonviolent resistance against an oppressive government may be seen as engaging in a form of constructive or justified aggression.
In this way, it is important to always remember that aggression is a complex and multifaceted feature of the human experience. Its causes and manifestations are likely shaped by biological, psychological, social, and cultural factors, and it can be expressed in a variety of ways. A thorough understanding of the concept of aggression requires a comprehensive analysis of its many dimensions and its complex interplay with various factors that shape human behaviour.
Defence
The concept of defence can be understood as any set of behaviours or strategies that individuals use to protect themselves or others from harm or injury. By protect is meant; remove or diminish the potential for an individual or object to suffer actual or perceived harm or offence. As with aggression, its mirror and shadow concept, defence occurs in many forms. Indeed, one can re-apply the former framework to analyse defence as physical, psychological, or social. In the same manner then, it is important to note that defence can also be deployed in a variety of contexts, such as in interpersonal relationships, in the workplace, or on a global scale in the context of international relations.
At its core, defence is a reactive behaviour that is triggered by a perceived threat or danger. This is in contrast to aggression, which is often (though not necessarily) a proactive behaviour that is intended to cause harm or injury to others. While both defence and aggression involve the use of force or coercion, defence is generally seen as a more justified or legitimate behaviour, as it is motivated by the need, or minimally perceived need, to protect oneself or others from harm.
Partially continuing our prior division: From a psychological perspective, defence can be seen as a natural response to stress or anxiety. When individuals feel threatened or vulnerable, they may deploy a range of defensive strategies, such as denial, avoidance, or suppression of emotions. These strategies can be effective in reducing the immediate threat or danger, but they can also have negative consequences, such as increased levels of stress or anxiety over time. Further, particularly in the psychological domain, it is important to note that it can be deceptively hard to differentiate between defence and manipulation. This is not because the concepts are similar in virtue or moral context, but rather because many of the strategies employed to defend oneself against an aggressor can be parodied by a manipulator (who is actually the aggressor) in order to give the impression of defensive actions.
From a social perspective, defence can be seen as a product of social norms and cultural values. In some cultures, defence may be seen as a necessary and justified response to threats or aggression, while in others it may be viewed as inappropriate or even cowardly. Additionally, social factors such as power dynamics, inequality, and discrimination can influence the deployment of defensive strategies, as individuals who feel marginalised or oppressed may be more likely to engage in defensive behaviours as a means of protecting themselves from harm.
As previously mentioned, when considering the application of defence, it is important to distinguish between defensive behaviours that are constructive or justified, and those that are destructive or unjustified. Constructive defence involves the use of non-violent or non-coercive strategies to protect oneself or others from harm, such as negotiation, mediation, or legal action. These strategies are generally seen as legitimate and appropriate, as they seek to resolve conflicts or disputes without resorting to violence or aggression. In contrast, destructive defence involves the use of violent or coercive strategies to protect oneself or others from harm, such as physical violence or military action. These strategies are generally seen as less legitimate or justified, as they may cause harm or injury to others and can escalate conflicts or disputes.
Therefore, we may conclude, as with aggression, that defence is a complex concept the likes of which requires intense and nuanced analysis to understand, identify and accurately apply to any particular instance or obligation. Perhaps most importantly, as I will later distinguish, while defence can be seen as a necessary and legitimate behaviour in certain contexts, it is important to distinguish between constructive and destructive forms of defence, and to consider the potential consequences of defensive behaviours on both the individual and the broader society.
Revenge
The concept of revenge, typically contrasted with justice, has been a topic of philosophical and ethical inquiry for centuries. While justice is often seen as a societal response to wrongdoing, designed to restore balance and prevent further harm, revenge is typically viewed as a personal response to perceived wrongs, driven by a desire for retribution and often lacking in considerations of proportionality and fairness.
One of the primary differences between justice and revenge lies in their goals. Justice seeks to restore balance and ensure that the guilty party is held accountable for their actions. This can take many forms, such as restitution, punishment, or rehabilitation, depending on the nature of the offence and the legal system in question. Revenge, on the other hand, is focused on inflicting harm on the wrongdoer in order to satisfy a sense of personal or collective vendetta. Similarly, the two concepts differ in their relation to the broader social order. Justice is typically seen as an objective and impartial response to wrongdoing (I say ‘seen’ because it is not clear that this is actually the case), designed to ensure that society functions smoothly and that individuals are held accountable for their actions. Revenge, on the other hand, is often viewed as a disruptive force that can lead to cycles of violence and retribution, undermining social stability and impeding the pursuit of common goals.
From a linguistic and conceptual perspective, revenge is often associated with negative connotations, as it is frequently viewed as a morally suspect and potentially dangerous behaviour. The term ‘revenge’ itself derives from the Latin re-vindicare or vindicta, originally referring to the statutory right of a person to punish a wrongdoer who was convicted of a criminal offence. However, when this statutory right was removed, the term later came to be associated with lawlessness and thus the more negative connotations of revenge we are familiar with in a modern context. The use of this term, therefore, carries with it a historical and cultural baggage that can shape how we understand and approach the concept. This baggage helps us to understand why revenge is not always viewed in a negative light. In some cultures, particularly those which uphold the ancient right of vindicta, revenge may be seen as a necessary and even honourable response to certain types of offences. For example, in traditional societies with strong codes of honour, revenge may be seen as a means of upholding one's reputation and defending one's honour in the face of perceived slights or insults.
Despite these cultural variations, however, revenge remains a contentious and complex issue from an ethical standpoint. Some philosophers argue that revenge is a natural and even necessary response to certain types of wrongs, while others view it as a morally suspect behaviour that is more likely to lead to further harm than to achieve any sort of genuine justice. Ultimately, the relationship between revenge and justice is a complex interplay or dance which, depending on the interpretation, may be two solo acts, a duet, or one act in two movements. Analysis of the concept thus requires careful consideration of the underlying moral and ethical principles at play. That is to say that, whilst revenge may be seen as a natural human response to perceived wrongs, it is important to recognize the significant negative consequences it can produce, intended or otherwise, both for individuals and for society as a whole. Generally in contrast, justice aims, if not offers, a more systematic and objective means of responding to wrongdoing, aimed at restoring balance and promoting the common good. Ultimately, the choice between revenge and justice requires a careful weighing of the competing ethical considerations involved, with an eye ever towards achieving a just and equitable outcome for all involved parties.
Vigilantism
Vigilantism is generally understood as the taking of law enforcement into one's own hands, outside of the legal system, and that understanding will suit this writing. In this, it can take many forms, ranging from individual acts of vigilantism to organised vigilante groups. While vigilantism may be motivated by a desire to seek justice or to address perceived social ills, it is often seen as an expression of the prior concept of revenge, as it seeks to inflict harm on those who are perceived to have committed wrongs.
Because of this, the actualisation of this concept is controversial, to say the least, and raises a number of ethical, legal, and social questions. One of the primary concerns with vigilantism is that it can lead to the erosion of the rule of law and the breakdown of social order, something generally frowned upon by individuals in a society. Particularly given that, when individuals or groups take the law into their own hands, they may act in ways that are disproportionate, arbitrary, or unlawful, potentially leading to violence and further social instability.
As already stated, one of the key drivers of vigilantism is a sense of perceived injustice, often provoking a desire for revenge. Individuals or groups may feel that the legal system is unable or unwilling to adequately address the wrongs they have suffered or the social problems they perceive. This can lead them to take matters into their own hands, seeking to achieve a sense of justice or retribution through extralegal means. However, whilst one’s acts may be motivated by a desire for justice, it often counterintuitively leads to the presence of injustice. Vigilantes may lack the training, expertise, and legal authority of trained law enforcement officials, leading to the potential for abuse and error. Additionally, vigilantism can lead to social fragmentation, as groups may take actions that are perceived as illegitimate or unjust by others in the community, potentially leading to further conflicts and violence.
The legality of vigilantism also raises significant questions. In most legal systems, vigilantism is considered a criminal offence, as it involves the violation of the state's monopoly on the use of force. Individuals or groups who engage in vigilantism may be subject to prosecution, and their actions may be seen as undermining the legitimacy of the legal system and the authority of the state. Linking into this, considering the concept from an ethical perspective, vigilantism raises a number of important questions about the nature of justice and the appropriate response to perceived wrongs. While individuals or groups may feel justified in taking the law into their own hands, it is important to recognize that extralegal means of seeking justice can have significant negative consequences. Instead, efforts should be made to strengthen the legal system and to address underlying social problems in a more systematic and sustainable manner.
Thereby, the concept and application of vigilantism, particularly as an expression of revenge, can be broken into a number of subordinate analyses through ethical, legal, and social lens. Synthesising these we may broadly say that whilst vigilantes may be motivated by a desire for justice or retribution, a righteous end, they can in fact produce social anarchy and greater injustice through disproportionate harm and the undermining of the rule of law. Therefore, to remedy injustice, it is likely preferable that efforts should be made to address underlying social problems and to strengthen legal institutions, thereby approaching justice in a dispassionate and systematic manner.
Justice
At its core, justice is concerned with the fair and equitable treatment of individuals and the resolution of disputes in a manner that is consistent with moral and legal principles. In this regard, it is put at odds with revenge and vigilantism, which in many ways are the prior concepts antithesis and the corruptors of fairness and equity.
To put the contrast more plainly; let us consider the concepts in sequence: Revenge is the act of seeking retribution or retaliation for a perceived wrong or harm. Revenge is often driven by anti-social emotions, particular anger and resentment. It is, in its essence, a vicious response to perceived viciousness; and in doing so, only perpetuates a cycle of violence, offending the very concept of injustice it seeks to defend. It is, in short, the expression of justice taken into the personal and atomised hands of the egoistic individual who, in retribution for the failing of the law, attempts to measure the standard of just action against their own bias and prejudicial tendencies.
In many ways, vigilantism can thus be seen as synonymous with revenge. In both cases, one presupposes that the law of their will ought to override the law of the general will, or of the social contract. Yet, in taking the law into one’s own hands, that is, outside the ordained judicial process, one destroys that very concept, acting thus with a contradiction in their will. From this contradiction in will, it is no surprise that vigilantism results in a vicious corruption of society, promoting, in fact requiring, the abuse of power and the violation of individual rights.
Against these individual and egoistic concerns, justice is a more formal and institutionalised concept, aiming at the legal and institutional redress of wrongs. It is a collective, prosocial form of equity and organisation; being that only concept which enables disputes to be resolved through the application of principles agreed upon by society as a whole.
None of this should be misconstrued as claiming that no application of (that is, attempt to induce) justice can be immoral. The application of justice, unlike the concept itself, can be, perhaps necessarily is, influenced by a variety of factors, including bias, prejudice, and political influence. In some cases, the legal system may be used as a tool of oppression or injustice, rather than as a means of ensuring fairness and equity. For example, the history of racial discrimination and segregation in the United States has led many to question the fairness and equity of the American legal system, and to call for reforms aimed at ensuring that justice is applied in a manner that is consistent with moral and legal principles. Even in this great wrong, however, we must struggle to separate the concept of justice (that is, justice in itself) from the expression of justice (that is, justice in society). The former of which is invariably righteous, the latter not so. Therefore, one ought always aim to reach the former, whilst bearing in mind the latter.
Defence-By-Proxy
A ‘defensive war’, as an expression of defence-by-proxy, is generally understood as a military conflict initiated by a state in response to an attack or threat of attack or perceived threat of attack by another state. In such conflicts, the state initiating the war is often perceived as acting in self-defence, seeking to protect its sovereignty and security from external threats. However, the concept of a ‘defensive war’ is in itself ambiguous, particularly as there are many instances in which wars that are ostensibly defensive in nature are actually disguised forms of aggression. For example, states may (and have) use the pretext of a defensive war to pursue broader geopolitical goals, such as expanding their territory or influence, or to justify pre-emptive strikes against potential threats.
From a linguistic and conceptual perspective, the term ‘defensive war’ itself carries a positive connotation, certainly more positive than ‘war of aggression’ as it asserts, perhaps without justification, that the state initiating the conflict is acting in a justifiable and legitimate manner. The term ‘defensive’ implies a sense of moral and ethical superiority, suggesting that the state is acting in self-defence against an aggressor. To put this another way; we can see in acts of conflict always three parties: (1) the aggressor, (2) the victim, and (3) the rescuer. In using the term ‘defensive war’, the proponent is attempting to make the country unto whom they assert themselves the aggressor (1), make themselves the victim (2), and make those who seek peace the rescuer (3). However, it has often been seen in history that, as defences-by-proxy are used as facades for casus belli, the positions of the aggressor and the victim are rightly assigned, intuitively, to the country declaring war and the recipient of the declaration respectively.
One of the key challenges in assessing the legitimacy of a ‘defensive war’, that is to determine whether the term itself is being accurately applied, is determining whether the threat or provocation that led to the conflict was real or perceived. States often exaggerate or fabricate threats in order to justify military action, or they may respond to relatively minor provocations with disproportionate force. This can lead to situations in which such acts of self-defence morph into disguised form of aggression. This leads into the next challenge defence wars present, that being the concern of proportionality. Even if it is granted that a state has a legitimate reason to initiate a war in self-defence, it must still ensure that its response is proportional to the threat it faces. If a state uses excessive force or engages in tactics that harm civilian populations, its actions may be deemed illegitimate, even if they were initially justified as self-defence.
Additionally, the distinction between defensive and offensive actions can be further complicated by the use of asymmetrical warfare tactics, such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, or vigilantism more broadly. In such cases, non-state actors may use violence against a state, which may then respond with military force. The non-state actors may claim to be acting in self-defence against an oppressive regime, while the state may claim to be acting in self-defence against a terrorist threat. In such situations, it may be difficult to determine who is the aggressor and who is the defender.
In this way, we see that the concept and application of a ‘defensive war’ is complex and can be easily manipulated to justify aggressive actions. While the notion of self-defence is an important aspect of international law and ethics, it is important to be aware of the potential for states to use the pretext of self-defence to pursue their own interests or to engage in aggression against other states. The key to assessing the legitimacy of a defensive war is to carefully evaluate the threat or provocation that led to the conflict, and to ensure that the state's response is proportional and does not harm civilian populations.
An Analytical Consideration of the Morality of a ‘Just War’
Proceeding from the prior conceptual discussion; it is now the time to turn the theories of a supposed ‘Just War’ and give them their due in analytical consideration.
Just War Theory
To begin, let me address what the just war theory is, in itself, to its proponents. I will try my best to remove my own perspectives on the issue (which will follow later) and, in doing so, attempt to provide a historical description of the issue.
In its broadest sense, just war theory is a moral framework used to evaluate the morality of using force in international relations. It is presupposed by the belief that war is a serious moral matter, and that the use of force must be justified in order to be morally acceptable. In many regards, the just war tradition dates back to ancient Greece and Rome, flowing then into its heart in the Christian tradition. Nonetheless, it has since been developed over time by secular philosophers and legal scholars.
The core principles of just war theory are grounded in the moral principles of justice, proportionality, and discrimination. These principles are designed to guide decision-making about the use of force and to ensure that military action is conducted in a way that minimises harm to civilians and other non-combatants.
The first principle of just war theory is the principle of jus ad bellum (‘right to war’), which concerns the justification for going to war. According to this principle, war is only justified if it meets certain criteria, including the presence of (1) just cause, (2) a legitimate authority to declare war, (3) and the use of force as a last resort. The principle of jus ad bellum is designed to ensure that military action is only taken in response to a grave and imminent threat to national security or other vital interests.
The second principle of just war theory is the principle of jus in bello (‘right in war’), which concerns the conduct of military operations. According to this principle, military action must be conducted in a way that minimises harm to civilians and other non-combatants. Here proportionality is a major concern; requiring that the harm caused by military action be proportional to the military objective. Likewise here comes the principle of discrimination, that is, the commitment that military action be directed only at legitimate targets, such as military installations and combatants.
The third principle of just war theory is the principle of jus post bellum (‘Justice after war’), which concerns the aftermath of war. According to this principle, the end of a war should result in a just and stable peace. This includes the obligation to provide for the basic needs of civilians affected by the conflict, as well as the need to establish a system of justice that holds accountable those responsible for war crimes and other atrocities.
One of the key challenges of just war theory is the application of its principles in real-world situations. In practice, determining whether military action meets the criteria of just war theory can be difficult, as the criteria can be subjective and open to interpretation. Furthermore, the criteria of just war theory may be influenced by political and strategic considerations, rather than solely by moral and legal principles. For example, the decision to go to war may be influenced by factors such as public opinion, economic interests, and geopolitical considerations, rather than solely by the presence of a just cause.
Despite these challenges, just war theory continues to play an important role in guiding decision-making about the use of military force. This is partly because, as prior mentioned, it is the only major framework specifically designed to assess the morality of military action, and for holding accountable those responsible for violations of the principles of justice in the context of open conflict. In this regard, the theory represents an attempt to balance the moral imperative of protecting human life and dignity with the practical necessity of using force in certain situations. Though its principles provide a valuable framework for assessing the morality of military action, their application must always be guided by a commitment to justice and the protection of human rights.
Here I should give some commonly cited examples of just wars:
World War II: Many consider World War II to be a just war because it was fought to stop the aggression of Nazi Germany and Japan, and to prevent further atrocities from occurring. The Allies had a clear moral principle, a reasonable chance of success, and used proportional force in defeating the Axis powers. Additionally, the post-war trials of Nazi leaders established legal precedents for holding individuals accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Kosovo War: The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 undertaken to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbian forces, supported by the United Nations Security Council. NATO had a just cause, a reasonable chance of success, and used proportional force in achieving their goals.
Gulf War: The Gulf War in 1991 is often cited as an example of a just war. The war was fought to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, and was supported by a coalition of countries. The coalition had a just cause, a reasonable chance of success, and used proportional force in achieving their goals.
Notable Proponents
Moving forward now, let us consider a number of proponents of the theory and their positions. For, it is always good faith and prudential to understand the position of one’s academic opponent before you disparage them.
Aquinas
Thomas Aquinas, a prominent mediaeval philosopher and theologian, is considered to be one of the foremost contributors to the development of just war theory. Although he lived after Augustine, who also wrote on the topic, Aquinas’ presented perhaps the first comprehensive discussion of the concept. On that topic, unsurprisingly, Aquinas’ views are based on his Christian faith and his natural law theory.
Aquinas believed that war was sometimes necessary to protect innocent lives and to restore justice, but that it should always be guided by certain moral principles. It is from him that we get the idea that a just war must have a just cause, such as self-defence or the defence of innocent people, and that it must be authorised by a legitimate authority, such as a ruler or government. It is also from him we get the ideas of proportionality and discrimination in the conduct of war. That is to say, the use of force should be proportional to the threat posed by the enemy and should only be directed only against combatants, not against non-combatants. To be clear, Aquinas believed that the killing of innocent people was always unjust, even in the context of war. Finally, as prior mentioned, Aquinas believed that only those who had the responsibility for protecting the common good, such as rulers or governments, had the authority to declare war. He outlays the responsibility to these structures because he believed that all peaceful means of resolving conflicts should be systematically exhausted before one resorts to war.
It may also be worth mentioning that Aquinas believed that those who fought in a just war were not guilty of murder (assuming the war is actually just). Rather, he believed that soldiers who fought in a just war were performing a legitimate act of self-defence.
Kant
Immanuel Kant was a prominent philosopher of the 18th century who is widely known for his contributions to ethics, political philosophy, and metaphysics. While he did not develop a comprehensive theory of just war, Kant did have a number of views on the subject that are worth exploring.
Kant believed that the only just cause for war was the defence of one's own territory or people. In his view, wars of aggression were always unjust, as they involved a violation of the rights of other nations. In a manner after Aquinas, Kant argues that nations should only go to war as a last resort, after all other peaceful means of resolving conflicts had been exhausted. Likewise, he also upheld that the conduct of war should be guided by certain moral principles. In this, soldiers and military leaders have a duty to minimise harm to non-combatants and to treat prisoners of war humanely. He believed that the use of torture, assassinations, and other forms of violence against civilians were always unjust, regardless of the military objective.
Here it is worth remarking that Kant simultaneously believed that warfare was inherently problematic from a moral perspective, as it involved the use of force to coerce others, something he was vehemently against. Because of this, he argued that wars were always a sign of moral failure, and that the ultimate goal of international relations should be to establish a permanent peace among nations. This view is drawn from his famous essay “Perpetual Peace” (2016). In that text, Kant outlined a vision for a world in which nations would cooperate peacefully with each other, respecting each other's sovereignty and human rights. He believed that the establishment of a world federation of nations, based on the principles of international law and mutual respect, was the best way to achieve this goal.
Other
Augustine
St. Augustine of Hippo was a Christian theologian who lived in the 4th and 5th centuries. He is widely regarded as one of the earliest and most influential proponents of just war theory. Augustine argued that war could be justified if it was fought for a just cause, such as self-defence or the protection of innocent people. He also emphasised the importance of proportionality and discrimination in the conduct of war, arguing that military action should be directed only at legitimate targets and that the harm caused by war should be proportional to the military objective.
Grotius
Hugo Grotius was a Dutch jurist and philosopher who lived in the 17th century. Grotius is often regarded as the father of international law, and his work on just war theory was influential in the development of the modern system of international law. Grotius argued that war could be justified if it met the criteria of just cause, legitimate authority, proportionality, and discrimination. He also emphasised the importance of minimising harm to civilians and other non-combatants, and argued that certain weapons and tactics should be prohibited in order to protect human dignity.
Walzer
Michael Walzer is a contemporary political philosopher who has written extensively on just war theory. Walzer argues that just war theory is necessary in order to balance the competing moral imperatives of protecting human life and dignity, on the one hand, and defending against aggression and injustice, on the other. He emphasises the importance of a just cause, legitimate authority, proportionality, and discrimination in the use of military force. Walzer also argues that the principles of just war theory must be applied in a way that takes account of the particular circumstances of each case, and that the criteria for just war may vary depending on the political and strategic context.
Elshtain
Jean Bethke Elshtain was a political philosopher who wrote extensively on just war theory and its application to contemporary conflicts. Elshtain argued that just war theory provides a framework for assessing the morality of military action, and that it is necessary to apply this framework in order to hold political leaders accountable for their decisions. She also emphasised the importance of a just peace, arguing that the goal of military action should be to establish a stable and lasting peace that respects human rights and dignity.
In all regards, the proponents of just war theory have sought to balance the moral imperative of protecting human life and dignity with the practical necessity of using force in certain situations. Their work has emphasised the importance of criteria such as just cause, legitimate authority, proportionality, and discrimination in the use of military force, and has sought to establish a framework for assessing the morality of military action. While there may be differences of opinion among proponents of just war theory, their work has made important contributions to the development of a moral and legal framework for the use of military force in international relations.
Descriptive Analysis of the Principles
As previously alluded to; the principles underlying just war theory are those grounded in proportionality, discrimination, and justice. These roughly mirror the concepts jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. Let us thus further consider each of these three in turn.
Jus ad bellum
As a practice, jus ad bellum, literally ‘right to war’, seeks to establish criteria under which it is morally and/or legally righteous to initiate a war. Typically, this is expressed as a set of definitive conditions that must be met before one engages in military conflict. Such sets can be broken down into several distinct principles: just cause, right intention, last resort, and reasonable chance of success. My discussion of these will be quiet brief as I believe they rest on subjective axioms which avoid analysis:
Just cause is perhaps the most fundamental criterion for jus ad bellum. It refers to the idea that a state or nation must have a morally and legally defensible reason for going to war. Such reasons might include (purported) self-defence against an aggressor, the protection of innocent civilians, or the defence of basic human rights. Without a just cause, military action is generally considered unjustifiable and illegal. Further; almost without exception, just war theorists do not consider geopolitical or political ambitions to have the potential for a just cause.
Right intention is closely related to just cause, in that both underline the belief that states must have a moral and legal obligation to pursue its war aims in a just (that is, moral) manner. This typically implies that the conflict must be motivated by a desire to achieve a just and equitable outcome, rather than by a desire for personal gain or revenge. This criteria is potentially reducible to the former criterion, depending on the specific conception.
The principle of last resort requires that all non-violent means of resolving a conflict must be exhausted before resorting to military action. Such means may include diplomatic (ie. negotiation) or economic (ie. sanction) avenues of geopolitical strategy. In any case, it is generally asserted that all non-violent measures must be engaged and exhausted, even when doing so hurts the military capacity of the nation, before military action can be justified.
Finally, a reasonable chance of success requires that a state or nation must have a realistic chance of achieving its war aims through military action. This means that military action must not be a futile or hopeless endeavour, and must be supported by a realistic assessment of the military, political, and social factors involved (presuming that such an assessment is, in fact, possible)
On these principles, I will briefly add my voice to the scholars who argue that the above criteria are too vague and subjective. That is to say, in practice they can be, and have been, used to justify almost any military action. Similarly, one might assert that the very idea of jus ad bellum is an offence to human dignity, as all wars, in practice, inevitably involve the killing and maiming of innocent people. Despite these critiques, it must certainly be conceded that the concept of jus ad bellum remains an important part of international law and ethics. For, if this was not the case, there would be no reason in my writing this essay; I would be ‘preaching to the choir’ so to speak. Above this, it must also be conceived that the concept does provide a framework, whether it is a just one remains to be seen, for evaluating the moral and legal implications of military action, and at least aims to ensure that wars are fought for just and defensible reasons.
Jus in bello
The next key concept is that of Jus in bello or ‘right in war’. This refers to the study of how wars should be conducted once they have begun. Another common term for this conflict is the ‘law of war’ which, more specifically, refers to the set of ethical and legal principles that are presumed to govern the conduct of armed conflicts. Once more, it helps in analysis, indeed is the essence of analysis, to break the concept into its subordinate incidents. In this, jus in bello, as with jus ad bellum, can be broken down into three distinct categories: discrimination, actional proportionality, and the treatment of prisoners of war.
Discrimination requires combatants to distinguish between military targets and non-combatants during the conduct of armed conflict. This principle is based on the belief that non-combatants, such as civilians, are not legitimate targets of military action, and thereby the use of force against them is always unjust. This belief is generally grounded in the assertion that civilians are innocent and thereby not directly involved in the conflict. To act in opposition to this is generally regarded as a major violation of human rights, and can itself become cause for further intervention, particularly from a wider international community. In this regard, the principle of discrimination can be seen as enshrined in a number of international legal instruments, beginning with the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols (1949) (1977). Nonetheless, one of the key challenges associated with the principle of discrimination is determining who qualifies as a legitimate military target. While combatants, military installations, and weapons systems are generally viewed as easily discriminated targets, the status of other targets can be more ambiguous. For example, infrastructure such as bridges or power plants may have military significance, but they also serve civilian populations, making it difficult to determine how they should be treated under the principle of discrimination. This ambiguity is only worsened in cases where the civilian population are actually aiding their military in a military capacity, ie. through gorilla warfare or partisanship. In such situations, the line between civilian and combatant is blurred beyond almost all recognition. Putting aside the consideration of purposeful attack, a different challenge is the difficulty of avoiding incidental harm to non-combatants during military operations. Even when combatants take all feasible measures to avoid targeting non-combatants, there is still a risk of unintended harm to civilians and other non-combatants. This is particularly true in situations where combatants are operating in close proximity to civilian populations, such as urban areas, which have characterised many modern wars. In this regard, and despite the efforts of modern nations, the principle of discrimination remains a challenging one. Indeed challenging enough that certain critics argue that the principle is too difficult to apply in practice, and that it places an undue burden on combatants who are already operating in highly stressful and unpredictable environments. Against this, others still argue that the principle is not sufficiently robust, and that it fails to account for the full range of harms that can be inflicted on non-combatants during the conduct of armed conflict.
Actional proportionality is the second core principle of jus in bello, requiring the use of force to be proportional to the military objective being pursued. This presumes that military action should not cause unnecessary harm or suffering, in other words, it ought to be proportional to the goal in mind. The obvious problem with this idea is the question: What constitutes a proportional use of force? The answer to this question is necessarily a highly context-specific question, as the proportionality of a given action will depend on a number of factors, most notably the magnitude of the objective being pursued and the feasibility of alternative, less destructive, courses of action.
Finally, the treatment of prisoners of war rounds out the principles of the concept in question. This principle, in practice, is governed by a range of international legal instruments, most notably the prior mentioned Geneva Conventions (1949). These instruments,which indeed appear righteous, outline specific rules and guidelines for the treatment of prisoners of war, and require that all combatants adhere to these rules. Under such guidelines, ‘prisoners of war’ are defined as individuals who have been captured by a belligerent party during an armed conflict, and who are entitled to certain rights and protections under international law. These rights include the right to be treated humanely and with respect, the right to adequate food, shelter, and medical care, and the right to legal representation, all of which are quite virtuous aspirations. However, the key concern here is the break between the ideals governing treatment and the practice in reality; that is, the difficulty is in ensuring that combatants actually adhere to these rules and guidelines. It has frequently occurred that combatants engage in acts of brutality or mistreatment against prisoners of war, either out of a desire for revenge or as a means of extracting information. Although human rights groups work to monitor the treatment of prisoners of war, it is not clear that such groups have any power to enforce their ideals, and thus any power to correct the injustices they may rightly identify.
Jus post bellum
The final principle of just war theory, and the last requiring consideration is that of Jus post bellum or ‘justice after war’. This concept is actually relatively new compared to the prior concepts. This novelty is likely because the historical conceptions of just war actually justified the destruction of an immoral state of affairs, and thus did not require a consideration of a post war relation between the agitator and the vanquished. Against this, post-conflict reconciliation has become a major, almost primary, concern in modern conflict and justice. In this regard, jus post bellum, focuses on the principles and practices that should govern the transition from war to peace. In other words, whilst jus ad bellum and jus in bello focus on the ethics of conflict, jus post bellum is concerned with the ethics of conflict resolution.
At its core, jus post bellum is concerned with the idea of a just peace, not any peace. This concept of a ‘righteous peace’ refers to a state of affairs in which the underlying causes of a conflict have been addressed and resolved, and in which the conditions necessary for a stable and lasting peace have been established. Obviously this requires the cessation of all hostilities. However, it also strives for the implementation of measures to address the root causes of the conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and political repression. In these regards, it presents a more nuanced response to conflict; considering the impetus for the concerns and using this as the logic when forming a response appropriate to such concerns.
Nonetheless, whilst I am admittedly more fond of this concept, it is certainly not without problems. One such challenge is determining who has the authority and responsibility to govern the post-conflict period. In some cases, the defeated party may be required to relinquish control to an occupying force or an external authority, while in other cases, power may be transferred to a transitional government composed of representatives from all parties to the conflict. Regardless of who governs the post-conflict period, jus post bellum asks that the principles of fairness, justice, and accountability be upheld. This typically means that all parties to the conflict must be held accountable for any violations of international law or human rights that may have occurred during the course of the conflict. Unfortunately, this is far too uncommon, particularly for those party to the winning side. It also means that measures must be taken to address the harms caused by the conflict, such as the provision of reparations to victims of violence or the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions.
Once more we see the principle of proportionality, which governs all justice, arise here. In this expression, the principle requires that the measures taken to address the harms caused by the conflict be proportional to the severity and scope of those harms. This means that post-conflict measures must not be excessively punitive or vengeful, but must instead be aimed at promoting reconciliation, stability, and long-term peace. Indeed, we have seen that overly punitive or draconian peace measures can (at first) paradoxically cause further conflict; exemplified by the role that the brutal Treaty of Versailles had in creating the conditions for the ascension of the NSDAP in Germany and thus the Second World War (Wilde, R 2020). Thus we see that peace talks which have, at their heart, a desire for revenge, rather than justice, are, in actuality, war measures which seek to further wage war on the defeated country and have their eyes to the death of the vanquished rather than the resurrection of peace.
To put it shortly, jus post bellum represents an important evolution in the field of just war theory, highlighting the need for ethical considerations to guide the transition from war to peace. By focusing on the principles of just peace, fairness, justice, accountability, and proportionality, jus post bellum offers a framework for promoting a more stable, equitable, and peaceful post-conflict world.
Normative Analysis
Axioms
Consider the following set of moral axioms I hold:
Presupposed Axioms (PA)
A Moral Agent (MA) is a being which appears to have the capacity for Deliberate Moral Action and Therefore has Moral Liability
Note; this does not in principle rule out species other than humans, nor does it necessarily include all humans
Appears because it is impossible to eliminate the possibility of Philosophical Zombies or eternal Determinism
Capacity for Deliberate Moral Action instead of the typical Capacity for Preferences (à la Peter Singer) because I do not consider an expression of preference as sufficient for moral liability and I see moral liability as necessary for moral agency.
Moral Consideration ought only be extended to beings who are both Moral Agents and who are capable of reciprocating moral values (Special Moral Agents / SMAs)
Moral/Immoral Distinction (M/I)
Moral/Immoral Distinction (M/I)
An act is moral (good) if it promotes the flourishing of SMAs / allows the highest order of preferences among SMAs (taken as a collective)
An act is immoral (bad) if it directly inhibits the flourishing of SMAs
An act may be amoral (neutral) if:
It indirectly / incidentally inhibits the flourishing of SMAs
Note that Hyper-Complication of scenarios likely prevents moral judgement (ie. in the case of Macro-economic Systems)
It neither promotes / inhibits the flourishing of SMAs
Applied Axioms (AA)
SMA’s ought seek harmonisation with other SMAs
Harmonisation between SMAs is necessary for the flourishing of said agents and is thereby a precondition for the moral
That which directly inhibits the flourishing of SMA’s is immoral
Bodily Harm, Production of Disuniting Anarchy, Hyper-Atomisation and Moral Disinterest are all expressions of inhibition of the harmonisation of SMAs and thereby immoral
Social Contractarianism is a highly efficient method of harmonisation between SMAs and thereby is a moral system.
Here it is important to note and be ever aware that, whilst I uphold these principles with the utmost faith, they remain axioms and, as axioms, are necessarily subjective and do not admit of rational discourse
Analysis
Initial Consideration
To begin, let me put my analysis broadly on the table. By analysis I mean the investigation of my principles (‘axioms’) and consideration of such principles in a discursive manner against principles of a ‘just war’, taking great pains to highlight the antagonisms between the two. Self-evidently, where the axioms I hold conflict with the axioms of another system, such that only one may persist, I will persist in my axioms (this is tautological if those principles are truly my axioms and do not have the mere appearance of them: All axioms in a moral system overrule all other positions where the two are seen in conflict). Let me then, very briefly surge through my initial considerations:
According to my first axiom, a being with the capacity for deliberate moral action and moral liability is considered a moral agent (MA). The second axiom stipulates that moral consideration ought only to be extended to beings who are both moral agents and capable of reciprocating moral values (Special Moral Agents/SMAs). From these axioms I conclude that any discussion of a just war theory must consider the moral liability of the parties involved.
The second axiomatic set defines the moral/immoral distinction, stating that an act is moral if it promotes the flourishing of SMAs or allows the highest order of preferences among SMAs, taken as a collective. On the other hand, an act is immoral if it directly inhibits the flourishing of SMAs. It follows that any act that leads to harm or inhibition of the flourishing of SMAs is immoral and goes against the moral principles outlined.
The third axiomatic set states that SMAs ought to seek harmonisation with other SMAs as harmonisation between SMAs is necessary for their flourishing and, therefore, a precondition for the moral. Any action that inhibits harmonisation between SMAs, such as bodily harm or the production of disuniting anarchy, is considered immoral. Therefore, war, by its very nature, as an act that necessarily inhibits harmonisation between SMAs and causes bodily harm, is necessarily immoral. This set is rounded by the conclusion that social contractarianism is a highly efficient method of harmonisation between SMAs and is thereby a moral system. War is a complete violation of the social contract inasmuch as it involves the use of force and violence to achieve political ends. Therefore, any war, even one fought for a supposed just cause, goes against the principles of social contractarianism and is thus morally impermissible.
Jus ad bellum
Jus ad bellum is that it is based on the assumption that there are certain conditions under which a country or entity can justifiably go to war. However, the concept fails to consider the moral liability of the parties involved in the decision to go to war, not this or that war, but war in the abstract. My first axiom states that a being with the capacity for deliberate moral action and moral liability is considered a moral agent (MA). Therefore, any discussion of the morality of war must consider the moral liability of the parties involved, in a manner which I do not believe jus ad bellum accounts for.
Jus in bello
My first contention is that jus in bello violates the principle of moral liability, which is a central tenet of my moral framework. As previously stated, moral liability requires the capacity for deliberate moral action, and is a precondition of the moral. However, jus in bello is based on the assumption that the actions of soldiers and military forces during war are to be judged by different moral standards than those applied to everyday actions. This assumption is deeply problematic as it suggests that individuals are not morally liable for their actions during wartime, or that such actions are somehow exempt from moral scrutiny. This violates the principle of moral liability, which holds that all individuals are morally accountable for their actions.
Secondly, jus in bello is based on the assumption that war is an inevitable and necessary part of human society. However, this assumption is not necessarily true, rather we see in times of peace that war is a rather contingent part of human existence. As SMA's, our moral responsibility is to always seek the harmonisation of interests with other SMAs, and this involves finding ways to resolve conflicts peacefully. War is a manifestation of the failure to do this, and it is therefore morally suspect to create principles that serve to legitimise and regulate the conduct of warfare.
Furthermore, jus in bello is inherently biassed towards those who have the capacity to wage war, and the principles of the conduct of war are shaped to suit their interests. This bias is exemplified by the fact that the rules of war typically focus on the minimization of harm to soldiers, rather than civilians who are often the primary victims of conflict. This represents a profound moral failing, as it fails to acknowledge the inherent worth of all SMA's, regardless of their capacity to wage war.
Finally, the principle fails to acknowledge the inherently dehumanising effects of war. The conduct of war is often brutal and violent, and individuals who participate in conflict are often subjected to extreme levels of stress and trauma. These experiences can have profound and long-lasting effects on individuals, leading to a range of psychological problems such as PTSD. The fact that we create principles to regulate and limit the conduct of warfare suggests that we are not fully cognizant of the full implications of war on those who are involved in it.
Jus post bellum
From the perspective of the provided axioms, the concept of jus post bellum is highly problematic. Firstly, the concept of jus post bellum implies an end justifies the means approach, which is entirely incompatible with my axioms. According to the axioms, the morality of an act is determined by its effect on the flourishing of moral agents, regardless of the consequences. Therefore, even if a war was fought with just means and for a just cause, the moral consideration does not justify any subsequent immoral actions in the post-conflict period. Another way of approaching this is to say that the concept implies that the morality of the conflict is determined by its outcome, which is wholly absurd to me. Consider cases where a just war is fought but ends with a defeat. In this case, the jus post bellum principles would be applied to the defeated party, regardless of the justness of their cause, which at once violates the principles of just war theory and the axioms upon which I rely.
Moreover, jus post bellum is often associated with the idea of winning the peace, but this approach prioritises the interests of the victors over the vanquished. The defeated party may be required to accept the terms of the victor, even if they are not in the interest of the vanquished, which would not contribute to the harmonisation of the parties and further contribute to the development of intra-state anarchy.
Another issue with the concept of jus post bellum is that it does not provide guidance on how to repair the harm caused by the conflict, which is a key aspect of post-conflict justice. While the principles of jus post bellum may provide some guidance on the conduct of parties in the aftermath of a war, they do not address the fundamental issues of repairing the harm caused by the conflict. This includes issues such as providing compensation to victims, rebuilding infrastructure, and restoring the rule of law.
Finally, the concept aids in perpetuating the cycle of violence and revenge. It is often the case that the defeated party in a war may harbour feelings of resentment and desire for revenge. By imposing punitive measures on the defeated party, the victorious party may provoke a cycle of violence that could continue for generations. This directly contravenes in the development and perpetuation of the flourishing of SMAs and thereby contradicts my system.
In these ways, we see that all three principles of just war theory, that is, Jus ad bellum, Jus in bello, and Jus post bellum, contradict my ethical presuppositions and, at times, perhaps contradict even themselves.
A Polemic Against Warmongers
Thus far I have discussed the case for and (ultimately) against the ‘just war’ theorists, that is, those who seek to find a righteous path in an intrinsically unrighteous act. Hither to I restrained myself to a significant degree, attempting to constrain my considerations to an analytical and academic method. Here ends that method and my restrained approach. If you approach this writing with academic purpose in mind, here ends your interest. To the broader audience, I will now annex the paper with a piece of personal, and quite emotional writing. I hope the reader will give me this privilege, given the extensive muted discussion that has preceded. Therefore, let me for a minute remove myself from the garb of academia and humour my deeply held emotional sentiments. Let me thus round out my consideration with a polemic; not against those who agitate for a better world through problematic means, against those who have in mind the perpetuation of that wretched state of war. In a word; let me address the warmongers.
You are truly the most wretched, repulsive expression of human society which, in its death throes, attempts to drag its comrades into an abyss from which no soul returns.
They stand, not on the shoulders of giants but on the viscera of the common man. Thus it is no surprise that their bloodlust is without satisfaction. For, the ego of a violent man desires him to rise above all others and, given these men are of the lowest, most vicious nature, they truly do need the ladder of a thousand corpses before they even spy the stature of the humblest servant.
You are not leaders, but rather tyrants, who seek to impose your will on others through violence and oppression. Your egotistical fanaticism for power has blinded you to the humanity of others, reducing you to the most comical expressions of bloodthirsty savagery. The lives of fellow men thus express themselves, not in the eternal dignity of all persons but in the mere incidentality of this or that poor soul who, in caring for the interests of his countrymen, places his or herself in the beartrap of your machinations. These common folk, perhaps righteous in intent, you thus mock: Dragging the angel into eternity, defiling the sacred, and raping the virtue of justice. In short, you are an abomination, turning the glory of the misguided into the chauvinism of the wicked. You take good men, make fools of them, and send forth a blind horde unto a just world, reducing the universal to the particular, and the bountiful to the barren.
Thus coated in the blood of innocents, these reprobates hide with ease in the sanguine hell into which they would devolve the world. With each marching pace, another son has fallen, another daughter defiled, another father despaired, another mother widowed. In this desperate hellscape, they smile. Looking around, at once they find their blood moon eyes mirrored by the blood-stained ground upon which they stand, upon which they declare victory. Victory not over this or that enemy, nor even over enemies taken universally, but victory over universality. To such creatures, justice is an affront to honour, ease an affront to industry, and tranquillity an affront to stability. Thus they hold in their heart a creed, their sole creed, a perfect double-think expounded by George Orwell: “War Is Peace, Freedom Is Slavery, and Ignorance Is Strength” (2008).
In this miserable endeavour, these monsters stride over each dead son with the lightest exasperation, anxious not to mark their decorated boots with the gore of this or that victim. Taking great care to polish their medals with the tears of dying men. What’s more, if they’re feeling particularly generous, they’ll engage in an extraordinary exchange! Mothers will give them their sons, and they’ll return a medal and a flag…
You are vicious through and through, only the slightest conception of which can even be comprehended by a good man. You have brought nothing but misery and suffering to the world, and you deserve no mercy. You have no place in civilised society, and the only way to ensure that peace and prosperity can flourish is to eliminate your kind entirely.
Thus to you there is no remedy, no treatment that can be applied, no consideration outside the radical elimination of your class; that is, of warmongers, through any means necessary. If required, this is not to exempt the dissolution of your person, the destruction of your system of thought, and the erasure of your memory. Resist and I will take great pleasure in knowing that your last moment on this blessed earth will be marked by the alluring scent of gunpowder, the soft ping of an ejected cartridge, and the staccato cut-off of any protestations. You have taken the path of death, and of it you will find no bounty but destruction. For, as has long been so rightly declared: ‘To live by the sword is to die by the sword’. Therefore, who are we, the meek and the wretched, those you crush under heel, to deny you your own desire, that is, to exit this life in the same manner that you prescribe under others: With a boot heel on your head and a bullet engraved with your destiny…
Reference List
1949, Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection Of Civilian Persons In Time Of War Of 12 August 1949, Viewed 14 March 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf>
1977, 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Viewed 14 March 2022, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/additional-protocols-geneva-conventions-1949-ratification-kit>
Kant, I 2016, Perpetual Peace, Viewed 14 March 2022, <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50922/50922-h/50922-h.htm>
Orwell, G 2008, Nineteen Eighty-Four, Viewed 14 March 2022, <http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks01/0100021.txt>
Wilde, R 2020, ‘How the Treaty of Versailles Contributed to Hitler's Rise’, Viewed 14 March 2022, <https://www.thoughtco.com/treaty-of-versailles-hitlers-rise-power-1221351>
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