Experience and the Absurd
Experience and the Absurd: The Ecstasy of Experience and the Joy in Everything, My Challenge to Nihilism.
The Joyful Existence is held somewhere between the bear trap of life and the bullet of death. It is our constant struggle to hold ourselves between the two:
Jump up into experience too fast and be impaled on the teeth of doom.
Submit to life and you will have survived but never lived.
Thesis
Within this life there appears two sets of experiences, those which produce pain and those which produce pleasure in some form and some measure. The culmination of the two is roughly described as catharsis and the absence of the two as ataraxia. It is from these two experiences and the combinations or lack thereof from which all experiences and their emotional value, alongside the value of their derivatives arise. Philosophers have long argued between the extremes of these feelings, with the Naive-Hedonist falling into vice and permanent pleasurable decay and the Emotional-Stoic rejecting all pleasure and hardening themselves against a painful but unaffectable existence. Between these polar radicals lie countless positions concerned with the appropriate mix of pain and pleasure or lack thereof.
I believe that life is a subjective experience and any attempt to demonstrate some objective metaphysical or sentimental reality is ultimately futile. In this regard the mix of sentimental values must likewise be subjective. By this I mean that it is not up to some ivory-tower philosopher, pseudo-scientist, or scientist alike to determine which mix of suffering and enjoyment is the ‘correct’ mix which is then to be thrust upon the masses without regard for their conceptions of the roles and effects of such emotions. Note that while my lack of belief in regard to the objective value of life does technically colour some form of anti-objectivism (or minimally what we might call ontological non-cognitivism - a commitment to the lack of truth value pertaining to meaning), I would like to distance myself from the traditional pessimistic and often nihilistic depictions of that field.
Therefore, what I am proposing, in short, is that we ought to seek personal, subjective reflection on the desired mix of emotions, particularly one grounded in some ultimate universal. In achieving this, we will likewise experience some degree of meaning in our lives, not through a naive but a complex, rich, subjective form of what is technically Hedonism. In this way, subjective experience acts as an egotistical counter to the constant challenge of Existential Nihilism.
From the outset I will admit several weaknesses with this perspective:
It does not automatically generate meaning for those persons who will not seek it.
It does not produce particular actions or examples to aid people.
It is potentially open to contingent factors barring people’s search for meaning such as the potential impossibility to experience sufficient pleasure due to insufficient economic circumstances and so on.
All of these are valid criticisms of my view, however, I nonetheless maintain it as an important - if flawed - defence of meaning in existence.
Weak Arguments
Before considering my own arguments against Existential Nihilism, I will first consider a number of other proposed arguments; arguments which I consider to be weak, and will then articulate why I think they ultimately fail to defend meaning in existence.
Biological Prescriptivism
The first argument I will consider and reject is one based on biological prescriptivism. Simply stated, biological prescriptivism is the position that one ought to derive their moral behaviours based on biological drives / natural phenomena. In this vein, one ought not kill themselves as this is contrary to the natural drive of humans and all other life. However, this argument is a particularly weak one and falls at the outset to two immediately apparent fallacies: The Is / Ought Dilemma and the Naturalistic Appeal.
Is / Ought Dilemma (Hume’s Guillotine)
Biological prescriptivism, as a moral and ontological stance - all theories of meaning are ontological and somewhat moral in nature - seeks to derive what ought to be the case from what is the case in the world, particularly through the lens of biological drives and phenomena. However, in this it faces immediate philosophical rebuttals, chief amongst these being that of Hume's Guillotine, also known as the is-ought problem or is / ought dilemma. Hume's Guillotine, attributed to 18th-century philosopher, exposes the logical gap that exists when attempting to deduce normative claims (i.e., what ought to be the case) from descriptive premises (i.e., what is the case). The dilemma is perhaps first stated in Hume’s cornerstone work: A Treatise of Human Nature (2003). In that text, he writes:
“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning [ie. in a descriptive manner], and establishes the being of a God or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not [ie. a prescription].” (Ibid)
This insight cautions us, indeed urges us, against the temptation to assume, without proper prior reasoning, that ethical imperatives can somehow be almost magically derived from empirical observations of the natural world. That is to say, that we can conjure philosophical claims which have no attachment to the natural world, that is, normative judgements, from observations which do have attachment to the natural world (descriptive observations). Or, once more, that we can somehow construct a bridge, a metaphorical bifröst, upon which we may ride from the land of science to the land of metaphysics or ontology. Such a journey is absurd, not in the least because the latter space is not confirmed to exist, and thus we journey as if a blind cartographer, to a place we know not, on a path we know not, on a vessel we know not. Further, given that the principles of science, that is, of natural reason, are not only derived from but grounded, both literally and metaphorically, in the land of nature, who are we to presume that such principles can be transplanted to the realm of speculative reason? This philosophical critique poses a significant, I would even say fatal, challenge to biological prescriptivism, which endeavours to do precisely that, derive ontological conclusions from the biological and natural facts of the world.
To better understand the implications of this critique, let us consider a few examples. Proponents of biological prescriptivism might argue that, because humans are biologically programmed to reproduce, we ought to prioritise procreation as a source of meaning in our lives. Alternatively, they might contend that, since our survival instincts drive us to avoid danger, we should derive moral prescriptions from these instincts, such as the duty to protect ourselves and others. However, whilst it is true (descriptively observed) that humans possess innate biological drives, such as the need to reproduce or survive, it does not necessarily follow that these drives provide a proper basis for certain values (prescriptions). Indeed, some natural phenomena, such as aggression or selfishness, may even be morally problematic. By attempting to derive normative claims from descriptive premises, biological prescriptivism commits the same error Hume identified in other moral systems: it leaps from statements about what is the case to statements about what ought to be the case without providing a sound justification for this transition.
Moreover, there are problems as to the extent that biological prescriptivism can account for the complexities of moral issues. For example, our biological urgings do not appear to provide a coherent moral framework in cases where there are competing claims to the objects of these urges, ie. when resources are scarce or when conflict arises between humans.
To put it shortly, the biological prescriptivist, who seeks to derive ontological principles from biological drives, is at once fundamentally undermined by Hume's Guillotine: By attempting to deduce what ought to be the case from what is the case, the argument falls into the ensnaring is-ought problem. This dilemma, in turn, highlights the inadequacy of biological prescriptivism as a comprehensive and logically sound basis for morality and meaning, casting the view in a precarious if not a dead light.
Naturalistic Fallacy
Moving to the second, equally deadly spike: We observe that biological prescriptivism, insofar as it derives (or attempts to derive) guidance from natural phenomena, is susceptible to another philosophical death knell: The Appeal to Nature fallacy. This fallacy occurs when one asserts that something is good, moral, or valuable simply because it is natural or conforms to the processes observed in nature. This fallacy, indeed any fallacy, directly and internally (and thus unavoidably) undermines the validity (though not necessarily the veracity) of any philosophical position.
First, it is crucial to understand the structure of the appeal to nature fallacy. This fallacy takes one of two forms: In the positive version, the fallacious argument posits that a phenomenon is good or morally permissible because it occurs naturally or because it is consistent with biological processes. In the negative version, the fallacy claims that something is bad or morally impermissible because it is unnatural or inconsistent with biological processes. Biological prescriptivism, by grounding its ethical and ontological claims in the general realm of nature, commits both forms of this fallacy (though the positive side is more commonly explicitly espoused).
As an example of this fallacy in this framework, a biological prescriptivist might argue that because certain behaviours, such as cooperation or altruism, have evolved through natural selection, they ought to be considered morally praiseworthy and thus a source of meaning in our lives. However, this logic conflating the naturalness of a phenomenon with its moral or ontological worth (ie. it commits an appeal to nature fallacy). It is simply the case that the fact that something occurs naturally does not imply that it is intrinsically good, valuable, or purposeful. Nature is replete with examples of phenomena that, while natural, are morally neutral or even morally problematic, such as predation, disease, or natural disasters. By grounding claims in natural phenomena, the proponents ultimately overlooks the complex and often morally ambiguous nature of the world.
Furthermore, the appeal to nature fallacy undermines biological prescriptivism's ability to provide a comprehensive account of moral and ontological issues. By focusing on the natural or aspects of phenomena, the perspective risks neglecting other crucial dimensions of moral and ontological inquiry, such as social, cultural, historical, or psychological factors. For example, while reproduction may be a natural biological drive, human societies and individuals experience and interpret this drive in diverse and complex ways, which may impact their moral and ontological commitments.
Moreover, if one is to be consistent, the proponent may inadvertently endorse morally problematic behaviours or values. For instance, in nature, we observe behaviours such as aggression, selfishness, or competition, which have evolved through processes like natural selection. However, to assert that these behaviours are morally praiseworthy simply because they are natural is morally dubious at best. Such examples, of which there are many more, act as perfect lightning rods in exposing the ethical limitations of this account.
In conclusion, the appeal to nature fallacy poses another deadly challenge to biological prescriptivism. That is to say that, by conflating the naturalness of a phenomenon with its normative worth, biological prescriptivism commits a logical fallacy that undermines its validity as a reliable foundation for moral and ontological principles.
Species / Societal Preservation
A second argument surrounding a defence of life’s meaning is that of societal preservation. By this I am referring to arguments which fundamentally rely on the presupposition that one has a moral duty to preserve society or the human species. From this argument I have two counters:
An Egoistic Rejection of Societal Duty (Individuality)
Problematising the Preservation of Society
An Egoistic Rejection of Societal Duty (Individuality)
The position of societal duty, which posits that individuals have a moral obligation to preserve society or the human species more broadly, has been a topic of considerable philosophical debate. Central to this position is the belief that individuals ought to sublimate their own will to the will of the collective, prioritising the interests of society or the species over their personal interests. I reject this position and rather assert that we should accept an egoistic rejection of societal duty and a staunch defence of individuality as a cornerstone of modern liberalism.
To begin, one of the primary criticisms of the aforementioned position I find is its potential to undermine the value of individuality and personal autonomy, which are both foundational principles of modern liberalism, modernity, and perhaps even morality. The notion that individuals have an intrinsic duty to society assumes that the collective's interests are inherently more valuable than the interests of individuals, potentially leading to a suppression of personal freedoms and individual pursuits. This assumption, however, is not only philosophically problematic but also incompatible with the values of modern liberalism: A core tenet of modern liberalism is that individuals are the best judges of their own interests and that they should have the freedom to pursue their personal goals, provided they do not infringe upon the rights of others. This belief is grounded in the conviction that personal autonomy and individuality are essential components of a flourishing human life. By positing an intrinsic duty to society, the societal duty position risks overshadowing these values, prioritising the collective's well-being at the expense of the individual's freedom to pursue their unique path.
The argument that the collective's interests are inherently more valuable than those of individuals, as mentioned, risks suppressing personal freedoms and individual pursuits. This suppression can manifest in various ways and can negatively affect the development of a flourishing society. Therefore let us expand on this critique a little before we continue:
First, the prioritisation of collective interests over individual pursuits may lead to the stifling of creativity, innovation, and personal growth. In a society that values the collective above all else, there may be less room for individuals to explore unconventional ideas, take risks, or challenge established norms. This suppression of individuality can hinder progress in various fields, such as science, technology, arts, and culture. As history has shown time and again, many of the most groundbreaking discoveries and artistic achievements have stemmed from individuals who defied societal expectations and pursued their unique interests and passions.
Second, the suppression of personal autonomy that may result from the societal duty position can have psychological consequences for individuals. A sense of autonomy and self-determination is crucial for psychological well-being, as it contributes to feelings of competence, control, and self-efficacy. By undermining personal autonomy, the societal duty position may negatively affect individuals' mental health and overall well-being, leading to disempowerment, resentment, and disillusionment.
Third, the assertion that collective interests are inherently more valuable than individual interests can exacerbate social divisions and tensions. In a society that places the collective above the individual, minority groups or individuals with dissenting views may be marginalised, silenced, or coerced into conforming to the dominant norms. This marginalisation can result in the suppression of diverse perspectives and hinder the development of a pluralistic, tolerant, and inclusive society.
To briefly touch on the alternative; modern liberalism, which emphasises individual rights, personal autonomy, and self-determination, recognizes and values the unique contributions of individuals. By empowering individuals to pursue their passions, interests, and convictions, modern liberalism fosters creativity, innovation, and personal growth, which, in turn, can contribute to societal progress and well-being. Furthermore, our modern philosophies acknowledge that the interests of the individual and the collective are not always mutually exclusive. By promoting individual rights and personal autonomy, it is often the case that we can facilitate the development of a society in which diverse perspectives are respected, and individuals are encouraged to engage in constructive dialogue and cooperation. This inclusive approach can contribute to the resolution of social tensions, the promotion of tolerance and understanding, and the cultivation of a just and flourishing society. To put it succinctly, with regard to the dialectic between the individual and the collective, the position of societal duty, which assumes the collective's interests as inherently more valuable than those of individuals, risks undermining the value of individuality and personal autonomy. By prioritising collective interests, the societal duty position may lead to the suppression of personal freedoms, stifling creativity, innovation, and personal growth, negatively affecting psychological well-being, and exacerbating social divisions. In contrast, modern liberalism offers an alternative framework that recognizes the importance of individual rights, personal autonomy, and self-determination, fostering a more inclusive, diverse, and flourishing society.
To return now to my further critique and posit the philosophical alternative: An egoistic rejection of societal duty, opposing the collectivists, argues that individuals have no inherent obligation to sacrifice their personal interests for the greater good of society or the human species. Egoism, as a moral philosophy, posits that individuals should primarily act in their self-interest, asserting that self-interest is the ultimate source of moral value. In this regard, egoism is tightly aligned with the values of modernity, offering a more robust defence of individuality and the right to self-determination.
Now arguing by the negative, we see that collectivist positions often have insidious consequences, particularly in that, as prior mentioned, they have the potential to justify coercive or oppressive actions in the name of the collective good. Throughout history, political regimes and ideologies have exploited the notion of societal duty to suppress dissent, limit individual freedoms, and control populations. By framing individual sacrifice and subjugation as a moral imperative, these regimes have wielded the concept of societal duty as a tool to manipulate and oppress their citizens.
A separate negative critique may be raised here: That is, the societal duty position can be criticised for its vagueness and the difficulty of determining what precisely constitutes the best interests of society or the human species. Different societies and cultures hold diverse and often conflicting values, and what may be considered beneficial for one group may be detrimental to another. As a result, the societal duty position risks oversimplifying complex moral and ethical dilemmas and may inadvertently promote cultural hegemony, by assuming that a single, universally applicable standard of what is best for society or the species can be discerned. By a point of contrast, individuality and egoistic rejections acknowledge the rich diversity of human experiences and values, emphasising the importance of individual choice and self-determination in navigating the complexities of the moral landscape. By rejecting the notion of an intrinsic duty to the other, individuals are empowered to make decisions that align with their personal values and ethical convictions, contributing to a more pluralistic and inclusive understanding of morality.
Problematising the Preservation of Society
Although I have by now already raised some negative critiques, I feel they deserve further expansion. Therefore, let me discuss in greater detail the problems associated with social intrinsicism. That is to say that asserting that society ought to be preserved regardless of the consequences risks endorsing actions and policies that, while promoting societal preservation, may have detrimental effects on individuals and communities.
Of immediate concern with the position is its potential to justify morally questionable reactions in the name of conservative action. That is, in endorsing the primacy of societal preservation, one inadvertently, or perhaps explicitly, condones or even encourages policies and actions that lead to negative consequences for individuals, minority groups, or the environment. For instance, consider a society that prioritises economic growth and development above all else, believing that this will lead to the preservation and flourishing of the community. In pursuit of these goals, the society may exploit natural resources, pollute the environment, or displace vulnerable populations, causing significant harm and suffering to individuals and ecosystems. On what grounds could a position of societal preservation object to such actions, particularly if such actions don’t incidentally undermine the hypothetical society’s cohesion?
Another example can be found in the numerous historical instances where the collectivist attitudes have been invoked to rationalise, potentially accurately, oppressive regimes or policies. Totalitarian governments have often argued that strict control over their populations and the suppression of dissent are necessary measures to ensure societal stability and preservation. In these situations, the societal duty position may be employed to justify human rights abuses, surveillance, censorship, and other actions that infringe upon individual freedoms and liberties.
Additionally, in a more analytical vein, this view should be critiqued for its potential to create a false dichotomy between individual interests and the interests of society or the human species. By framing these interests as inherently opposed, the societal duty position may perpetuate the belief that individuals must constantly choose between their personal well-being and the well-being of society, leading to an ongoing tension between individual freedom and collective responsibility. This dichotomy, however, is not universally applicable as there are numerous instances where individual and societal interests can be aligned or even mutually reinforcing. Further, even where the dichotomy is somewhat applicable, it is rather a dialectic than a dichotomy, that is, a tension requiring synthesis between the self and the other. Consider, for example, public health measures, such as vaccination programs, which both protect individual health and contribute to the well-being of society as a whole. By insisting on the primacy of societal preservation, the societal duty position may obscure the potential for collaborative and synergistic (ie. synthesising) approaches to individual and collective well-being.
Putting it succinctly, the position of societal duty, which posits that individuals have a moral obligation to preserve society or the human species, ought to be critiqued on its potential to lead to problematic outcomes. By emphasising societal preservation irrespective of the consequences, this position risks endorsing morally questionable actions, perpetuating a false dichotomy between individual and societal interests, and obscuring opportunities for collaborative approaches to well-being. In examining the problematic aspects of the societal duty position, it becomes evident that a more nuanced and balanced perspective, which acknowledges the interdependence and potential alignment of individual and societal interests, is necessary for ethical decision-making and the promotion of a just and flourishing society.
Life for Life’s sake
A third argument against anti-nihilism surrounds those relying on an axiomatic or otherwise fundamental valuing of life in and of itself, these arguments I will group as the Life for Life’s Sake arguments. This argument is particularly common and intuitively makes sense: It seems we don’t want to die and value our life to the greatest extent. However, I will present a case against even this position.
Life For Life’s Sake
The first pin set up for combat is the position in its most straightforward, naked form. This retort asserts that life possesses some inherent (that is, unremovable or categorical) value and is typically assumed as a foundational principle in combating nihilism. Nonetheless, this principle is not without its flaws.
To begin, the argument opens itself to charges of circularity in its reasoning. That is, by asserting that life has value in the fact that it is life, the argument appears to beg the question. To better draw out this flaw, consider the argument in syllogistic form:
P1. That with inherent value cannot be violated
To be inviolable is to have inherent value
P2. Life is inviolable
C. Life has inherent value
We see that P2 is equivalent to C when P2 is expanded based on the implicit premise of P1 and thus the argument puts it’s conclusion in its premise, ie. it begs the question. A simpler way of arriving at the same view of the argument is to simplify it, potentially to the point of uncharitability (which is why I just expanded it), to the statement: “Life has value because it is life”. Here we see that the statement is not a premise but rather assertion, taking its object as its presupposition. In this way, the position holds no philosophical weight. A more robust argument would need to offer a clear empirical or logical (that is, incidental or necessary) rationale for why life has inherent worth, instead of relying on such fallacies.
Secondly, it should be apparent that any such argument relies heavily on an intuition pump, appealing to the natural value we (typically) place on our own lives. Firstly, as was discussed in the biological prescriptivist section, this represents a fallacious appeal to nature. More particularly however, it should be objected that intuition alone doesn’t represent an adequate basis for any robust philosophical position. Intuitions can be, and often are, misleading; guiding us away from reality and into the path of illusion. In a similar vein, intuitions, inasmuch as they are merely the body’s pattern recognition capacities in practice, necessarily vary significantly between individuals and cultures, insofar as these subjects have varying experiences [patterns]. This, in itself, makes it difficult to establish a universal standard for valuing life based solely on intuition. Thereby, by basing the argument on an appeal to intuition (which is in itself fallacious), the Life for Life’s Sake proponent exposes themselves both to the logical traps of fallacy and to the typical challenges regarding the subjectivity and potential variability of its core premise.
Thirdly, the argument appears, at least to me, to express a great deal of arbitrariness. That is to say, if life is inherently valuable simply because it is life, could one argue that any characteristic or quality could be deemed intrinsically valuable by the same logic? Most absurdly, why couldn’t I just as validly (using their logic) claim that death is inherently valuable? To provide further examples, one might claim that beauty, intelligence, or physical strength have inherent value simply because it exists. This line of reasoning, therefore, seems to devolve into a form of arbitrary value assignment, in which any quality or characteristic can be deemed valuable without justification. To avoid this pitfall, a stronger argument would need to establish clear criteria or principles for determining intrinsic value, rather than asserting the value of life as an arbitrary given.
Finally, the Life for Life's Sake argument encounters the problem of varying, and even contradictory, perspectives. As was prior touched on, individuals and cultures differ substantially in their beliefs regarding the value of life, both life as a biological process and life as an experience, with some placing a higher value on certain aspects of life or certain types of lives. For example, some individuals may prioritise the quality of life over its mere existence, while others may emphasise the sanctity of life at all costs. The existence of differing perspectives raises the question of whether it is possible or even desirable to impose a singular, unified standard for valuing life, as such a standard may inadvertently exclude or marginalise alternative viewpoints.
To put it succinctly then, this argument, in its most naked form, in attempting to combat nihilism, in fact lays on its own sword before the battle has even begun. By relying on circular reasoning, intuition, potential arbitrariness, and failing to account for the varying perspectives on the value of life, the argument exposes itself to criticism and weakens its philosophical validity.
A Misreading of Nietzsche's Ubermensch
On a slightly tangential point, I want to clarify the thought of that great philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, particularly against what I believe is a deep misunderstanding of his works. I believe there are, indeed I have encountered, proponents of this view who believe they have found in Nietzsche and his Ubermensch (1999), a great defender of their views. I believe this is in fact a misreading of his works or a fabrication, a reading into without any language to read.
To begin then, it is essential to provide a brief overview of the very concept of the Ubermensch. First, let me say I cannot fully expound this view here but I will try to do it justice nonetheless. For a better treatment of the concept, please see Beyond Good and Evil: Nietzsche's Response to the Death of God. The Ubermensch or Overman, for Nietszche, represents an idealised vision of humanity that has transcended its current moral and ontological limitations to achieve a higher state of being. The standard interpretation of this figure is as an individual who has embraced the creative, life-affirming aspects of existence while rejecting the nihilistic and life-denying influences that Nietzsche believed plagued modern society (particularly as expressed in religion and morality). One way I believe the proponent might mistakenly derive their argument from this concept is by conflating life-affirmation with life-necessitation. It is true that the Overman strongly affirms life as it is, with all its imperfections, chaos, and suffering, rather than seeking refuge in metaphysical fictions or moral absolutes. However, this life-affirmation does not imply an unconditional acceptance of life as the proponent asserts. Instead, it calls for a critical reevaluation of existing values and the creation of new values that align with the nature of existence.
To extend this flaw, the proponent likely fails to realise that Nietzsche's Ubermensch does not, and was not intended to, represent a universally applicable ideal for all individuals. Whilst they do embody a beautiful vision of true potential, Nietzsche did not propose the Ubermensch as a metaphorical one-size-fits-all solution to the challenges of existence. Rather, such a figure serves as an inspiration, that is, a call to action for individuals to find their own meaning in life (or non-life). By thus assuming that the Ubermensch does represent a universal ideal, one erroneously infers that it endorses the intrinsic value of life for all individuals, which is simply not the case.
Finally, the proponent likely forgets the role of suffering in Nietzsche's philosophy. On this, he believed that suffering was an integral part of existence in that it serves as the catalyst for personal growth and self-transformation. The Overman is not someone who seeks to eliminate suffering or who values life only when it is free of pain and hardship; rather, the Ubermensch embraces the full spectrum of human experience, including suffering, as an opportunity for self-overcoming. This is where we can see the faulty endorsement of that concept as focusing more on life in the abstract than the quality of a life lived in a particular manner.
Disappointing the Cosmos
A final weak argument I will consider is a more antiquated one: The idea of a cosmic responsibility to live - either to God or to another transcendent concept. I will consider both positive and negative conceptions of this argument, that meaning either a duty to survive or a duty not to kill yourself.
Ancient Greeks and a Positive Duty to Live
First, let us consider the duty to survive seen through the classical Ancient Greek frame. The Greeks, particularly those writing on the Heroic Age (ie. Homer in the Iliad (2010)), generally (though certainly not universally, the stoics being a notable exception, as in A Discussion of Suicide) believed that individuals had an obligation to live a life of excellence (virtue), striving for personal glory and honour. This belief is closely tied to their understanding of arete. Arete or practical excellence is a concept central to Aristotelian ethics, reflecting the presupposition that one should strive to actualise their highest possible level of moral and intellectual capacity in all aspects of one’s life. In expression, this is generally taken as entailed with eudaimonia or ‘flourishing’. According to Aristotle, and potentially Plato, the ultimate goal of human life is to achieve eudaimonia which, in turn, presupposes an attainment (or at least pursuit) of arete. Here it is important to note that excellence so conceived is a holistic concept, not limited to a specific domain of human activity. Rather, it can be, and was, applied to various aspects of life, including physical prowess, intellectual abilities, and artistic achievement. For instance, a warrior displaying arete would be courageous, skillful, and honourable, while a philosopher exhibiting arete would be wise, insightful, and just. These beliefs are the groundings upon which the Greek idea of a duty to live (insofar as arete and thus eudaimonia presuppose a living subject) rest.
To speak of examples that highlight this view, perhaps the exemplar is Homer’s Achilles. Achilles’ (and most heroes) primary motivation in the Iliad (2011) appears to be the achievement of immortal fame and glory (Kleos). This achievement, of course, requires that one remains alive, at least for a period prior to the attainment. Of course, one may be permitted to die in the pursuit of Glory, often this is the essence of Glory. Nonetheless, although death may become the cutting floor upon which the honourable are both created and dispatched, death is not in itself a virtue. Rather, the honourable death is a virtue. That is to say, it is actually the termination of an honourable life that represents arete, and not the termination in itself. In this regard, we clearly see a duty to preserve oneself, at least until one can achieve such excellence, such Kleos.
Whilst this obligation to life may seem noble and inspiring, it is not without its key flaws. One issue, what appears to be the perpetual issue with all such accounts, with this position is its reliance on norms and expectations (nomos) that are not contemporarily existent and thus not particularly relevant. The values and ideals of Ancient Greek society were deeply rooted in the specific historical and cultural context of the time, and as such, are not likely to be transferable to other societies or time periods (ie. our own, radical epoch). In this, the argument, even if it attaches itself to specific objects (Greek culture), attaches itself to transient references (Culture) and thus is exposed as parochial and temporally restricted. Moreover, the belief in itself, even in its home, must be criticised for encouraging a disproportionate emphasis on personal glory and honour at the expense of other moral considerations. Once more, our Achilles exemplifies this proximate blindness. In that case, the pursuit of fame and glory (for most of the text) is prioritised over altruistic and compassionate concerns (ie. the well-being of one’s comrades and the suffering of the innocent). This leads to a tunnel-vision in which personal achievement and recognition leads to disregards over the broader moral landscape of one’s life, a neglect of other ethical duties.
Two further, more succinct arguments here raise their heads. Firstly, the (heroic) Greek concept ought to be challenged in its reliance on the existence of transcendent concepts or entities (ie. the gods or a universal cosmic order or logos). The existence of such transcendent entities is not universally accepted or proven and, if attached to temporal consideration or intersubjectivity, slips its foundations in the modernist framework. In this, as in all instances, the reliance on metaphysical assumptions, on ontological axes, expose the argument itself to natural scepticism and doubt. Secondly the framework appears to promote or impose a rigid and deterministic understanding of human life and purpose: By asserting that individuals have a cosmic responsibility to live and pursue excellence, the argument commits itself to the discouragement of personal autonomy and self-making (Bildung). Individuals who do not conform to the prescribed ideals of excellence or virtue are thus marginalised or excluded, leading to the stifling growth and the exploration of alternative paths to fulfilment.
Christians and a Commandment Against Suicide
To move in a different strain, having considered an argument to live, let us now consider an argument not to die (or at least not to kill oneself). Such arguments are perfectly exemplified in the Christian (indeed all Abrahamic) Tradition(s) (see also ‘Theological Views’ in A Discussion of Suicide).
To begin, as with all points of critique, it is important to contextualize the opposition, in this case the Christian case against suicide. In that tradition, suicide is typically considered a grave or mortal sin (instantly confining one to Hell, particularly as there is no opportunity for repentance) as it represents a rejection of God’s gift of life and a further act of disobedience to his divine will. This belief is quite reasonably grounded in the theological sanctity of life; asserting that human life (and perhaps all life) is sacred (and thus inviolable) due to its creation by God in his image (thus conferring a divine status). Therefore, in taking one's life, an individual is not only violating their responsibility against oneself (the law of the flesh) but also committing a direct offence against God.
Perhaps the most succinct treatment of this belief can be found in the works of the great theologian St. Augustine. In his magnum opus, The City of God (2014), Augustine argues that suicide is a sin because it represents a violation of the divine commandment not to kill (Given as the 5th Commandment in the Catholic tradition), which he asserts naturally extends to oneself. As he writes:
“It is not without significance, that in no passage of the holy canonical books there can be found either divine precept or permission to take away our own life, whether for the sake of entering on the enjoyment of immortality, or of shunning, or ridding ourselves of anything whatever. Nay, the law, rightly interpreted, even prohibits suicide, where it says, “Thou shalt not kill”. This is proved specially by the omission of the words “thy neighbour”, which are inserted when false witness is forbidden: “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour”… how much greater reason have we to understand that a man may not kill himself, since in the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”, there is no limitation added nor any exception made in favour of any one, and least of all in favour of him on whom the command is laid!... The commandment is, “Thou shalt not kill man”; therefore neither another nor yourself, for he who kills himself still kills nothing else than man.”
(Ibid: Book 1, ¶20)
Despite the seemingly clear-cut and quite intuitive nature (there is that deadly word again) of the Christian position on suicide, there are nonetheless critiques that can be put up against it. First, as with the Heroic Greeks, the Christian position is based on certain theological assumptions that are not universally accepted. It is axiomatic and, of this status, can be swept aside like bent typeface. The sanctity of life is predicated on the existence of God and the belief in divine creation. For individuals who do not share these beliefs, the argument lacks all persuasive force. Moreover, the position represents the height of rigidity and dogmatism in philosophy, the very enemies and contradictors of that art. In asserting that suicide is inherently (that is, categorically) sinful, ie. a violation of some cosmic responsibility, the argument necessarily disregards the complex nature and effect of human suffering and despair. In certain cases, the prohibition against suicide may inadvertently contribute to additional suffering, as individuals who are experiencing extreme distress may feel trapped by their circumstances and unable to escape their pain. In such cases, would it not be more Christian to grant unto the meek their peace. That is, to look upon the sanctity of creation with the eyes of mercy, not the chains of despotism? This line of thought flows into the third critique: This belief exposes a potential inconsistency amongst Christian ethics. For example, as has been alluded to, Christian doctrine regularly emphasises the importance of compassion and mercy; towards oneself and towards others. By categorically condemning suicide as sinful, does the proponent not, in the same breath, attack these core Christian values? Do they not deny the possibility of understanding or empathy towards those driven to such desperate ends?
Alas, to return to the academic lens, let us reinforce that this conception relies on an absolutist moral framework. Of course, the Christian might accept this heartily as a metaphorical feature not a bug. Nonetheless, I would express my concern that the argument leaves little room for nuanced or contextual considerations. Because of this, the stance may not accurately reflect the actuality of human experience or the diversity of factors that can contribute to suicidal ideation and behavior. In certain cases, the prohibition against suicide may fail to account for the unique circumstances and challenges faced by individuals, potentially leading to a judgmental and overly rigid ethical stance.
My Arguments
Having thus turned away from what I see as the weaker arguments for the pursuit of meaning, we are only halfway there. If we are to stop suddenly here, we will find ourselves without any foundation and, if we are to look down, we will at once find that we stand on nothing. Let us then not gaze too long into the abyss but rather step on nothing for a time and yet continue, walking across the cosmic steps of despair, in hope that we find some stable ground to stand upon. Let us introduce our valkyries, three heroes of hope in which we may not find but must cultivate a meaning for ourselves. These heroes are the contemplative subjectivity of the absurd, the naive intersubjectivity of experience, and cold objectivity of death.
We are not to stop until we reach bedrock, we are not to falter until we find, or more accurately make, a home, a hearth with a cornerstone not of shaky temporality but rigid universality. Let us look upon ourselves not as we have become but as we are. In this whimsical journey let us, in each case, first cast off the chains of academia and discuss this subject as subjects. Let us mythologise before we historicise. Having thus construed our saviours, we will, of course, end each figure’s narrative with a neat return to academic analysis. In this analysis, we will take recourse to metaphor as the concepts themselves, and certainly their content (aside from their externality), are high in ineffability and thus constantly rush to slip the tyranny of comprehension.
The Absurdity of Life
In the grand tapestry of existence, where stars give birth to unfathomable cosmic beauty and vast expanses of emptiness stretch beyond the reaches of our understanding, there lies a conundrum that whispers in the hearts of mankind - a question that has haunted our species since the first sparks of consciousness ignited from within our machina. It is the enigma of the absurd, a paradox that cradles our fragile lives in the palm of its hand, a riddle that weaves itself into the very fabric of our beings.
The doctrine of absurdism, a philosophy that dares to gaze into the abyss of life's inherent contradictions, finds itself nestled between the cold embrace of nihilism and the fervent grasp of existentialism. Like a lone ship adrift on a boundless sea, absurdism navigates the tumultuous waves of human experience, bearing the weight of our relentless search for meaning amidst the indifferent, chaotic cosmos that surrounds us. Uplifting the indomitable human spirit and its fury amongst the cold facticity of our senses.
In this tempest of absurdity, we are but mere travellers, wandering through a landscape of shadows and uncertainty, seeking solace in the flickering embers of meaning that elude our grasp. Our hearts, like beating drums, resonate with the echoes of a yearning that cannot be quenched - a desire for significance in a world that refuses to acknowledge our cries for comprehension. We are both the architects and the inhabitants of this cosmic theatre, staging our own plays of passion, tragedy, and triumph, all the while clinging to the hope that our stories may find some semblance of purpose. The absurd, a silent sentinel that watches over the human condition, stands at the intersection of our desperate longing for meaning and the indifferent reality that denies it. It is the haunting whisper that lingers in the stillness of our souls, a siren song that calls to us in the depths of our despair, urging us to confront the void that lies within our existence. In this dance, we are both the pursuers and the pursued, locked in an eternal chase with a phantom that forever eludes us.
As we traverse the labyrinth of life, the shadows of this contradiction cast their veil over our every endeavour, their tendrils reaching into the most intimate corners of our thoughts and desires. It is in the face of this vast, unyielding chasm that we are called to rebel—to rise up against the tyranny of the universe and reclaim our agency in a world that has turned its back on our plight. In this rebellion, we find solace and strength, defying the cosmic silence with our resounding cries of defiance.
In embracing the storm, staring at the void, we do not surrender to despair, but rather transform our beings into one’s of life-affirmation, a testament to our resilience and courage, a declaration that we will not be crushed beneath the weight of the cosmos indifference. We will forge our own meaning, craft our own stories, embrace the beauty of life in all its chaos and contradiction. For, it is in this dance with the absurd, this eternal waltz between the darkness and the light, that we find our true essence as human beings. It is in the delicate balance between despair and hope, between the cosmic silence and the resounding chorus of our own defiant voices, that we discover the poetry of our existence. We are the artists and the muses, the dreamers and the rebels, painting our own vibrant tapestries of meaning against the vast, empty canvas of the universe. And so, in the twilight of our fleeting lives, as we stand on the precipice of the great unknown, we find solace and strength in the knowledge that we have dared to defy a will without will. For in the end, it is in the embrace of this tension and our courageous act of rebellion that we find our truest expression of humanity, leaving an indelible mark upon the infinite tapestry of existence.
Absurdism and It’s Enabling of Meaning
Absurdism, as a philosophical stance, acknowledges the inherent tension between humanity's search for meaning and the universe's apparent indifference to our existence. The absurd is not in the human subjectivity nor in the universes objectivity but in the discrepancy. That is to say, the tension arises from the conflict between the human need to find significance and the inherent lack of any objective meaning in the world. Nonetheless, this seeming (though not actual) contradiction does not disbar the possibility of finding personal meaning; rather, perhaps counterintuitively, it enables us to embrace our subjective experiences and create a unique sense of purpose in our lives.
To begin, let us declaratively say that absurdism is not nihilism. Nihilism posits that life is devoid of intrinsic meaning or value. Such views may naturally lead one to pessimism and to despair. Contrawise, absurdism finds that despite the absence of objective meaning, individuals are not without some personal meaning, some universal but subjective purpose found in embracing the absurd and forging one’s own path. Without this clarification, which is crucial in understanding the potential for personal meaning within an absurdist framework, the conflation between the two concepts accounts for much of the misunderstanding of the latter concept.
To aid in our understanding, consider the metaphor of a painter working on a blank canvas:
The universe, in its indifference, provides the blank canvas - void of any inherent meaning or predetermined purpose. The painter, humanity, has the freedom and indeed the responsibility to create their own unique work of art upon this slate, imbuing it with their own being, their very soul. That the canvas starts blank does not diminish but rather raises the value of the artist's creation; it serves as an invitation for the artist to make their own choices and explore their individuality.
Whilst one can acknowledge the lack of any overarching, transcendent purpose, the power of subjective human experiences nonetheless guarantees us a universal power for meaning. By embracing the absurd, individuals are liberated from the constraints of an externally imposed purpose, allowing one to forge one's own path on a road which is frighteningly alien and yet charmingly personal.
To put this view in context; Albert Camus, one of the foremost thinkers of absurdism, famously argued that the recognition of the absurd does not lead to despair, but rather to a form of existential freedom. In his essay The Myth of Sisyphus (2005), Camus uses the Greek myth of Sisyphus as a metaphor for the human condition. Sisyphus, condemned by the gods to eternally push a boulder up a hill only to have it roll back down, embodies the absurd nature of existence. Nonetheless, Camus famously asserts that Sisyphus can find meaning even in the very act of acknowledging and embracing the absurdity of his situation. By accepting the futility of his task and choosing to continue despite it, Sisyphus transcends the absurd and imbues his life with a universal meaning.
Thus we see the role of individual choice and agency highlighted, and not diminished as before, in the creation of meaning. By recognizing the absurd and engaging with it, individuals are not defeated by the lack of objective meaning but are instead empowered to create their own subjective purposes. This process of self-determination is essential to the human experience and allows for a rich, meaningful life despite the absence of a universal, objective purpose.
To put all this, richly conceptual discussion into more readily digestible terms, let us say this in concluding: The dominant interpretation of the absurd does not disbar the possibility of personal meaning but rather enables it through the embrace of universal subjectivity. By acknowledging the inherent tension between humanity's search for meaning and the universe's indifference, individuals are liberated to forge their own paths and imbue their lives with personal significance. In this way, absurdism provides not only a philosophical framework for understanding the human condition but also a compelling invitation to embrace our individuality and forge our own paths, creating lives which are categorically meaningful in themselves even, and especially, in the face of a categorically indifferent universe.
The Ecstasy of Experience
The ecstasy of experience, that elusive understanding, calls us to unravel the mysteries of our minds, to delve into the depths of the human soul. It whispers to us, inviting us to embrace, and to be embraced by the sheer wonder of the world that surrounds us; to drink deeply from the wellspring of life and lose ourselves in the dance of reality. A cosmic symphony that resonates within the very fibres of our being, stirring us like a great chord resonated on our heart strings: Our insatiable longing to touch the divine, to taste the nectar of truth, and to bask in the radiant glow of infinite enlightenment.
Imagine, if you will, standing atop the highest mountain peak, gazing down upon the vast and sprawling creation laid out before you. The beauty of the world unfurls itself in a breathtaking panorama: Every tree, every river, every valley conspires to form a living, breathing masterpiece transcending the limits of language. As we stand here, enveloped in the silence of it all, our heart swells in gratitude, beating time with this grand orchestra; The very essence of our universe unveiled before gilded eyes.
A wellspring from which all inspiration, all passion, all creativity and wisdom flow. The font from which powers our indomitable spirit, that drives the poet to pen their verses and the artist to paint their canvas. The force that animates the scientist in their pursuit of knowledge, the philosopher in their quest for wisdom, the lover in their search for communion. It is the sacred fire that burns in the heart of every human being, igniting the flames of transcendence and illuminating the shadows beneath our existence. In the quiet, still moments of our lives, we catch glimpses of this ecstasy, as if through a veil, a camera obscura that separates the mundane from the superspectral. We feel it in the laughter of a child, in the embrace of a loved one, in the song of a bird, in the beauty of a sunset. It is in these fleeting, ephemeral yet essential moments that we are beset by the boundless potential dormant within us, ever-patient to be set free.
This experience is the cry that calls to us from the depths of our despair, urges us to relinquish our fears, cast aside the chains of convention and conformity, and soar on wings of imagination. It is the pure celebration of life as life: Life in all its myriad forms and expressions, an affirmation of the geist dwelling within us all. It is a journey into the heart of the human experience, an exploration of the vast and infinite landscape of consciousness that lies just beyond the horizon of understanding.
As we embark upon this voyage of discovery, we are called to embrace the universal with open hearts and open minds, to surrender ourselves to infinitude. For, it is only in the depths of our vulnerability and the embrace of our humanity that we can truly come to know the divine, to see the face of God etched upon the canvas of creation, and to hear the music of the spheres as it echoes through the vast and boundless expanse of time and space. Let us, then, throw open the doors of perception and step boldly into the unknown, unshackled by our conscious chains. Let us immerse ourselves in the ecstasy of experience, allowing its currents to carry us away on the tides of passion and wonder, to the farthest reaches of the cosmos and the deepest depths of the human soul. For in this intersubjective communion, we come to realise that we are not mere spectators in the drama of existence, but active participants in the unfolding of the grand cosmic narrative, intricately woven into the weave of life, destined to leave our own indelible mark upon the ever-evolving story of experience.
Cathartic Hedonism and Naive Curiosity
Cathartic Hedonism and Naive Curiosity, as two distinct yet complementary avenues for establishing meaning in life, offer us a compelling framework which engages the universal innocence of the self and the development of an intersubjective web. These concepts are perhaps wholly novel, I haven’t found them discussed in any literature. Therefore, as we proceed in our discussion, let us clearly define these precepts where they arise.
Cathartic hedonism is the proposition that the pursuit of pleasure is intrinsically linked to the development and release of pent-up emotions which, whilst in this instance facilitate, otherwise prohibit a profound sense of meaning in life. It brings to the forefront the subconscious understanding of the importance of embracing our desires and indulging in pleasurable experiences, not for the positive gratification alone, but as a means of fostering personal growth and transformation. The specifier cathartic, meaning relating to catharsis, that is, the release of emotions as the destruction of psychological neglect, thus emphasises the role of negative experience which must precede and indeed precipitate the emotional release which, in turns, furthers the authentic and integrated self.
Imagine, for instance, the metaphor of a garden:
Our emotions, desires, and experiences can be likened to the various plants, flowers, and trees that populate the garden. In order to cultivate a flourishing and vibrant landscape, we must attend to the needs of these living entities, nurturing them with sunlight, water, and fertile soil. Yet, if these plants never encounter a biological stressor they will be abolished by the slightest winter chill or the calmest spring strong. In this way, by engaging with our emotions and desires in a healthy and constructive manner, we allow the garden of our inner life to blossom, yielding a rich and bio-diverse array of meaningful experiences.
To now consider its complement; naive curiosity, we see the emphasis on the importance of embracing an innocent and childlike sense of wonder in our quest for meaning. That is simply to say that, by cultivating a genuine and open-minded interest in the world around us, we can form a deeper connection to ourselves, others, and the universe as a whole. The essence of this concept is rooted in the recognition that the world is an intricate and endlessly fascinating interconnected noumena, that our capacity for curiosity holds the key to unlocking the intersubjective mysteries of existence.
To illustrate this idea, consider the metaphor of a vast ocean, stretching out before us as far as the eye can see:
The ocean represents the boundless expanse of knowledge, experience, and insight that is available to us if we are willing to venture beyond the confines of our own limited perspectives, that is, to venture beyond sight of the coastline. By diving into the depths of this ocean with a spirit of authentic naivety, that is, naivety provoked by a desire to cultivate ourselves rather than that prompted by a simple fascination with ignoration, we can discover treasures hidden in zone’s of twilight and chart territories hence unbelieved, enriching our understanding of the world and ourselves in the process.
The convergence of cathartic hedonism and naive curiosity, as twin interdependent pillars of meaning, shadow concepts reflecting the afterthought of each other, results in the creation of an intersubjective web that connects individuals through shared experiences and mutual understanding. This web is woven through the ongoing exchange of emotions, desires, and insights, as individuals embark on their respective journeys of self-discovery and personal growth. In this way, the innocence of the self (naive curiosity) serves as a catalyst for the formation of deep and meaningful connections with others, precipitated by deep emotional experience (cathartic hedonism), equally required for and equally reinforcing the notion that our search for meaning is an inherently communal endeavour.
Thus we see that, in the dual approach of these conceptual siblings, we find a wholly human, completely intersubjective framework of meaning. Meaning not in life but rather through life. By embracing our desires and emotions, and cultivating a genuine curiosity about the world around us, we can foster personal growth, forge meaningful connections, and expand our horizons in pursuit of a more profound and integrated understanding of ourselves and the universe. Ultimately, it is through the synthesis of these complementary perspectives that we can arrive at a holistic and comprehensive appreciation of what it is to be human, what it is to have purpose, and what possibilities await us on our journey to these ends.
The Unknownable Death
In the twilight of our existence, where the shadows dance and flicker on the edges of our perception, there lies a threshold beyond which no mortal has ever ventured, from which no mortal returns. This mysterious realm is the domain of ever enigmatic Death, eternal and ineffable. A force which waits, patient and inscrutable, for each and every living being to take in turn their last portioned breath and receive its cold embrace.
In the depth of our mind, we hide our grasp that Death is inescapable: Just as the sun which rises in our east must fall again in the west, so too does death represent the only successionary constant to which we are all bound. Yet, this deep ocean of oblivion, in spite of its omnipresent spectre, finds itself the greatest uncharted expanse at the dead body of our living experience. That which lies beyond this unbreakable veil of mortality fills us with admixture of fear and fascination, curiosity and dread. We stand always on the shore of an ocean that stretches out to infinity, its dark depths never to be plumbed.
Death itself is a paradox to the human subject, a place that exists at the limit of every human life, and yet remains forever beyond our reach. The ultimate enigma, a riddle wrapped in a mystery, concealed within the mind of the great cosmic will. We long to pierce the veil and gaze upon its secrets, to fathom its concepts, to unlock its hidden truths. Yet… we are powerless to do so, for its realm is absolute and eternal.
In our quest to comprehend the incomprehensible, we turn to metaphor and allegory, weaving fables to capture the essence of this or that incomprehensible force. We breathe form into them; Death as a spectral figure, a mist, a shadow. We conceive of a skeletal apparition, grinning mockingly at our futile escapes, our temporary evasions. It waits, ever present, ever patient, the hood of all life at the end of the universe and the end of all time. For all our attempts to bring the unknowable unto the light, we fail… Death is, and must remain, outside the grasp of our richest minds. Breaking our reason, defying our logic, ravaging our rationality.
In the face of such phenomena, what are we to do? We are left with nothing but a surrender, a surrender to the unknown, an embrace of the uncertainty at the centre of us all. We must accept that Death, as a force, can be neither tamed nor controlled. Of this acceptance we must not fall to despair but rather rise to tranquillity: In this understanding, we realise that the beauty and the wonder of life are inextricably bound up in Death, interwoven like the warp and weft of the cosmic cloak. For, in the dance of life of which we all partake, of light and darkness, of creation and destruction, there is always a poetry that transcends understanding. It is an art that speaks to the deepest recesses of the human soul, that resonates with the heartbeat of the cosmos itself. In this dance, we find not only the key to our own existence but a glimpse of the eternal, a vision of the undying that lies hidden in the shadows of our mortal lives.
Let us then venture forth, into the blackened night, with hearts of wonder and eyes of stars, on our futile journey to explore all we might find and to know, at the end, there will always be one familiar figure waiting to welcome us. Let us remember that the eternal and the absolute are not to be found in the cold light of reason or the sterile halls of logic, but in the rich depth of metaphor and allegory, the poetry and the beauty that lie at the heart of the human experience. For it is in our capacity to dream, to imagine, and to create that we may glimpse the true nature of the eternal, and perhaps, in some small way, come to terms with the spectre of Death.
Death: The Final, Unknowable, Objective, and Universal Experience
Death, as an inexorable part of the human condition, perhaps the only universal component of that condition (certainly the only objective predicate), provides the theoretical potential, if not the actual possibility of a universal grounding of meaning. The knowledge that our time on Earth is finite, coupled with the realisation that the nature of the experience of death remains fundamentally inaccessible to the living, creates an existential tension that has the potential to shape our understanding of the world and our place within it. In this way we find a dialectic at the heart of life, it is the interplay between the absolute, objective nature of death and its unknowable qualities, their synthesis, upon which we may find a fertile, steady ground to look down upon and upon which to plant a garden of purpose.
To begin, let us consider the Thesis (that is, the first component) of this dialectic: The absolute and inescapable nature of death. This concept, in itself, has profound implications for our understanding of the human experience, implications which have been more and more frequently noted in the historical literature, not to mention as a cornerstone topic for the whole school of Phenomenology. As the prominent proponent of that philosophy, Martin Heidegger, argues in his work Being and Time (2010): The knowledge of our own mortality and the inevitability of death informs our experience of “being-towards-death” (Sein-zum-Tode in German), one of the universal, essential aspects of our existence as human beings. This awareness of our mortality provides a unique opportunity for reflection on our lives; indeed it is the presupposition upon which all experience of time and thus its subordinates like finitude arise which, in turn, inform and potentially grant meaning unto the choices we make (in light of this finality). As Heidegger writes, being-towards-death is not a method of orientation, or absolute lens, towards the ultimate termination of being, rather it is itself a mode of being (alongside Dasein (self-reflexive being) and Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein in German) (the embodiment of Dasein in particularities amongst the phenomenal world)).
However, the absolute nature of death is not the only aspect of its relationship to meaning. Therefore, with this conception of the absolute, universal nature of Death, let us turn to the antithesis of this dialectic. That is, Death as fundamentally mentally unknowable, ineffable (inexpressible), and, even stronger, fundamentally inexperienced and incomprehensible. This brute fact has similar significant implications for the human experience. As Thomas Nagel explains in his essay Death (1970), death is not the positive experience of non-existence, indeed it is not any kind of positive experience, and such a proposition is a clear contradiction. Rather death is, in its essence, the complete and utter annihilation of all positive experience and their possibility. It is the universal lack of all experience. Thus it is clear that we cannot grasp the subjective experience of death; for, there is no experience to grasp and, in any case, it is clearly a state beyond the bounds of all potential conscious awareness. This unknowable quality of death, while it may initially appear to be a source of existential despair, in fact serves as a catalyst for the rejection of death-obsession development in favour of life-affirmation. For, what could one investigate in the investigatable? What could one affirm in a concept which, characteristically, lacks all content? There is nothing. Contrawise, consider life, the concept in whose content we find all actual and even potential experience. If one is to affirm any concept at all, how can that affirmation, for a subject, not include a necessary presupposition and thus affirmation, at least by-proxy, of life? I would conjecture that they cannot.
Finally, no dialectic is at rest until we have reached the point of synthesis; therefore, consider what might be learned from the concept produced by the interplay between the absolute nature of death and its unknowable status. This synthesis, lying between the universal and the ineffable cannot, in any substantial form, be expressed analytically. Rather, it can only be grasped with the lightest touch through metaphor. Let us take up the metaphor of a journey:
As we set forth on the voyage of life, we are acutely aware that our ultimate destination is death. We know that our arrival at this endpoint is inevitable, yet the precise details of our journey and the experience of the destination itself remain shrouded in mystery and ambiguity. The fusion of the absolute and the unknowable imbues our journey with a profound sense of significance. The certainty of our eventual demise heightens the importance of every choice and action we take on this path, granting gravity unto each decision. Moreover, the enigmatic nature of the destination, of death itself, impels us to grapple with the unknown, to confront and explore the limits of our understanding. This constant negotiation with the unknowable pushes us to seek meaning, purpose, and connection in the face of the ultimate mystery. Through this synthesis, we begin to perceive the beauty and value of life as a fragile, ephemeral experience. The interplay of the universal and the ineffable in the concept of death awakens a deep appreciation for the preciousness of existence and the profound importance of our choices and actions in the time we have.
Ultimately, the metaphor of the journey teaches us that the dynamic tension between the absolute and unknowable aspects of death is not a source of despair, but rather an invitation to engage more deeply with the world and to embrace the challenge of crafting a life imbued with meaning, purpose, and authenticity.
This interplay in itself is but one source of meaning. However, it is not the only source of meaning properling belonging to the synthesis. Rather, the produced itself produces further avenues to universal meaning. Of these, the first avenue relying on this universality is the path of authenticity, itself belonging to the previously discussed schools of absurdism and existentialism. Authenticity, as understood by existentialist philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre and the aforementioned Camus, involves both the recognition of annihilation and the embrace of, in the face of this, the individual's freedom and responsibility in their life. That is to say that, by acknowledging absolute facticity, we are free to pursue a life that reflects our individual values, to become the true Overman, to embrace the passions and desires which constitute our temporal lives rather than being constrained by the external expectations or societal norms which constrict them.
Another product of this interplay is existential gratitude, that is, a subject’s appreciation of their subjectivity as expressed in the present moment. In recognizing that our time on Earth is limited and that the experience of death is beyond our comprehension, we are enabled to cherish the experiences we do have, rather than fixating on experiences we can’t have. Finally, on a more incidental route, the optional route, the absolute ineffable serves us, rather than us it, as a source of inspiration and motivation to engage in acts of creativity, altruism, and compassion. As we confront the reality of our own mortality and the uncertainty of what lies beyond, we may be inspired to leave a lasting impact on the world through our actions, in short to produce legacy, whether it be through the creation of art, the pursuit of knowledge, or the cultivation of meaningful relationships. In all these species, the awareness of death provides us with the greatest existential impetus for living a life of significance as a piece of development in the rich realm of existence we find ourselves in.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the exploration of various philosophical perspectives on the question of some purpose in life has led us to consider both the weaker and stronger arguments for finding meaning. The weaker arguments, encompassing biological prescriptivism, societal duty, life for life's sake, and cosmic responsibility, appear to be ultimately fallacious, unsubstantiated and/or unsatisfactory in their endeavours. However, the rejection of such arguments does not precipitate a (permanent) fall into despair and nihilism. Rather, through the examination of some stronger arguments; absurdism, experience, and death, it seems there are indeed compelling ways to cultivate meaning in life.
For the sake of reinforcement, consider these stronger positions in their succinct forms, that one may not forget their importance:
Absurdism, in acknowledging the apparent contradiction between our human desire for meaning and the seemingly indifferent universe, enables an empowering existential stance where we, as individuals, can create our own subjective meaning in the face of objective meaninglessness. By embracing the absurd and actively constructing personal meaning, we affirm our individuality, our freedom, and our capacity to shape our lives according to our values and desires.
The ecstasy of experience, encompassing both Cathartic Hedonism and Naive Curiosity, by focusing on the innocence of the self and the development of an intersubjective web, invites us to embrace life's pleasures, wonders, and challenges. By engaging in the world with a sense of awe and curiosity, and by cherishing the connections we form with others, we can create a rich tapestry of experiences that imbue our lives with a deep sense of meaning and fulfilment.
The consideration of the absolute and unknowable nature of death, and the dialectic they compose, precedes an appreciation of the significance of our choices and actions in the present moment. The synthesis of the absolute and unknowable aspects of death, as illustrated through the metaphor of a journey, inspires us to engage more deeply with the world, to confront the limits of our understanding, and to seek meaning, purpose, and connection in the face of the ultimate mystery.
Where the weaker accounts fall on fallacy or particularity, the strong accounts are resolute in experience and universality. These three heroes form a trinity of meaning which, either in whole or in part, can be taken up by the active existential agent, one who is defined by their personal agency, capacity for wonder, and deep-rooted interconnectedness with others. By embracing these perspectives, we can move beyond the limitations of nihilism and engage with a richer, more fulfilling, and more inspiring vision of what it means to live a meaningful life. The exploration of these philosophical positions provides valuable insights into the human condition, as well as a deepened understanding of the complex interplay between our individual experiences and the broader context of existence.
Reference List
Hume, D 2003, A Treatise of Human Nature, Project Gutenberg, viewed 21 March 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4705/pg4705-images.html>
Nietzsche, F 1999, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Project Gutenberg, viewed 21 March 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1998/1998-h/1998-h.htm>
Homer, 2011, Iliad, trans. R Lattimore, University of Chicago Press, London
Augustine, 2014, The City of God, Volume I, Project Gutenberg, viewed 21 March 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45304/45304-h/45304-h.htm>
Camus, A 2005, The Myth of Sisyphus, Penguin Books Great Ideas, London
Heidegger, M 2010, Being and Time, University of New York Press, Albany
Nagel, T 1970, Death, viewed 21 March 2023, <https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil150/Nagel.pdf>
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