Unique Emotions: Conceptions of The Real and the Ideal

Emotion

Emotions are subjective, self-contained phenomenal experiences. In greater depth, emotions are subjective, evaluative mindstates, which operate on a subject independent of the sensations, thoughts, or images evoking them. The study of subjective experiences is known as phenomenology and is a relatively modern field in the philosophy of being. These subjective experiences are often considered a part of embodied consciousness.

Finally, it is important to clarify that the term emotion is itself subject. Though most commonly referring to any level of subjectivity in perception or sensation, often relating to an individual's sense of well-being, emotions do have a broad semantic field, ranging from the individual and spiritual to the social and political. The term can also describe various psychological characteristics of experience or the entire inner life of an individual (e.g. mood). As self-contained phenomenal experiences influenced by sensations and perceptions, emotions can impact the character of subjective reality and may cause biases or distort veridical perception through projection or wishful thinking, among other effects.

The Humean Account: Passions as Mental Representations

The Philosophy of Emotion became a field of particular interest in the Romantic period and continued to be discussed through the enlightenment and post-enlightenment eras. Some of the most prominent philosophers of that time, in particular John Locke, David Hume and Adam Smith, dedicated entire treatises to the field. Here I am referring to Locke’s An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding (2004), Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (2006) (itself a revision of his text A Treatise of Human Nature (2003)) and Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (2022). These two works, amongst others, inform much of our modern conceptions of emotions, both in the philosophical and the psychological modes of understanding. For the purpose of this writing, I will consider Hume’s text in greater detail, not to demean the importance of the other authors in any regard but simply because the former deals more explicitly with my particular object of interest, that being, the relation between emotion and mental representation.

In his text, A Treatise of Human Nature (2003) David Hume lays out, in great detail, his account of emotions, which he calls ‘the passions’, and their relation to mental representations. Most specific to this writing is Book 2 of this work: ‘Of The Passions’. In that section of the text, he describes the cause of emotions or ‘passions’ in the following manner: “Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and considered by the mind; but [all] arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception” (2003, Bk. 2, Pt. 1, Sct. 1). Previously, he writes: “We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel [ie. to feel], to see; all this is nothing but to perceive.” (2003, Bk. 1, Pt. 2, Sct. 6)

In developing his account of emotions and their distinctions, Hume begins by discussing the distinction from Book 1 between impressions of sensation (original impressions) and impressions of reflection (secondary impressions) and focuses specifically on the latter. He categorises these reflective impressions, including passions and emotions, into two groups: the calm and the violent (nearly imperceptible emotions of beauty and deformity, and stronger turbulent passions) and direct and indirect (depending on the complexity of their causal story). He then focuses on pride and humility as examples of indirect passions and provides his account of the psychological mechanisms behind them.

Hume explains that passions cannot be described in words and identifies them by their characteristic causes and effects. The cause of a passion is what evokes it and can be divided into the subject and the quality of the subject that operates on the passions. The object of the passion is what the passion is directed at, and in the case of pride and humility, it is directed at oneself. Both the object and cause of these passions have roots in human nature, where the object is fixed by the basic constitution of human psychology (referred to as "original") and the cause is determined by more adaptable psychological mechanisms (referred to as "natural").

Hume's account is based on three mechanisms: association of ideas (the mind naturally moves from one idea to another related idea), association of impressions (the mind naturally moves from one passion to another resembling passion), and mutual assistance (when we feel a passion towards something, we tend to feel a resembling passion towards something else related to it). Applying these mechanisms to pride, Hume explains that the pleasant sensation of pride is evoked when something related to oneself produces its own pleasant sensation. Similarly, the unpleasant sensation of humility is evoked when something related to oneself produces its own unpleasant sensation.

Hume then lists five limitations to his account. The relation of ideas must be close, the cause must be evident to oneself and others, it must be long-lasting, general rules must have a strong influence, and judgements must be influenced by comparison.

In subsequent sections, Hume tests his account by examining the three causes of pride and humility: qualities of the mind, body, and external objects. He explains that his account holds up regardless of whether moral evaluation is based on innate moral psychology or self-interest and cultural training. He also explains that the beauty or deformity of something's structure is nothing more than its power to produce pleasure or pain in us. He then examines external objects related to us and explains that they do not cause pride or humility without a relation of contiguity or causation. Finally, he focuses on property and riches and explains how his account accommodates property (private use consistent with justice) but has more difficulty accommodating riches (the mere power of acquiring comforts). He explains that unexercised power can influence our passions through predictions of human behaviour or through our association of the power with qualities that produce pleasure or pain.

In conclusion, Hume's account of indirect passions such as pride and humility is based on three mechanisms (association of ideas, association of impressions, and mutual assistance) and is subject to five limitations (close relation of ideas, evident cause, long-lasting, influence of general rules, and influence of comparison). All the while Hume maintains that emotions are, and will always be, subjective experiences produced by reflections of the mind and compose of mental representations of some object of the senses, real or ideal (or idealisations of the ideal (second order ideals)).

The Real and The Ideal

Continuing in the Humean vein, it is important to consider the relation between mental representations (the ideal) and their object (when it’s in the world) (the real). According to Hume, beliefs are mental states that reflect our perceptions of the world. These perceptions are derived from our sense data, which serves as the foundation or reference for our beliefs. As a result, the direction of fit in this relationship is from belief (the ideal) to the world (the real), meaning that our beliefs are dependent on the information we receive from our senses.

Similarly, desires, according to Hume, are mental states that reflect our wants and wishes for the world to be a certain way. Desires are derived from our perceptions of the world and how we want it to appear, similar to beliefs. However, desires reflect a different aspect of our mental states as they capture our aspirations for how we want things to be, rather than our current understanding of how things are. This aspect will be very important for my consideration of the ideal components of the considered unique emotions.

The Ideal and its relation to Truth

According to Hume, beliefs have a truth-value, meaning they can be either true or false. He argues that a belief is considered true when it corresponds to reality and false when it does not. For example, if one holds the belief that the Earth is round, this belief can be tested and verified through investigation of the actual state of the Earth.

Contrastingly, desires do not have a truth-value as they do not purport to reflect the actual state of the world. Instead, desires give reference to a potential state of the world, reflecting the way we imagine things to be in our minds. As a result, desires cannot be true or false. For instance, if one has a desire for coffee, this desire cannot be falsified as it references a potential world in which the person has coffee, not the actual world in which they do not.

The Ideal as Mental Representations in its Primary and Secondary forms

Hume's philosophy distinguishes between two types of desires: primary and secondary. Primary desires are those that aim to actualize a potential state of the world that one wishes to bring about. These desires are direct and unmediated, reflecting a person's wants and aspirations.

Secondary desires, on the other hand, are desires whose objects are primary desires. For instance, if one has the primary desire for a cup of coffee, they may then develop the secondary desire to acquire milk to make the coffee. If it is later discovered that the supermarket does not sell milk, this secondary desire was in error but this does not affect the existence, veracity, or strength of the original desire. The secondary desires may be based on misinformation or a flawed plan, and as a result, they are subject to rational critique, even though the primary desire is not. To foreshadow what I will later discuss, this concept, that is, the reflection on mental reflections, plays a key role in certainly wholly ideal emotions like anxiety wherein the concept is produced by the relation between an ideal state (your envision of the anxiety agitator) and your reflection on that state (your desire to avoid engaging with the ideal state). For example; I may be anxious to give an upcoming public talk. In this I have a desire to avoid an ideal situation. In other words, I have a second order desire: to avoid a primary ideal, my conception of the public speaking (the first order desire), which has its object in the world, the upcoming public speaking event (the real).

Anxiety

Anxiety is an ideal emotion; as with disappointment, it is not materially connected to any reality which occurs before us or which we are to necessarily experience, ie. it is not connected to the real. No, anxiety is the pain of self-doubt which comes upon a humble mind when that ming makes a pessimistic and thus uncertain judgement of the future (their conception of the ideal).

Emotions are not simple, passive reactions to external events, but are instead the product of interactions between an event and our beliefs, expectations, and values. For example, the experience of fear arises when we encounter a perceived threat and believe that harm is likely. When the object of this fear is a construct of the ideal, the fear is termed anxiety, and the term fear becomes more akin to the term doubt of which anxiety is synonymous.

Here it is important to restate that emotional experiences are not determined by the objective reality of any event, but are instead shaped by our beliefs and judgments about that event. Two people could witness the same event and have very different emotional reactions, depending on their differing beliefs about what is happening and what is likely to happen next. When the event in question is occurring or has occurred, the event is real and thus the emotional response has a real object. However, when, as with anxiety, the event is forecasted or has not yet transpired, the emotional response cannot have any real object and can only be provoked by an interaction of the mind with the mental representations of the mind (the ideal) (the subject’s conception of a potential object).

In this regard, anxiety is not a direct response to any real threat, but is instead dependent on our beliefs and expectations about the cause of the uncertainty or vague threat. For example, if we believe that a certain situation is likely to result in harm, or if we have little experience or knowledge about a situation and therefore lack a clear expectation about what will happen next, we might experience feelings of anxiety. This implies that, unlike the real emotions (real in the sense that they have real objects, not real as to imply that others are fake or useless), anxiety (and other ideal emotions) may theoretically be remedied through the alteration of the ideal which, necessarily unlike the real, lies within the subjects mind. Whether in practice this ideal or the reflections of the mind are actually alterable is a subject perhaps better studied by psychology, and one I will not comment on. Suffice it to say that if one could hypothetically alter their mental dispositions, ie. to be more proud or less reflective, one could alter their emotional responses, ie. to remove the potential for anxiety.

To summarise, the experience of anxiety is not simply a reaction to objective reality, but is instead shaped by our beliefs and expectations about potential or ideal realities. Our emotions are a result of the interaction between the events of the world and our own judgments and beliefs about those events. In short, anxiety is the suffering brought about by our humility and our self-neglect.

Not Fear

Though it has already been referenced, it is worth once more reinforcing the difference between anxiety and fear more broadly. Fear and anxiety are both emotional responses to perceived threats or uncertainties. However, they are distinct emotions that are experienced differently and are shaped by different beliefs and expectations.

Fear is an intense and immediate emotional response to a specific and imminent threat. When we experience fear, we believe that harm is about to occur and that we need to take immediate action to protect ourselves. Fear is often accompanied by physical symptoms such as a racing heartbeat, sweating, and a heightened sense of alertness, as the body prepares for action. The experience of a particular fear will be shaped by our beliefs about the nature of the threat, the immediacy of the harm, and the likelihood of harm. The strength of our fear will depend on the strength of our beliefs in these three areas. For example, if we believe that a threat is imminent, that the harm is likely, and that the harm will be severe, our fear will be intense. On the other hand, if we believe that the threat is distant, that the harm is unlikely, or that the harm will be minor, our fear will be less intense.

Anxiety, on the other hand, is a more diffuse and persistent sense of unease that arises when we encounter a perceived threat or uncertainty and believe that harm is likely. Unlike fear, which is focused on a specific and imminent threat, anxiety is more diffuse and can arise from a variety of sources. For example, we might experience anxiety about an upcoming exam, a health scare, or a difficult conversation with a friend. In some regards, anxiety can be seen as a subset of fear. Particularly in that its particularities are also shaped by beliefs regarding the nature of the threat, the likelihood of harm, and the degree to which we feel that we are in control of the situation. The strength of our anxiety will depend on the strength of each of these beliefs. For example, if we believe that a threat is serious, that harm is likely, and that we have little control over the situation, our anxiety will be intense. On the other hand, if we believe that the threat is minor, that harm is unlikely, or that we have control over the situation, our anxiety will be less intense. Note that, in the case of fear, the third factor is the likelihood of harm. In the case of anxiety, the third factor is the degree of control. This is because, in cases of fear, it is presumed that a third party actor or object will impose the danger upon us (ie. we will have no control). Contrawise, almost essentially, in the case of anxiety, the ‘danger’ is self-imposed, or at least conceived of as self-imposed, and thus merits a consideration of the perceived control.

To summarise, although fear and anxiety are both emotional responses to perceived threats or uncertainties, they are distinct emotions that are experienced differently and are shaped by different beliefs and expectations. Fear is an intense and immediate emotional response to a specific and imminent threat, while anxiety is a more diffuse and persistent emotional response to a perceived threat or uncertainty.

Disappointment

Disappointment is a unique emotion. It is not the product of pain, or of suffering, or of anxiety more broadly. No, disappointment (as anxiety) is a sentiment which resides entirely in the mind.

Disappointment is a special feeling of resentment or anguish. It is a kind of anguish not brought about by psychological damage, Rather, it is anguish borne from a disjunction between two subjects, one real and one ideal. It is the anguish borne from the realisation that the real subject has not attained the ideal. Disappointment is the burning hatred of reality; brought about not when reality is painful, but when reality is unexpected; Thus it is the inverse of anxiety.

Anxiety arises when we encounter a perceived threat or uncertainty and believe that harm is likely. On the other hand, disappointment arises when our expectations about the outcome of an event are not met. This emotion is a result of the gap between what we expected to happen and what actually happened. It has no intrinsic reference to either what actually occurred or what we expect to occur, and exists only in the mediation between the two.

For example, if we expect a certain outcome, such as receiving a promotion at work, and that outcome does not occur, we might experience feelings of disappointment. The intensity of this emotion would depend on the strength of our original expectation and the degree to which it was not met. The stronger our original expectation, and the greater the gap between our expectation and the actual outcome, the stronger our disappointment would be. Nonetheless, the disappointment is not a product of missing the promotion. For, if we had not expected it, we would not lament it. Neither is the disappointment a product of our expectations. For, if we had received it, we would not languish. Therefore, it is only the product of a disjunction between expectation and reality. In other words, like anxiety, it is produced by a discrepancy between the real and the ideal.

Furthermore, the pain associated with disappointment cannot, as with fear, be present in the external world. For, the pain is purely mental in nature, holding the mind as its object and as its cause. Further, as no external being has pure access to another's mind or to the manipulation of that mind but through the permissions of that being, external actors can only influence disappointment indirectly (ie. by persuading us to expect this or that). Even then, we must accept their persuasions (we need not necessarily) and then still their predictions must in fact be wrong. Thus, even in this case, we have the autonomy to avoid disappointment. We may reject their persuasions, may recuse ourselves from their judgements, may externalise our expectations onto them, or may in fact end up pleasantly surprised if their predictions are correct. In this way, disappointment is not only of the mind, it is of one’s own mind. It is, in short, the suffering we inflict upon ourselves for being wrong in our judgements of the other.

Regret

Whenever we act, we naturally form expectations about the outcome of our actions. If the actual outcome is less favourable than what we expected, we may experience regret. Regret, in this sense, is an emotional reaction to a judgement that the outcome of an action was not as good as it could have been, given what was expected or desired.

In this regard, regret is a form of disappointment, however it is one typically focused on a disconnect between the real self (the real) and a hypothetical self (the Ideal) (ie. it is personal in nature, unlike disappointment which refers to any real-ideal disconnect). Another way to understand this is to say that regret is a unique emotion in that it is directed towards the self. Unlike other negative emotions, such as anger or hatred, which are directed towards external objects or persons, regret is an emotion that is focused inwardly. This means that when we regret something, we are not blaming others or external circumstances, but rather our own choices or actions, ie. the emotion is self-deprecating.

Furthermore, if we are to continue in the Humean tradition I have been utilitising, it is important here to discuss the relevant points of similarity in that philosophy. Hume believed that emotions serve as the guiding force behind human action, shaping our choices and motivating us to act in certain ways.

For Hume, the self-referential quality of regret is important because it allows us to reflect on and learn from our past experiences. By reflecting on our past actions and the outcomes of those actions, we can form judgments about what worked well and what did not, and use this information to guide our future behaviour. In this sense, regret can be seen as a valuable emotional experience that helps us improve and grow. It allows us to consider the potential consequences of our choices before we act, and to make better decisions in the future based on our past experiences.

In summary, regret is a complex emotion that is produced by the disconnect between a person's expectations and their experiences. This disconnect arises when the outcome of an event or decision falls short of what a person had hoped for or anticipated. As a result, the individual experiences feelings of disappointment and a sense of wishing that things had turned out differently.

It is important to note that regret is often a natural response to disappointment, and is not necessarily a negative experience. Rather, it can serve as a valuable opportunity for growth and self-reflection, as it allows individuals to consider the reasons behind their expectations and evaluate the choices they have made.

By understanding that regret is rooted in the gap between what we expect and what we experience, we can work to reconcile these differences and avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future. Whether through therapy, self-reflection, or other means, the process of learning from regret can help us to improve and grow, and to live our lives more fully and authentically.

Reference List

Hume, D 2003, A Treatise of Human Nature, Project Gutenberg, viewed 14 February 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4705/pg4705-images.html>

Hume, D 2006, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, viewed 14 February 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/9662/pg9662-images.html>

Locke, J 2004, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding: Volume I. MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books I. and II. (of 4), Project Gutenberg, viewed 14 February 2022, <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/10615/10615-h/10615-h.htm>

Smith, A 2022, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, viewed 14 February 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/67363/pg67363-images.html>

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