On Animal Abuse; or The Corollaries of Permitting the Consumption of Meat

My goal in writing this is threefold. Firstly, to consider the ethical grounds on which one may rationally permit the consumption of meat. Secondly, to outline the different limits between these prescriptions. Finally, to explicate the necessary corollaries of these positions.

Part 1: A Justification of the Consumption of Animals

In what manner, or from which principles, can we permit the consumption of animals?

By consumption is meant the eating of the flesh or other material of an animal, be it alive or dead, the acquisition of which either presupposes or produces the death or minimally torture of such an animal. In other words, the eating of meat or material acquired following the intentional slaughter for consumption of a living creature.

I will here turn away those who reject the consumption of meat obtained from purpose-killed animals in favour of either (1) Vegetarianism, (2) Veganism, (3) Personal Hunting, and (4) Carcass scavenging. My arguments are not intended to bind such persons and will not do so. Rather, they are directed essentially at any person who feels it okay to enter a supermarket or butcher and purchase meat (or other animal products).

There are many ways persons may justify to themselves or to others the occasioning of the death of animals for their own pleasure. I should add that such an act seems to intuitively require justification, given its gravitus and irreversible nature, and the horror it produces in similar circumstances (ie. if done to humans, or even to certain animals such as pets). Here are some potential justifications for the eating of animals (I do not mean imply that these are valid, just that they are likely to be encountered):

Argument from Superiority: ‘We may eat animals because we are superior to them (in some morally relevant way).’
Argument from Function: ‘Livestock are designed or otherwise produced for the purpose of being harvested, as such it is their proper function, and the facilitation of such function cannot be wrong.’
Argument from Solipsism: ‘Animals are not conscious beings, or they cannot feel pain or displeasure, thus we do not harm them by killing them.’
Argument from Apathy: ‘I do not care if it hurts them.’
Argument from Ego: ‘It may hurt them, but my pleasure is more important than their life.’
Argument from Tradition: ‘It may be wrong but to prohibit it would be destructive to many historical practices and cultures to forbid it’. Or (less charitably) ‘If it were wrong to eat animals, that practice would not have persevere so well (essentially universally) across history)
Appeal to Nature: ‘People are naturally omnivorous, it is thus permittable for them to eat animals.’
Argument from Amoral Status: ‘Animals do not have the qualities of a moral agent, thus they are outside the bounds of morality.’

Part 2: A Differentiation of Prescriptions

Whilst the justifications I provided all have a common end (to permit the purposeful consumption and killing of animals) they do not lead to identical prescriptions. Importantly, none categorically permite the consumption of animals (nor do they themselves categorically prohibit the consumption of people). That is, they each have limiting conditions (when used in isolation) under which such justifications do not obtain to their usual end (the permission of animal consumption):

Argument from Superiority: We may not eat any animal which is superior to us
Argument from Function: We may not eat any animal which is not functionally livestock
Argument from Solipsism: We may not eat any animal to which consciousness obtains
Argument from Apathy: We may not eat any animal we care about
Argument from Ego: We may not eat any animal, the consumption of which would bring us displeasure
Argument from Tradition: We may not eat any animal protected by tradition
Appeal to Nature: We must not eat or engage with synthetic products, including artificial meat. Potentially, we must not eat any animals not killed in natural manners (ie. through hunting if that is conceived of as natural). Further, it may have to be accepted that it is permissible to eat humans since cannibalism seems relatively natural, and is certainly not unnatural.
Argument from Amoral Status: We may not eat any animal with the qualities of a moral agent.

Part 3: Necessary Corollaries

Similarly, just as each (whilst aiming at a common end) has different limiting principles, each may have different corollaries owing to the necessary logical differences between each species of argument. I should note that each argument need not operate in isolation, and one may take up multiple at once or in succession, and may present further arguments to counter my corollaries. I shall present these corollaries as unfavourable for the sake of my argument, though it should be noted that they are not necessarily so. Rather, my goal in presenting them is to make their users aware of consequences they may not recognise. In the same sense that you may persuade someone to change, not by arguing that they are wrong but simply but enumerating consequences a course of action will lead to. Nonetheless, the user may simply choose to accept the consequences as either (1) necessary or (2) trivial, and in doing so metaphorically ‘bite the bullet’:

As To:

Argument from Superiority: The proponent of such an argument certainly must justify in what manner man is superior to animals. This manner, if it is to permit the domination of animals by man, must be of an ethically relevant kind. For example, I may assert that one painting is superior to another because of its purportedly greater beauty, but this will not lead me to conclude that I may destroy the lesser artwork. Analogously, if one is to say they are superior and that superiority enables certain moral actions, the superiority must be with reference to some morally relevant factor. For our purposes the actual factor does not matter, but it must be clearly enumerated.

Let us suppose the person says; “We are superior as to rationality, and rationality alone is a morally relevant factor” (as I believe is a common argument). Let us even grant them that this is the case (which many vegans would not), we may now ask them: “Suppose that an alien species tomorrow came to earth, in the possession of technology, military, art, and philosophy of a greater rational nature than that ever known on earth. Let us suppose they can solve any problem we present to them with little trouble, be it mathematical, scientific, technological, or any other field which admits of solutions. What could you say to such a species if they then say: ‘these earthlings are indeed base and hold only the lowest form of rationality, they are much more fit as food for our philosophers than as cavemen on this planet’”. How could you object to them eating you for pleasure? I would say that you could not

Argument from Function: This argument, as I hope the proponent is aware, commits itself to functional determinism. That is, the view that a substance's purpose and its ethical permits are determined by its function. This view itself may be harshly critiqued, but that is not my purpose here. Instead consider the following example:

“A slave is born to a family of slaves, who themselves were born to a family of slaves, themselves who had been in bondage for generations. This newborn's function, as with the function of his ancestors, is as a slave to a master. This function determines the ethical obligations his master has to him and he to his master (functional determinism). Suppose that one day many years later, a pastor comes by the slaves working on their master's land and says to them ‘Why do you work under the yolk of a human master? Are men not born free in the image of God?’. The slave replies: ‘Indeed, men are born free. Though I am not a man, and not born a man nor born of a man, rather I am a slave and born of a slave. It is my purpose to slave in this field below my master, as prescribed to me by the great chain of being’. The pastor leaves and speaks to the master: ‘Why do you keep these men in chains before you? Why do they work the fields while you watch them?’ The master replies succinctly; ‘I keep no men in chains, nor do any men work my fields’. The pastor understands the master's reasoning and leaves, disappointed. The next day whilst the pastor walks by the estate once more, he sees the slave hung from a tree beside the field. Shocked, he runs inside to the master and tells him of this sight with great anxiety: ‘A man - a man has been hanged! Beside the fields your man is hanged!’. The master rushes to the window and throws it open with force to see and upon spying the slave's limp body breathes a sigh of relief. ‘That is no man dear father. Your eyesight fails you for tis naught but a slave, and like a slave has been properly punished for disobedience. You should watch your tongue, you know; after your talk yesterday, that slave suddenly refused to slave away. Thus he threw off his function, and in doing so, threw off himself; for what is an object without a purpose, is it not nothing? And what is the purpose of nothing but mere annihilation. For, as you must comprehend, nothing can have no function, and what may that without purpose be but nothing. Thus, to nothing he reduced himself, and thus I reduced him to nothing’. Finally, the pastor understands, and leaves content once again. All is in its proper place and all with their proper function, in a great chain of being from the animals to the divine.” Indeed, this argument was widely used by defenders of slavery (particularly racially based slavery). On what grounds could a functional determinist object to the slaves' treatment?

Argument from Solipsism: The proponent of this argument gives themselves an impossible burden of proof and further puts themselves in a metaphysical bind the likes I which (I believe) they haven’t recognised. Such an argument makes the following claims:

1. There is such a thing as consciousness

2. A biological creature can have consciousness

3. It is possible to determine what does and does not have consciousness

4. Animals do not have consciousness

Claims 1 and 2 are not trivial but they are also not controversial. Claims 3 and 4, however, I must assert are nothing more than speculation. There is absolutely no way that this proponent can (1) know what does and doesn’t have consciousness, and (2) know that no animal has consciousness (or minimally that no animal they’ve eaten has consciousness). This is because (a) consciousness doesn’t seem to be a physical property, and (b) neither science, nor any other system (it seems) can study metaphysical or ultra-physical properties; thus, science cannot ascertain consciousness in any particular thing, human or otherwise, thus the proponent cannot produce any a posteriori evidence for their claims, thus (in the absence of a priori evidence) they can produce any evidence whatsoever. Further, this line of argumentation commits itself to the classical solipsistic dilemma, which can be put as such:

1. I can only have first-hand knowledge of experiences

2. Consciousness is experiential

3. I have first-hand knowledge of my consciousness

Thus I know such a thing as consciousness exists

4. I have no first-hand knowledge (and thereby no knowledge) of the content of others experiences

Thus I have know knowledge of others experiences

Thus I have no evidence to presume such things exist

Thus I have no evidence that others have consciousness.

This dilemma, in short, as it applies here, essentially binds the proponent to consistency. The proponent must either take the position that (1) consciousness can be inferred through observation of others or (2) consciousness cannot be inferred through observations of others. If they take position (2) they must reject their defence for eating meat; because any shaky grounds for inferring consciousness in humans will apply to all animals. If they take position (2) they may still eat meat but cannot object to cannibalism. That is; if we know as much about animal and (other) human consciousness (that is, we know nothing) as the second position claims, then we cannot object to the consumption of other humans on the grounds that they’re conscious (for this position can never know that). In short, the solipsistic proponent, if they wish to maintain the position, must allow for the slaughter and torture of everyone else and not just non-human animals.

Argument from Apathy: This proponent (hopefully) consciously adheres to some system of ethical egoism, which in itself might be ostracised. This is because (seemingly) all systems of egoism have two fundamental flaws, one despicable and one unfavourable.

As to the first flaw, all systems of ethical egoism conflate moral consideration with emotional consideration. That is, they only grant moral consideration unto an object if that object has already received emotional consideration. What does this mean? Well, put simply, it means that if I don’t care about a particular thing (person or otherwise) then I have no grounds to criticise the treatment of that thing. That means that not only animals but persons too, if you don’t care about them, are free reign to abuse. The criminal you disdain, the cashier who short changed you, the ex partner who scorned you, the parent or carer who disciplined you; if you don’t emotionally care for them (ie. if you’re apathetic) then you are permitted to torture them and you can’t object to their torture if others were to do so. This seems like immaturity of the highest order. I may dislike, even loath, a person but I am mature enough to uphold my ethical principles and object stridently to their mistreatment where it breaches such principles.
That brings us to the second flaw; such systems have no consistent prescriptions and perhaps no consistent principles. The ethical egoist may act completely differently in the exact same scenario based on nothing more than their inward disposition. If they’re feeling romantic they may buy flowers for their partner, if they’re feeling cold they may rape them. If they’re feeling empathetic, they may save a drowning man, if they’re not they may laugh at him. Such comical changes in prescription should be seen as harsh rebukes of any such systems which permits behaviours without considering any observable factors, and is nothing more than a childish narcissist’s attempt to defend themself.

Argument from Ego

As has been previously raised, this argument is quite obtuse and imposes quite a strange test on the user. The test is thus; before picking up one’s knife and fork to eat any meal, or before wrapping oneself in animal garment of animal origins, one must ask themselves: Will this act thus please me? This itself raises a number of practical issues. Chief amongst these is the problem of doubt. In other words, how is one to know that this particular action I am about to engage with will bring me pleasure? Perhaps the wielder responds by saying: ‘It has done so in the past. I thus have no reason to doubt it will do so in the future!’. This line is quite astute but also not particularly logical. Whilst it may (although needn’t) be true that we may look to previous experiences to predict the experiences of future events, it is not clear what the validity of such predictions is. For, as I hope any one will admit, it is certainly possible to have conflicting experiences (at least at differents times), and the causal relation between stimuli and experience is tenuous at best, particularly insofar as a matter as fickle as taste is concerned. By way of example; one might have a prior fondness for seafood and enjoy it quite happily. However, when one attempts to return to it after a period of absence, it is certainly not out of the question that one will no longer hold such fondness. In other words, it is possible to become, and thereby also to reverse, a sympathy towards matters of taste. Further, the events which precipitate this becoming or reversal are not always, or even often, clear. In such cases, how can the proponent of this argument make the choice as to whether or not they engage in some particular activity. It is here I should note that this objection, which I believe is the principle and sufficient, is of a purely practical nature (relating to choice in particularities) and does not critique the theoretical principles of the system itself, which may or may not even meet preconditions for purely objective criticism.

Argument from Tradition

Of course, this argument commits an appeal to tradition fallacy. That is, it commits itself to the proposition that an institution or set of beliefs is desirable, moral, or minimally permissible because it is traditional (ie. substantially historical) in nature. Alternatively, an appeal to tradition may assert that a traditional system of belief has been proven correct or righteous because it has persisted. Here I should note that the principle being fallacious do not validate its opposite but rather its negation; ie. the principle that a novel institution is desirable is also fallacious (an appeal to novelty). I do not know whether it would be better for the proponent to be aware of this fallacy (and thus not act from ignorance) or not (and thus, at least potentially, not be aware of its consequences). Although it may need no substantial consideration, I will briefly highlight some of the (hopefully considered) immoral traditions that have passed (and occasionally persist). Consider that at one point in time, perhaps even at this point, the horrors of female circumcision; of slavery, spousal rape, child brides, caste systems, cannibalism, torture, and of stonings were all considered traditional and justified on such grounds. I cannot help but think of the Antebellum slave owner appealing to tradition to ground their institutions of bondage. It is quite hard to avoid such images when one appeals as such. Leave it to say this; when one proposes a principle, it is of general prudence that the principle be justified on its own merits independent of features external to it (ie. it’s permanence) (insofar as these features as external to it)

Appeal to Nature

Once more we have a fallacious argument. An appeal to nature is a type of logical fallacy in which a person argues that something is good, right, or moral because it is natural. Contra-wise, it also occurs when one argues that something is bad, wrong, or immoral because it is unnatural. The reason is fallacious and thus to be disposed of is that it incorrectly, or minimally unjustly, assumes that the concepts ‘nature’ and ‘good’ are identical. This is plainly not the case unless one defines the concepts equivalently and thus reduces the argument to a mere tautology, which also proves nothing. Put another way, the argument engages in a kind of descriptive - normative reduction by assuming that the way things naturally occur is always the way they ought to be, and that human beings should thus follow what is ‘natural’. Let us dispatch it thusly; is, murder, rape, theft (insofar as naturally law pertains), assault, slander natural to man, and even in various degrees to non-human animals? Are the disorders of pedophilia and psychopathy not inherent and thus natural to the human mind? Is not all civilisation and law an attempt to bring nature to its heel? To render something righteous of the otherwise brutal human? Do we not even say that for one to act in an egregious manner is to act ‘savagely’, of a ‘brutish’ nature, or like an ‘animal’? We certainly do. Let us not then dispatch will all our ethical considerations by becoming the most insane of optimists and declaring that all is as it ought to be. In other words, let us not become necessitarians, but rather always strive to uncover and carry out the truly righteous path, particularly because it is not in any manner natural to man.

Argument from Amoral Status

As to all arguments which diminish the moral status of animals, I will provide a more extensive discussion (only because one of these is my position and thus my explicit bias, not necessarily because I consider it without flaws).

Argument from Amoral Status

Let us now raise the question, the very question at the heart of this writing, which all sincere meat eaters must consider: Is the breeding, torturing, experimentation, and perpetual slaughtering of animals immoral?

Axioms

Consider the following set of moral axioms I hold:

Presupposed Axioms (PA)

A Moral Agent (MA) is a being which appears to have the capacity for Deliberate Moral Action and Therefore has Moral Liability

Note; this does not in principle rule out species other than humans, nor does it necessarily include all humans
Appears because it is impossible to eliminate the possibility of Philosophical Zombies or eternal Determinism
Capacity for Deliberate Moral Action instead of the typical Capacity for Preferences (à la Peter Singer) because I do not consider an expression of preference as sufficient for moral liability and I see moral liability as necessary for moral agency.

Moral Consideration ought only be extended to beings who are both Moral Agents and who are capable of reciprocating moral values (Special Moral Agents / SMAs)

Moral/Immoral Distinction (M/I)

Moral/Immoral Distinction (M/I)
An act is moral (good) if it promotes the flourishing of SMAs / allows the highest order of preferences among SMAs (taken as a collective)
An act is immoral (bad) if it directly inhibits the flourishing of SMAs
An act may be amoral (neutral) if:

It indirectly / incidentally inhibits the flourishing of SMAs

Note that Hyper-Complication of scenarios likely prevents moral judgement (ie. in the case of Macro-economic Systems)

It neither promotes / inhibits the flourishing of SMAs

Applied Axioms (AA)

SMA’s ought seek harmonisation with other SMAs

Harmonisation between SMAs is necessary for the flourishing of said agents and is thereby a precondition for the moral
That which directly inhibits the flourishing of SMA’s is immoral

Bodily Harm, Production of Disuniting Anarchy, Hyper-Atomisation and Moral Disinterest are all expressions of inhibition of the harmonisation of SMAs and thereby immoral
Social Contractarianism is a highly efficient method of harmonisation between SMAs and thereby is a moral system.

Return to the Question

The question I am thus asked is this: According to this set of moral axioms (ie. according to my moral system) is it immoral to kill and eat nonhuman animals?

In the general case it is not. This follows from two separate syllogisms:

P1. Moral Consideration Ought Only be Extended to Moral Agents

P2. Non-humans in the general case are not Moral Agents

C. Moral Consideration Ought not be extended to non-humans

P1. Moral Consideration Ought Only be Extended to those capable of reciprocation of moral values

P2. Non-humans in the general case are not capable of reciprocation of moral values

C. Moral Consideration Ought not be extended to non-humans

Before accepting this logic, in order to operate in good faith I must raise the following simultaneously necessary conclusions:

Certain humans may not be moral agents and thereby not worthy of moral consideration
Certain humans may be moral agents but not capable of moral reciprocation (although this is incredibly hard to think of)
Certain animals may be moral agents and capable of reciprocation moral values and thereby worthy of moral consideration

Therefore, although it may be permissible (ie. amoral) to kill and eat non-human animals in the general case, this in no way eliminates the possibility that some morally capable animal may arise for whom it would be immoral to kill.

From this comes the next question, one which most would struggle with. Is it possibly permissible to kill and eat humans in the specific case?

The answer to this is obvious to me as it both follows from my axioms and is implicit in the previous argument. Yes, there very well may be hypothetical members of the species homosapien (I don’t know if I’d call them persons though) who are incapable (note incapable doesn’t mean they aren’t currently but that they do not have the capacity) of appearing to make deliberate moral choices and thereby are not moral agents. Or who are moral agents but are incapable of reciprocating moral values. In either case (although I think the latter is rarer than the former), such a hypothetical person/people would not receive moral consideration and thereby all acts which impact them alone would be considered amoral. In short, yes you could slaughter and eat such a group of people.

What has hereby been discussed is my opinion on the immediate moral of animal/human butchery and consumption. Note that there are many other ways one might arrive at veganism, some of which I support where they align with my axioms. For example; arguments for veganism on the grounds of preventing catastrophic climate change I find incredibly strong. Particularly as this aligns heavily with my Moral/Immoral Distinction and Applied Axioms insofar as Climate Change directly inhibits the flourishing of moral agents (humans in the general case) and hinders their harmonisation. As such, my rejection of the immediate moral argument for veganism should in know way be taken as a rejection of veganism in principle.

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