Beyond Good and Evil: Nietzsche's Response to the Death of God

An Inspection of Morality; The Master Slave Dialectic in The First Treatise of On The Genealogy of Morals

Perhaps most explicitly in The Genealogy of Morals (2016), Friedrich Nietzsche presents the idea of the ‘master-slave morality’ dichotomy. He argues that there are two categories of morality with different historical sources: one which values power and pride, the earlier ‘master morality’, and a later form that values empathy, kindness, and sympathy called ‘slave morality’. Aside from this fundamental difference in values: Master morality judges actions themselves as good or bad, whereas slave morality judges actions by the intentions behind them. Nietzsche believed that each culture's moral beliefs are shaped by the conflict between these two moral structures.

As I will later discuss, in the preceding text to that work and subject of this writing - Beyond Good and Evil (2003), Nietzsche explains that the distinction between ‘good/evil’ and ‘good/bad’ have different origins, belonging to the aforementioned slave and master morality respectively. Further still, he asserts that the term ‘good’ carries the opposite meaning in each case. In the ‘good/bad’ distinction of master thinking, ‘good’ refers to nobility, power and life-affirming qualities. ‘Bad’ simply refers to ‘common’ or ‘low’ and the values associated with them. Contrawise, in the ‘good/evil’ distinction of slave morality, ‘good’ becomes the opposite of the master’s ‘good’, and that masters good is (ie. self-expression, nobility) is now labelled ‘evil’. This inversion of values arises from the resentment felt by the weak towards the powerful, and the desire to rebel against those powerful by undermining their cultural expressions.

The Master Morality: Good and Bad

According to Nietzsche, the first form of morality was established by warrior aristocrats and ruling classes of ancient societies. Their ideas of what is good and bad aligned with their power dynamics towards lower classes such as slaves. This system of morality, called ‘master morality’, is exemplified in ancient Greek Autocracies, particularly in Sparta. To be considered ‘good’ meant to have wealth, strength, power, and health. To be ‘bad’ meant to be poor, weak, sick, and pitiful; worthy of pity or disgust rather than hatred.

Nietzsche characterises master morality as the morality of the strong-willed, those willing to step above the masses and assert themselves upon the world. He uses this to critique the belief, common in the contemporary Judeo-Christian ideologies, that what is good is helpful and what is bad is harmful. He polemically critiques that those who uphold these ideologies have accepted them on habit, whilst forgetting their origins and justifications. To contrast this view, he argues that, in the earliest societies, the value of an action was based on its consequences, even if there are no ultimate moral noumena. The values in master morality are ultimately derived egoistically. That is, people will assert that the good is that which benefits them and those they care about. From this; individuals with a strong will will define good as nobility, power and strength, and bad as weak, timid and petty. Other values which stem from this include open-mindedness, courage, truthfulness, trustworthiness, and a sense of self-worth. Master morality is characterised by the noble individual who spontaneously creates their own idea of what is good and derives the concept of bad from this as the opposite of good. They don't require approval. They judge based on their own benefit. They accord honour to things which align with their values. This type of morality serves as a way for strong-willed individuals to actualize their will to power through self-actualization in their path to becoming the Over-man [Ubermensch].

The Slave’s Good and Evil

Nietzche’s second form of morality, that of slave morality, emerged as a response to the former master morality, or to the values and beliefs of those in power. This is the impetus for the observed inversion between the two systems. Nietzche asserts that the slaves, in rebelling against their masters, sought to overturn the systems of said masters and thus inverted the cultural values that once dominated them. Masters are the ones who create morality, slaves respond to that morality with their own version.

The contrast between good and evil is the foundation of all slave morality, and holds different meanings to the good and bad of master morality. The slaves ‘goods’ are all associated with other-worldly values such as charity, piety, restraint, meekness, and submission. Nietzche posits that this is because the slave had no power to attain goods in life, and thus idealised the goods in the infinite, or the conceptual, or in death. The slave ‘evils’ are all associated with worldly values such as cruelty, selfishness, wealth, and aggression. Once more, he posits that the condemnation of these values arose from the slaves inability to acquire their ends and from the slaves association of them with their masters.

In general, Nietzche viewed slave morality as being negative and fearful, with its values arising to improve the self-esteem of slaves. He linked slave morality with the Judeo-Christian traditions, asserting that those traditions have slave-like origins. Speaking of the particular goods of slave morality, Nietzsche argued that the idea of equality became the ultimate good as it enabled slaves to overcome their own conditions without despising themselves. That is, by denying the inherent differences between people in terms of success, strength, beauty, and intelligence, slaves were able to create new values that rejected master morality. This allowed them to overcome their sense of inferiority towards their masters.

It appears that Nietzsche viewed slave morality as a leading cause of the nihilism that had taken over Europe in his time. He believed that contemporary Europeans have both master and slave morality influencing their values and called for exceptional people to reject this one-size-fits-all approach to morality. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that morality is important for the masses and suggested that only exceptional people ought to follow their own inner laws.

Ultimately, for Nietzche it appears that Master morality is based on what is valued and deemed good by the powerful, while slave morality is rooted in the opposite, devaluing what the masters value and what the slaves do not possess. Master morality comes from a place of strength, while slave morality stems from a place of weakness and oppression. As a result, slave morality often vilifies its oppressors and is characterised by a negative outlook. Instead of striving for power through force, slave morality aims to subvert and make the masters slaves as well. The focus of slave morality is on what is useful for the community as a whole, rather than just for the strong. Nietzsche sees this as a contradiction as the weak use their numbers to manipulate the strong into believing that the desire for power is wrong, and that the qualities they lack, such as humility, are virtuous. In this way, slave morality denies that it was forced upon them by a master and instead presents humility and other biblical principles as voluntary. This ultimately enslaves the masters as well.

At the end of this it should still be noted that, whilst often being seen as preferring the master morality, Nietzche’s analysis of the two categories are primarily descriptive or historical and should not (in themselves) be taken as acceptance or glorification of either.

To Move Beyond Good and Evil: Welcoming a New World

Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (2003) is an 1886 book (typically) in nine parts by the philosopher Freidrich Nietzhce. The work can be seen as sitting in the centre of his moral works, immediately following the first such work (Thus Spoke Tharathustra (1999)) and immediately preceding the ultimate work (On the Genealogy of Morals (2016)). Stylistically, the text also sits between those two writings. It follows through on many ideas covered in the prior work in a more aggressive manner, accusatory and highly polemic. In this regard it is unlike the poetic nature of Tharathustra. However, it does not have the academic tone of the later Genealogy which largely expands on the ideas in this text. Thus, it can be seen as both the thematic and stylistic bridge between two of the most important and most famous of Nietzche’s writings.

Parts One and Two; Of Moralistic Philosophers and their restraint of the Free Spirit

In the first part of his text, Nietzsche passionately attacks philosophers of the past for their dogmatic moral beliefs. These beliefs, which he claims are in fact merely prejudices, were passed off by said philosophers as objective truth. Prior philosophies, particularly systematic ones, thus become merely a way for philosophers to justify their own moral weakness, and to sublimate the search for truth under the search for immorality in the lives of others.

In the second part of the book, he introduces the idea of a ‘free spirit’. These are exceptional individuals who act independent of prejudice, and as investigators without the fear of retribution. He encourages his readers to avoid those who suffer for the sake of truth and instead listen to his conception of the ancient ‘cynics’ who speak negatively about humanities nature without condemning it.

Part One: On the Prejudices of Philosophers (§1 - §23)

In the first part of Beyond Good and Evil (2003), Nietzsche critiques past philosophers for their dogmatic beliefs and moral prejudices. He argues that past philosophers have been guilty of blind dogmatism, passing off their moral prejudices (ie. emotions) as objective truth. He claims that the search for truth or the search for immorality is not as important as the seeking of untruth in an authentic life. He offers an entirely psychological explanation of every past philosophy, stating that each has been an ‘involuntary and unconscious memoir’ on the part of its author, existing only to justify the author's moral prejudices which they solemnly baptise as truths.

Beyond this, Nietzsche begins to question the concepts of truth and falsity. He casts doubt on the project of past philosophy by asking why we should even pursue the truth rather than simply accepting untruth ‘as a condition of life’. In one passage, Nietzsche writes that “he erroneousness of the world in which we think we live is the surest and most certain thing our eyes can light upon” (2003, §34). He argues that philosophers are wrong to rail violently against the risk of being deceived, and that it is nothing more than a prejudice to believe that truth is worth more than mere appearance. He argues that life is nothing without appearances, and it appears to Nietzsche that it follows from this that the abolition of appearances would imply the abolition of truth as well.

Another important section in the first part is Nietzsche’s consideration of the Stoic concept of ‘living in agreement with nature’ (2003, §9) as showing how philosophy ‘creates the world in its own image’ by trying to regiment nature ‘according to the Stoa’. He argues that nature, as something uncontrollable and "prodigal beyond measure" cannot be tyrannised in the way Stoics tyrannise over themselves (Ibid). This view leads onto his polemical attacks on philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Schopenhauer, who he sees as prejudicial and inconsistent.

Part Two: The Free Spirit (§24 - §44)

In the second part of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche introduces and discusses the idea of the ‘free spirit’ or the ‘scholar’, those who act independent of prejudice as investigators without fear of cruelty. He argues that these scholars are truly independent of prejudice, however they are nonetheless “philosophical labourers and men of science in general” and shouldn’t be conflated with pure philosophers, the “commanders and law-givers” (§211). He further describes the “free spirits” as “investigators to the point of cruelty, with unhesitating fingers for the intangible, with teeth and stomachs for the most indigestible” (§44) and warns that they’re rugged beasts to destroy the philosophers of the past.

Nietzsche moves beyond the philosophies to critique the sciences. In particular he singles out physics for attack. He suggests that the concept of “Nature's conformity to law” is just one interpretation of natural phenomena and that it could also be seen as the enforcement of power-demands. He appears to advocate for scientific anti-realism, stating that it is humans who have created concepts like cause and effect, and that these concepts are not necessarily reflective of reality. He argues that the laws of nature, as understood by science, are not absolute and unchanging, but are rather human constructs that are subject to change over time.

In addition, Nietzsche also engages in the critique of pure moral concepts, such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’, laying the groundwork for his later discussions. He argues that these concepts are not absolute and objective. Rather, they are also human constructs that are subject to change over time. He claims that morality is not something that can be discovered through reason or science as the enlightenment philosophers (exemplified by Kant) attempted to do, but is something created and imposed by human beings. He then suggests that morality has been used throughout history to justify the oppression of certain groups of people, such as the weak and the poor, by the strong and the powerful. Setting up the dichotomy between the master and the slave which he sees as the historical basis for his two systems of moral categorisation.

Part Three and Four: The Religious Mood and Aphorisms

Part Three: The Religious Nature (§45 - §62)

A key target of Nietzche’s criticisms, not only in this text but in many of his works, is religion, and more specifically the Judeo-Christian religions which dominated the Europe of his time. In discussing the contemporary Christian values he observed, Nietzsche contrasts southern (Catholic) and northern (Protestant) Christianity, arguing that northern Europeans have much less “talent for religion”. Though this remark is not the compliment it may at first seem. Rather, Nietzsche argues that religion has always been connected to “three dangerous dietary prescriptions: solitude, fasting and sexual abstinence”. For Nietzche, these represent the utmost cruelty imposed upon the cultural geist by the will of a band of rebel slaves that have composed the Christian priest class. This theocracy exerts control by cruelty according to categories of sin (evil), each with corresponding sacrifice. He closes by calling Christianity, “the most fatal kind of self-presumption ever”, claiming that it has beaten everything joyful, assertive and autocratic out of man and turned him into nothing more than a “sublime abortion”

In this section, Nietzsche once more returns to his critiques of ‘good and evil’ as all-present in religion and slave moralities, claiming that they are no more than human inventions. They are mere constructs and concepts; not eternal features but rather human products, shaped by human needs and will. The impetus for this slave imposition is the will to power as expressed in the minds of the weak. In other words, those who have not the strength to be noble (the slaves) instead condemn the noble and assert that meekness is a virtue, twisting the former systems of morality to justify their inverse power and oppression throughout history. In attacking this system, he implicitly (and later explicitly) encourages his readers to go beyond good and evil. That is, to reject traditional morality and create one’s own values such that they may live authentically.

Part Four: Maxims and Interludes (§63 - §185)

The fourth section of Nietzche’s text is entitled “Maxims and Interludes” (§63 - §185) (or occasionally ‘Aphorisms’). This is the shortest and perhaps the hardest section to interpret. The difficulty comes as the collection of sayings are typically very short, highly metaphorical, and do not (at least immediately) connect to each other or to other sections of the text. Most of the short statements consist of (mostly cynical) observations on various aspects of human existence. The interspaced longer sections, generally contain discursive passages which elaborate on specific maxims.

Amongst the reflections are discussions of morality, religion, politics, art, and the nature of knowledge. The latter of which became a subject of increasing interest for Nietzche. He continues his critiques of traditional morality, once more asserting that it is merely a human invention to manipulate and oppress the unaware and the common. This provides a throughline to the other aphorisms which begin to reflect on the nature of power and its expression in the human will to power, arguing that the desire for power is a fundamental aspect of human nature, as is characteristic of his philosophy. One way to interpret this maxim is as claiming that individuals and societies are only truly alive if they are able to harness and channel their will to power in creative and productive ways, as the nobility and aristocracy of the premoral period did (in Nietzche’s view). This then leads to his reflections on the nature of art and aesthetics (on which Nietzche was very interested; see his work The Birth of Tragedy or Hellenism and Pessimism (2016)). He argues that art is a means of expression and a mechanism for celebrating the will to power. This culminates in his view that the highest form of art is that which is able to create new values through said will to power.

Nietzsche also talks about the importance of self-overcoming, of becoming who you are and not living in accordance with what others expect from you. This is the only path to the ultimate goal for Nietzche, that is, becoming the Ubermensch (The ‘Over-Man’). He thus encourages his readers to reject traditional moralities, both slave and master, and to create their own values so that they may live authentically. This desire for authenticity and to become an Over-man leads directly into Nietzche’s consideration of the eternal recurrence. This is the idea that the universe and all events in it will recur an infinite number of times, and we ought to live each day in such a way that they would want to relive the same life again and again. The Over-man or Superman is he who would be happy to step into each single day an infinite number of times; not from a desire for self-flagellation as the christian slave does, but from a genuine enjoyment of the situation they have constructed for themselves.

Once more it is important to note that this section is perhaps one of the most dense, complex and challenging sections of the whole text. However, a close reading of it can also be one of the most rewarding. The Maxims and Interludes contains some of Nietzsche's most memorable and profound statements (§§64, 73, 92, 95, 108, 130, 146) and it is a great (though not introductory) path to understanding Nietzsche's philosophy. §146 in particular has become a famous saying even outside of philosophy:

“He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.”

(2003, §146)

Part Five: On The Natural History of Morals (§186 - §203)

The fifth section of Nietzche’s text is perhaps the most intertextual, linking into many of his prior and subsequent writings, specifically to the Thus Spoke Tharathustra (1999) (which preceded it) and The Genealogy of Morals (2016) (which proceeds it). It is the section in which Nietzsche's critique of traditional (ie. Judeo-Christian) morality becomes most emphatic and most explored.

Nietzche’s critiques of the Judeo-Christian structures lead him to posit that mankind requires a new alternative; a ‘new morality’. Essentially, Nietzche states that the “good and evil” of Judeo-Christianity lies in the metaphysical and is grounded in nothing more than psychosis and faith, unlike the ‘good and bad’ of the pre-moral aristocracy. This conception, to Nietzsche, infers that the Christian morality is a mere dogmatism, a human creation that serves the needs of specific communities or groups, or more often the weak members who control these groups and communities. There is nothing necessarily eternal about moral conceptions; and the moral gods too are only a human invention, like all gods.

Following this view, Nietzsche contends that traditional morality is a product of the weak and the oppressed who seek to collectivise to impose their values on the strong and powerful. He claims that this slave morality, characterised by concepts such as humility, meekness, and self-denial, is detrimental to the development of the “Overman”, the ideal of human excellence and self-overcoming. He claims that the ‘good man’ (under slave morality) is the typical representative of the most frequent (ie. common / low) and most inferior type of man. To this end, Nietzsche posits the need for a new anthropology, a new philosophy of mankind, one that is based on self-creation, self-overcoming, and self-realization, as a means of promoting the development of the Superman or “Overman” [Ubermensch]. He states, ‘Man must be trained for war and he must be led to it: so as to be able to endure it’.

Nietzsche also introduces the concepts of ‘slave morality’ and ‘master morality’ (which are prerequisites to his Genealogy of Morals) in this section of the text. He explains that slave morality is a reaction to the oppression of the noble or ‘master’ class, and operates by inverting the values of said classes; valuing humility, meekness, and self-denial where the masters valued pride, assertion, and self-expression. He states, ‘The slave revolts against the virtues of his master: he explains how bad, how stupid and how wicked they are’ and in doing so constructs a system of value inverse to him, taking his good from their bad and his ‘evil’ from their good. Nietzsche argues that these two moralities have evolved over time and have been in a constant struggle for dominance throughout history.

Overall, Nietzsche's critiques of morality (especially of the Judeo-Christian species) which are most condensed in this section, have become an essential contribution to the field of moral philosophy. He presents a compelling argument for the need to move beyond traditional morality and create a new morality grounded in overcoming oneself to produce the Superman. Nietzsche's ideas about the evolution and development of moral systems, as well as his concept of ‘slave morality’ and ‘master morality’, continue to be widely discussed and debated in academic circles to this day. His quotes and references contained in this section are some of the most famous and referenced in the academic studies of Nietzsche's work.

Part Six and Seven: We Scholars and Our Virtues

Part Six: We Scholars (§204 - §213)

Part six of the text (“We Scholars” (§204 - §213)) is quite reminiscent of the opening section, taking aim at the scholarly community. The primary difference being that, whilst in part one Nietzche criticises the professional philosophers of the past, in part six he takes aim at we he takes to be the contemporary scholarly community. That is; those who work in the academic studies of philosophy, the inheritors of those traditions, who he takes to be different from a pure philosopher.

His key contention is that the current academic community has imposed on itself arbitrary limitations due to their dogmatic adherence to tradition and conformity, and due to their disparaging of critical thinking. In a similar sense, Nietzsche asserts that scholars are overly preoccupied with the accumulation of knowledge rather than its interpretation and application. He posits that this approach is often motivated more by personal ambition and the desire for recognition than by a genuine desire to understand the world. Ie. these scholars have become professional or pop-academics, a concept Nietzche treats with great disgust. Because of this, Nietzsche argues that scholars are excessively reliant on the authority of past thinkers. This leads to a lack of critical examination of the assumptions and the biases that underlie their work. As a result, this adherence to tradition prevents scholars from being truly independent thinkers and leads to a stagnation of ideas, even when these ideas have become nonsensical (ie. the lack of a shift in thought following the death of god).

Similarly scathing, Nietzsche slams the manner in which scholars approach the study of philosophical history. He argues that scholars tend to view the past as a linear progression towards the present and that they often impose their own values and beliefs onto historical figures and events. If we were to label this anachronistically, we might assert that Nietzche is expressing thoughts here which would go on to give rise to the post-modernist movements of the late 20th century. Indeed, as with those thinkers, Nietzsche asserts that a more nuanced and critical understanding of the past, one devoid of ‘grand narratives’, will lead to a deeper understanding of the present and of the human condition more generally.

Further still, Nietzsche criticises the traditional forms of education and the role of universities. He posits that they are not only ineffective in teaching creativity and independence but also, in many cases, actually harmful to those concepts. It appears he implies the current education systems are aimed at creating conformists who can rigidly defend what they have been taught, not independent thinkers who can question, criticise, and create new knowledge. Therefore, Nietzsche calls for a radical and independent approach to knowledge and learning, one not constrained by the assumptions of the past. He encourages scholars to question traditional beliefs and to be willing to challenge accepted ideas and ways of thinking. He posits that this will lead to a more creative and dynamic scholarly community, one that is better equipped to understand and interpret the world.

Part Seven: Our Virtues (§214 - §239)

Once more, this section of the text (“Our Virtues” (§214 - §239)) mirrors an earlier section; “On The Natural History of Morals” (§186 - §203). Once again, this section is aimed not at the structures of the past, but at the present and at the manner in which those structures contemporarily express themselves.

In short, Nietzsche argues that traditional morality and virtues are often based on the values of the ruling class (not to be confused with the ‘master’ class of the premoral period) and do not reflect the needs and desires of the individual. He further suggests that these ‘virtues’ are used as a tool of oppression and control, rather than of morality, to keep individuals in a state of subservience and to maintain the status quo.

To begin, Nietzsche once more emphasises that traditional morality and the virtues its selects are in no sense natural. Rather, they are simply expressions of the will to power and have been imposed on individuals by a society. This leads to what he sees as an unavoidable conflict between the virtues of a society one exists in and one’s own desires and needs. In this struggle, one of these sets must be sublimated under the other. Typically, the individuals must repress their natural instincts in order to conform to societal expectations. This, he asserts, leads to forms of unnatural repression and feelings of guilt and self-loathing as the individual is sublimated under the collective and the individual’s will becomes the harshest inquisitor against itself; searching for and condemning every peculiarity.

As an alternative, Nietzsche proposes that the individual may reject the social structures in favour of their own. That is, instead of blindly adhering to traditional virtues, individuals should strive to develop their own unique virtues that are in alignment with their own desires and needs. Thus a call for the rejection of traditional morality and the creation of new values that are based on self-overcoming and the affirmation of life. He suggests that this will avoid the Nihilism which he labelled a ‘sickness’ in his time and will lead to a more authentic and fulfilling existence.

These discussions lead directly into Nietzsche’s idea of the "Ubermensch" or the "Superman". Such an individual has succeeded in creating his own virtues and overcoming traditional morality. This exceptional specimen is thus self-determined, possessing a strong will to power reminiscent of the pre-moral aristocracy. He argues that the individual who has achieved this level of self-overcoming will be able to harmonise his morality with himself and thus destroy the fatal conflict otherwise present.

Part Eight and Nine: Peoples and Countries, Nobility for the New World

Part Eight: Peoples And Fatherlands (§240 - §256)

In Part 8 Nietzsche presents his critical examination of the concepts of a "peoples" and of "fatherlands" as well as the nationalist ideologies that have emerged from them. Nietzsche argues that the notion of a "people" is both artificial (created by persons) and arbitrary (within definable concept). This notion, so he posits, is simply another method of those positions of power to control and manipulate the masses. He contends that the idea of a shared cultural heritage among a people is a myth propagated to create an artificial sense of unity and belonging among the people, and that this sense of belonging is most often used to justify wars, imperialism, and other forms of aggression against other groups and the expulsion of exceptional individuals.

It is worth noting that Nietzsche's critique of nationalist ideologies extends to the concept of the "state" and the "nation". He believes that the concept of the state and the nation are also artificial and arbitrary constructions that are used to justify the suppression of individuality and the manipulation of the masses. This view in Nietzche’s philosophy would go on to be suppressed by his twisting sister and executor, who is largely responsible for the wicked manipulation of Nietzche’s philosophical ideas (ie. the Ubermensch) into their unfortunate (and inaccurate) association with National Socialism.

Finally, Nietzsche critiques the idea of the "fatherland" as a source of moral authority, arguing that this concept is used to legitimise the actions of any arbitrary state and to suppress individual autonomy and creativity. He maintains that the idea of the fatherland is often used to enable authoritarian policies, serving as a means of legitimising the exploitation of other ‘peoples’ and cultures. In contrast to these nationalist ideologies, Nietzsche advocates for individuals to create their own values and morality. This leads to his promotion of a cosmopolitan worldview that values the diversity of cultures and peoples. This ideal cosmopolis would be once more populated by the supermen of tomorrow, transcending all artificial and arbitrary limits.

Part Nine: What is Noble? (§257 - §296)

In the final part of the text, Nietzsche examines the concept of "nobility" (in the pre-moral ‘master’ notion) and its relationship to the individual and to society. Nietzsche defines the "noble" individual as one who is self-confident, self-sufficient, and self-reliant. This individual acts in accordance with their own inner sense of purpose as a true expression of the will to power, not bending theirs to the wills of those surrounding them. This conception of nobility is, almost entirely, identical to the Nietzche’s Superman who transcends the limitations of the "herd" to create there own structures and values.

A "noble society” is one that is ruled by such individuals. Nietzche asserts that this society would be characterised by creativity and an abundance of power. It would be one where individuals are able to pursue their own goals and aspirations, as living expressions of the asthetic drive underlying the will to power. In many ways, such a system would be the inverse of the current society, which Nietzsche sees as based on the ideals of equality and democracy, characterised by mediocrity, weakness, and decadence. He argues that these slave ideals, particularly that of equality, have led to a ‘levelling down’ of the individual. Further, the expression of equality in the state (ie. democracy) has resulted in a rule of the masses, who thus bind themselves to one another and construct a collective system of morals and values under which they enslave each other.

In a tangential manner, Nietzche takes aim at what he takes to be the weakling view that nobility is inherited and that the noble people are of a certain class or race (as in Feudal structures). He maintains that this is a way of masking the lack of nobility in the individual or society, and serves as a means of maintaining the status quo. He believes that true nobility cannot be inherited but must be earned through individual effort and achievement. Nietzsche's critique of inherited nobility is an attack on the traditional aristocratic system and the idea of inherited privilege.

In conclusion, Nietzsche's idea of nobility is complex and multi-faceted. He defines the noble individual as one who is self-reliant, self-sufficient and self-confident, creating their own values and morality. Furthermore, the society that is ruled by these noble individuals is a society where creativity, power and nobility is valued. Additionally, Nietzsche critiques the traditional aristocratic idea of inherited nobility and privileges, advocating for the earning of nobility through individual effort and achievement.

Reference List

Nietzche, F 1999, Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Project Gutenberg, viewed 17 January 2023,

<https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1998/pg1998-images.html>

Nietzche, F 2003, Beyond Good And Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, Project Gutenberg, viewed 17 January 2023, <https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4363/pg4363-images.html>

Nietzche, F 2016, The Birth of Tragedy or Hellenism and Pessimism, Project Gutenberg, viewed 17 January 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/51356/51356-h/51356-h.htm>

Nietzche, F 2016, The Genealogy of Morals, Project Gutenberg, viewed 17 January 2023,

<https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52319/pg52319-images.html>

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