An Introduction to Schopenhauer: Father of Modern Pessimism

Arthur Schopenhauer

Arthur Schopenhauer was a German philosopher who is considered one of the most significant thinkers of the 19th century. He was born in Danzig in 1788 and died in Frankfurt am Main in 1860. He studied at the universities of Göttingen, Berlin, and Jena, and became a professor of philosophy in Berlin in 1820.

Schopenhauer is best known for his major work The World as Will and Representation (2011, 2012a, & 2012b) which was published in 1818 and is widely considered his magnum opus. In this work, Schopenhauer propounded his unique philosophy of the world, which he called ‘philosophy of the will’. He argued that the world is not an orderly, rational place, as previous philosophers had believed, but is instead driven by an irrational, unconscious force, which he described as the ‘will to live’. According to Schopenhauer, this will is the source of all life, but also the source of all suffering, since it is characterised by a never-ending cycle of desire, frustration, and suffering.

In this regard, Schopenhauer's philosophy was heavily influenced by Eastern thought, particularly Hinduism and Buddhism, and he is considered one of the most pessimistic philosophers in the Western tradition. He held that the only way to escape this cycle of suffering was through the denial of the will to live; either through asceticism, which he regarded as the path of the saint, or through aesthetic experience, which he regarded as the path of the artist.

In addition to his views on the nature of the world and the meaning of life, Schopenhauer also made significant contributions to ethics, aesthetics, and epistemology. He was a highly original thinker and his ideas had a major impact on the development of philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries, and continue to be widely studied and debated today.

The World As Will and Representation

First published in 1818, The World as Will and Representation (2011, 2012a, & 2012b) [German: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung] is Schopenhauer’s central philosophical work. The text itself covers a wide range of philosophical topics and themes, ranging from epistemology, to metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics.

In terms of epistemology, Schopenhauer argues that knowledge is limited and that the world can only be known indirectly, through representation (The world as representation), rather than directly (this is why he is considered in the German Idealist Tradition, in a similar sense to Immanuel Kant). He also contends that the world is a manifestation of the will (The world as will), and that everything in the world is an objectification (object of the subject that is) in the will.

In terms of metaphysics, Schopenhauer claims that the will is the underlying reality of the world. Everything, including individual human beings and the physical world, is merely an expression of this will. He also argues, in a manner very similar to Buddhist thought, that the world is characterised by a never-ending cycle of desire, frustration, and suffering, and that the only way to escape this cycle is through the denial of the will.

In terms of ethics, Schopenhauer argues that morality is based on compassion and that the highest ethical goal is to relieve suffering. He also claims that the denial of the will, either through asceticism or aesthetic experience, can provide a way to escape the cycle of suffering and attain a state of inner peace.

Finally, in terms of aesthetics, Schopenhauer claims that aesthetic experience is a way of temporarily suspending the will, and that it can provide a glimpse of the world as it is, free from the veil of representation. He also argues that beauty is a manifestation of the will and that it can provide a way of escaping the cycle of suffering.

The World as Will

Book II of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation (2011, 2012a, & 2012b) explores the relationship between the will and representation, two of the central concepts in his philosophy. In this section, Schopenhauer argues that the world as we experience it is a product of representation, which is itself a product of the will.

Schopenhauer believed that the will is the fundamental reality of the world, and that everything in the world is a manifestation of the will. He argued that the will manifests itself in the form of representation, which is our experience of the world through the senses and through thought. This representation is an imperfect reflection of the will, as the will is beyond our understanding and can only be experienced indirectly through its manifestation (this is why Schopenhauer is an indirect idealist in a similar sense to Kant. They both assert there is some reality, however that reality can never be known in-itself, rather it can only be approximated via its imitations).

He argued that the will was the source of all motion and change, and that it was the force behind all physical and psychological phenomena. Schopenhauer believed that the will was the ultimate reality, and that the world as we know it was merely a representation of this underlying reality. Schopenhauer's theory of the will was a response to the problem of explaining the nature of reality and the basis of human motivation. He maintained that the will was the ultimate reality, and that all things, including human beings, were driven by this force. He believed that the will was the source of all human desires and motivations, and that it was the underlying cause of all human actions. Schopenhauer considered the will to be a blind and unconscious force that drives individuals to pursue their wants and desires, without any regard for the consequences of their actions.

Schopenhauer also explored the nature of perception and knowledge in Book II, arguing that our understanding of the world is limited by the nature of representation and the limitations of our senses. He believed that our senses and intellect are incapable of grasping the true nature of the world, and that the only way we can have a true understanding of reality is through a direct experience of the will.

Schopenhauer further claimed that the only way to escape the limitations of representation is through the denial of the will, either through asceticism or aesthetic experience. He believed that by renouncing all worldly desires and living a life of asceticism, one can temporarily escape the cycle of suffering that is created by the will. He also believed that through aesthetic experience, one can temporarily suspend the will and experience a fleeting moment of peace and inner calm.

In addition to his views on representation and the will, Schopenhauer also explored a number of other philosophical topics in Book II, including the nature of space and time, the relationship between the individual and the world, and the nature of truth and knowledge.

The Will to Life

The ‘will to live’ (or the ‘will to life’) is a central concept in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, who saw it as the fundamental driving force behind all human behaviour. According to Schopenhauer, the will to live is an unconscious drive that motivates all living beings to seek pleasure and avoid pain, to continue existing, to reproduce, and to achieve their desires and goals.

The will to live was seen by Schopenhauer as the source of all human suffering, as individuals were driven by their unconscious desires and were constantly seeking to fulfil their wants and aspirations. He believed that this drive for satisfaction was the source of all human conflict and suffering, as individuals competed for resources and vied for position in society. Schopenhauer believed that the only way to escape this cycle of suffering was to overcome the will to live, and to attain a state of inner peace and tranquillity.

Schopenhauer's views on the will to live are closely tied to his pessimistic worldview, which holds that life is inherently filled with suffering and that true happiness is impossible. He believed that the will to live is the source of all human suffering, as it creates a constant state of desire and lack that can never be satisfied. In his view, the will to live creates a never-ending cycle of striving and suffering, as individuals are constantly driven to seek pleasure, avoid pain, and fulfil their desires, but can never achieve a state of lasting satisfaction.

To escape this cycle of suffering, Schopenhauer believed that individuals must renounce their desires and the will to live, either through asceticism or aesthetic experience. He believed that through these means, individuals can achieve a state of peace and contentment by denying the will to live and breaking the cycle of striving and suffering.

The World as Representation

Schopenhauer's work, The World as Will and Representation (2011, 2012a, & 2012b), opens with the declaration ‘the world is my representation’, conveying the idea that the world we know and experience exists only in our minds. Schopenhauer's philosophy is rooted in this belief. That is, the view that the empirical world is merely a collection of appearances, whose existence and connections are only found in our mental representations. In this he was heavily influenced by Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism. Indeed, he often saw his own philosophy as an extension of Kant's.

According to Schopenhauer, the external world exists empirically, but our knowledge and experience of it is always indirect. In Book One of the text, Schopenhauer explores the world from a subjective point of view, where everything in the world is dependent on the subject and is merely a representation to it. He posits that everything that belongs to the world is therefore ‘subject-dependent’. This requires that all objects in ‘the world’ exist only in relation to a subject, and all of our knowledge and experience of the world is dependent on some subjects' perception of the relevant object.

In essence, Schopenhauer believed that the world as we know it is not an objective reality, but rather, a subjective experience shaped by the mind of the observer. He argued that the mind creates a representation of the world through the lens of our experiences, and this representation is what we know as reality. The world, as a result, is merely a mental construct of the individual, shaped by the individual's own perceptions and experiences.

Similarly, in Book 3, Schopenhauer focuses on the relationship between the phenomenal world (the world as it appears to us through our senses) and the noumenal world (the world as it exists in itself, independent of our perception). This book delves deeper into the concept of representation and the limitations of our cognitive abilities in perceiving the true nature of the world.

Schopenhauer argues that the phenomenal world is determined by the principle of sufficient reason, which states that everything that exists has a sufficient reason for its existence. He asserts that this principle operates at a purely intellectual level and is not connected to the will, which is the true nature of the world. The will is the blind, unconscious force that drives everything in existence, including human beings.

Nonetheless, Schopenhauer explores the idea that the will can be perceived directly, without the mediation of the intellect and its principle of sufficient reason. He argues that this direct perception is the basis of artistic experience and is what allows artists to capture the essence of the will in their works.

This book also contains an in-depth discussion of the relationship between the will and the intellect, as well as the role of the intellect in shaping our perception of the world. Schopenhauer argues that the intellect serves as a veil between the will and our conscious experience, distorting and obscuring our perception of the true nature of the world. He asserts that it is only through a direct perception of the will that we can attain a true understanding of the world.

In conclusion, Book 3 of The World as Will and Representation continues Schopenhauer's exploration of the relationship between the phenomenal and noumenal world, and the limitations of our cognitive abilities in perceiving the true nature of the world. It offers a unique perspective on the role of art in capturing the essence of the will and provides a thought-provoking examination of the relationship between the will and the intellect.

A System of Logic: The Principle of Sufficient Reason

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason is a philosophical essay written by Arthur Schopenhauer. In this essay, Schopenhauer offers an analysis of the principle of sufficient reason, that is, the view (in one expression) that all consequences are resultant of some sufficient cause, without which they wouldn’t have occurred. Schopenhauer asserts that this principle is the foundation of all knowledge and inquiry. He further argues that the principle can be analysed in four forms: logical, physical, mathematical, and ethical.

The logical category refers to the relationship between a proposition and its reason or justification. Schopenhauer believes that a proposition must be logically grounded in order to be considered truly valid.

The physical category refers to the relationship between cause and effect, in which every event has a sufficient cause. This category is the foundation of natural science, which is concerned with the explanation of natural phenomena.

The mathematical category refers to the relationship between numbers and mathematical operations. Schopenhauer believes that mathematical truths are necessary and universal and exist independently of the physical world.

The ethical category refers to the relationship between actions and their motives, which Schopenhauer argues are the basis for morality. He believes that every action must have a sufficient motive, and that ethical principles must be grounded in human nature and its limitations.

The Forms

Four objects present themselves to the will, each of which accords to a particular capacity and intuition of that will. These objects are the experience of (1) Becoming, (2) Knowing, (3) Being, and (4) Willing.

The Logical Form

Schopenhauer’s First Form, the Logical Form or the Form of Becoming argues that: The combination of time and space is what enables a subject to experience perceptual actuality. It enables the interpretation of ideas and creates the basis for making judgments. This is known as the law of causality, which is perceived subjectively as an intellectual and a priori-linked understanding. All judgments about cause and effect are based on this principle and are considered to be the expected outcomes of these judgments. The natural sciences exist within this realm of expanding principles. Philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer proposed a proof for the a priori of causality that diverges from Immanuel Kant's theory. Schopenhauer's proof is centred around the intellectuality of perceived things (representations) and draws inspiration from mediaeval philosopher Witelo's work on optics and the psychology of perception.

The Physical Form

The Second Form of the PSR, the Form of Knowing, argues that this class of objects (those which can be known to the will / those subsumed by epistemology) encompasses all judgments and abstract concepts that a subject knows through conceptual and discursive reasoning rooted in the ground of knowing. Unlike the other three classes of objects, which are immediate representations, this class is composed of fixed representations of representations. The truth-value of concepts derived from the other three classes of objects is based on reference to something outside of the concept. Concepts are abstract judgments grounded in intuitions of time and space, ideas of perception (such as causality in the outer world), or acts of direct will (such as causality experienced from within). Concepts are easier to deal with than representations and are, in fact, almost like formulas in higher arithmetic, representing mental operations. This class makes language (in the form of abstract judgments that can be communicated) possible, and as a result, all the sciences become possible.

The Mathematical Form

The third form, of Mathematics or the Form of Being argues that time and space are separate grounds of being. In a similar manner after Kant, Schopenhauer argues that these a priori forms respectively allow for an inner, temporal sense and an outer, spatial sense for the subject. These forms of pure sensibility make sensations possible for the subject and are presupposed for all other forms of the principle of sufficient reason. The intuition of time allows for arithmetic, while the intuition of space allows for geometry. Time is one-dimensional and purely successive, with each moment determining the following moment. In space, any position is determined only by its relationship to all other positions in a finite, closed system. The intuitions of time and space provide the grounds of being that make arithmetical and geometrical judgments possible and valid for experience.

The Ethical Form

The fourth and final form, of Ethics or the Form of Willing postulates that a subject of knowing can directly know himself as a ‘will’ in itself. A subject knows his acts of will only after the fact, in time. Action is rooted in the law of motivation, the ground of acting, which is causality seen from the inside. In other words, a subject not only knows his body as an object of outer sense in space, but also as an inner sense in time alone; a subject has self-consciousness in addition to knowing his body as an idea of perception. Why a subject acts the way he does is determined by sufficient motives, which may come in the form of intuitions, perceptions, or extracted abstract concepts. The subject will act or react according to his character or ‘will’. Schopenhauer argues that the human sciences are deeply rooted in this aspect of the principle.

Schopenhauer’s Ethics

The Object of Ethics

Schopenhauer believed that the objective of ethics was not to dictate what moral actions one should take, but rather to examine moral actions and behaviours. He viewed philosophy as a theoretical discipline, whose primary function was to explain what is already given.

Kant's philosophy, on the other hand, centred around the idea of transcendental idealism, which holds that space and time are merely modes of perception through which we experience phenomena in a multiplicitous manner. Reality itself, however, is free from multiplicity and is not characterised by being one, but by being beyond the realm of multiplicity. Despite appearing as separate entities, two individuals are in essence not distinct from each other.

According to Schopenhauer, the principle of sufficient reason governs all appearances and the egoistic individual, who focuses solely on his own interests, must navigate the empirical laws to the best of his abilities. However, it is the individuals who are capable of acting against their self-interests that are of importance for ethics. For example, a person who experiences pain upon witnessing poverty among his fellow human beings and chooses to use a significant portion of his income to alleviate their suffering instead of indulging in personal pleasures, demonstrates a greater sense of connectedness with others and a lesser distinction between self and others than is typically seen.

From the perspective of appearances, the egoist sees a clear separation between individuals, while the altruist experiences the suffering of others as his own. This connection leads to compassion, which Schopenhauer considered to be the foundation of morality. The altruist is moved by compassion, and the suffering of others is not a detached or indifferent matter for him, but something that he feels a deep connection to. Compassion thus forms the basis of moral behaviour.

The Content of Ethics

Schopenhauer's ethics were heavily influenced by his theory of the will. He believed that individuals should strive to overcome the will to live, and to attain a state of inner peace and tranquillity. He believed that the only way to escape the cycle of suffering was to overcome the will, and to attain a state of contemplation and awareness. This state of awareness was seen by Schopenhauer as the ultimate goal of human existence and the ultimate state of fulfilment.

The Basis of Morality (2014) is a major ethical work first published in 1840. The work was written in response to a competition hosted by the Royal Danish Society, although it did not win a prize. The work is divided into four sections. The first section is an introduction, where Schopenhauer provides his account of the question posed by the Royal Danish Society and his interpretation of the history of Western ethics. The second section is a criticism of Kant's foundation of ethics. In the third section, Schopenhauer presents his own ethical theory, which is based on the idea that morality stems from compassion. The final section of the work provides a brief description of the metaphysical foundations of ethics.

Schopenhauer begins with a critical examination of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, which Schopenhauer considered the clearest explanation of Kant's foundation of ethics. In the second section of the work, Schopenhauer embarks on his criticism of that work, arguing that Kant's idea of morality founded on a categorical imperative was ultimately based on selfish egoism. Against this, Schopenhauer declared that a person's own behaviour should be based on compassion, which is not egoistic, and must become the sole impetus for moral actions: “If an act have an egoistic object as its motive, then no moral value can be attached to it” (2014, p. 166). According to Schopenhauer, morality is based on compassion, which is the immediate participation in the suffering of another, leading to the prevention or elimination of it. Thus, Schopenhauer believed that only actions arising from compassion have moral value, and every action resulting from other motives has none. In this he concludes: "Compassion is the one and only fount of true morality, because it is the sole non-egoistic source of action" (2014, p. xvii)

Perhaps as important as his positive account, is what is to be learnt from Schopenhauer's explosive tyrades against the accounts of other philosophers, particularly those known to him personally. In adjacent sections of the text, Schopenhauer takes the opportunity to criticise Hegel's philosophy, on which he writes: "The philosophaster's object was not to instruct, but to befool his hearers, as every page attests. At first Fichte and Schelling shine as the heroes of this epoch; to be followed by the man who is quite unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior in point of talent—I mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan Hegel. The Chorus is composed of a mixed company of professors of philosophy, who in solemn fashion discourse to their public about the Endless, the Absolute, and many other matters of which they can know absolutely nothing.” (2014, p. 70). Considering that Fichte was Schopenhauer’s lecturer in undergraduate, and that Hegel was Schopenhauer’s contemporary, colleague, and inheritor of Fichte’s position as chair of philosophy, these words come quite scathing. He certainly was not afraid to attack with great zeal the other German idealists, indeed these attacks in the text resulted in him not winning the Danish society prize even though his was the only essay that was accepted. In other writings, notably the preface to The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics (2009), Schopenhauer continues his attacks against the other German ethicists, exploding into rants against the Danish board of judges who did not acreddit him. In that very short dismissal, the Judges wrote:

“In 1837 the following question was set as subject for a Prize Essay: "Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for in an idea of morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience), and in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which arise from it? Or is it to be found in some other source of knowledge?" There was only one competitor [Schopenhauer]; but his dissertation, written in German, and bearing the motto: "To preach Morality is easy, to found it is difficult"[1] we cannot adjudge worthy of the Prize. He has omitted to deal with the essential part of the question, apparently thinking that he was asked to establish some fundamental principle of Ethics. Consequently, that part of the treatise, which explains how the moral basis he proposes is related to his system of metaphysics, we find relegated to an appendix, as an "opus supererogationis," although it was precisely the connection between Metaphysics and Ethics that our question required to be put in the first and foremost place. The writer attempts to show that compassion is the ultimate source of morality; but neither does his mode of discussion appear satisfactory to us, nor has he, in point of fact, succeeded in proving that such a foundation is adequate. Indeed he himself is obliged to admit that it is not.[2] Lastly, the Society cannot pass over in silence the fact that he mentions several recent philosophers of the highest standing [Hegel, Kant, and Fichte] in an unseemly manner, such as to justly occasion serious offence.” (2014, p.285)

Schopenhaur was infuriated upon learning this, and dedicated much of the preface to his next moral work, The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics (2009) (which is composed of this text and the the text ‘On the Freedom of the Will’), to rebutting the academy’s decision with great zeal. Greater still was his fury when he learned that one of the prominent judges was, in fact, a Hegelian, and scorned Schopenhauer because of the latters disregard of Hegel. This knowledge inflamed Schopenhauer so much that he made an explicit point of ridiculing Hegel and the Academy that rejected his work in the preface of the prior mentioned text, writing:

“If a union of journal writers sworn to the glorification of the bad, if paid professors of Hegelry and yearning private teachers who would like to become such professors, indefatigably and with unparalleled shamelessness proclaim this very ordinary mind but extraordinary charlatan to all four winds as the greatest philosopher the world has ever possessed – then that is worth no serious attention, still less so given that the blatant intent of this miserable business must gradually become evident even to those of little practice. But when it goes so far that a foreign academy wishes to adopt that philosophaster as a ‘distinguished philosopher’, and even permits itself to vilify the man [speaking of himself here] who honestly and unflinchingly opposes the false fame, deceitfully obtained, bought and composed out of lies, with that degree of emphasis that is alone proportionate to the impudent promotion and obtrusion of what is false, bad, and mind-corrupting – then the matter becomes serious.” (2009, p. 14)

“If to this end I were to say that the so-called philosophy of Hegel was a colossal mystification that will provide even posterity with the inexhaustible theme of ridiculing our age, a pseudo-philosophy that cripples all mental powers, suffocates real thinking and substitutes by means of the most outrageous use of language the hollowest, the most devoid of sense, the most thoughtless, and, as the outcome confirms, the most stupefying jumble of words, and that, with an absurd passing whim plucked out of the air as its core, it is devoid of both grounds and consequences, i.e. is neither proved by anything nor itself proves or explains anything, and what is more, lacking any originality, a mere parody of scholastic realism and of Spinozism at the same time, a monster which is also supposed to represent Christianity from the reverse side, in other words a lion in front, a serpent behind, and in the middle a goat – then I should be right. If I further said that this ‘distinguished philosopher’ of the Danish Academy scrawled nonsense as no mortal ever did before him, so that anyone who could read his most celebrated work, the so-called Phenomenology of Spirit, without having the impression that he was in a madhouse, would belong in it – then I would be no less right” (2009, pp. 14 - 15)

It is thus clear that Schopenhauer was highly critical of all purely abstract ethical systems which conceptual and metaphysical or formally speculative grounding not otherwise produced in the will, of which Hegel’s if the paradigm.

East Meets West: Philosophical Pessimism

Aside from his linked views on the will and its relation to the world and the mind, Schopenhauer is perhaps best remembered for his prominent role in the development of Philosophical Pessimism (he quite directly led to the development of German Pessimism with figures like Nietzche and Mannlander). Philosophical pessimism is the view that the world, on balance, either contains or produces more suffering than happiness. Philosophical pessimists generally view life as essentially unhappy, painful, and futile.

Schopenhauer’s pessimistic interpretation of idealism is embedded in his account of the ‘will to life’. His pessimistic view arose from his understanding of life being driven by an endless cosmic Will. He saw the Will as the underlying force behind both inorganic and organic matter and considered it to be an aimless, persistent and insatiable striving. He believed that the closest human experience to the Will could be understood by observing one's own desires and bodily sensations. Schopenhauer believed that this will to life was, unsurprisingly then, the greatest if not ultimately sole source of suffering and sadness in our lives. Further, only through the sublimation of the will to life or through its denial (the aesthetic or ascetic paths) can we escape its wicked grasp. In this regard, Schopenhauer’s philosophy closely mirrors the philosophy of eastern monastic religions, most notably Buddhism. However, there is at least one fundamental difference between the two groups views on suffering and desire. Buddhism professes that desire can be overcome, indeed one necessarily overcomes all desire and earthly attachment when one achieve nirvana and becomes enlightened. Against this, it appears that Schopenhauer’s much darker view is that desire is a deeply-rooted reality of the will to life itself, and our only rebuttal can be the constant struggle against this will, which is in no way comparable to its cessation. As he writes:

“We saw that the inner being of unconscious nature is a constant striving without end and without rest. And this appears to us much more distinctly when we consider the nature of brutes and man. Willing and striving is its whole being, which may be very well compared to an unquenchable thirst. But the basis of all willing is need, deficiency, and thus pain. Consequently, the nature of brutes and man is subject to pain originally and through its very being. If, on the other hand, it lacks objects of desire, because it is at once deprived of them by a too easy satisfaction, a terrible void and ennui [boredom] comes over it, i.e., its being and existence itself becomes an unbearable burden to it. Thus its life swings like a pendulum backwards and forwards between pain and ennui. This has also had to express itself very oddly in this way; after man had transferred all pain and torments to hell, there then remained nothing over for heaven but ennui.” (2011, Book 4: § 57)

In a similar manner he viewed reason as weak and insignificant in comparison to the Will, comparing the intellect to a sighted lame man who rides on the shoulders of the strong blind caretaker (the will). In this regard, Schopenhauer believed that once a person's desires are satiated, the feeling of satisfaction is fleeting and quickly replaced by new desires, leading to a state of endless striving and unfulfilled desires. He argued that even moments of satisfaction only lead to boredom, which he saw as proof that existence has no real value in and of itself:

“Human life must be some kind of mistake. The truth of this will be sufficiently obvious if we only remember that man is a compound of needs and necessities hard to satisfy; and that even when they are satisfied, all he obtains is a state of painlessness, where nothing remains to him but abandonment to boredom. This is direct proof that existence has no real value in itself; for what is boredom but the feeling of the emptiness of life? If life—the craving for which is the very essence of our being—were possessed of any positive intrinsic value, there would be no such thing as boredom at all: mere existence would satisfy us in itself, and we should want for nothing. But as it is, we take no delight in existence except when we are struggling for something; and then distance and difficulties to be overcome make our goal look as though it would satisfy us—an illusion which vanishes when we reach it; or else when we are occupied with some purely intellectual interest—when in reality we have stepped forth from life to look upon it from the outside, much after the manner of spectators at a play. And even sensual pleasure itself means nothing but a struggle and aspiration, ceasing the moment its aim is attained. Whenever we are not occupied in one of these ways, but cast upon existence itself, its vain and worthless nature is brought home to us” (2004a, ‘On the Vanity of Existence’)

Furthermore, he argued that the business of biological life is a constant struggle and conflict, not just boredom and unsatisfied desires. In this struggle, each different manifestation of the will to live contests with one another to maintain its own existence:

“This universal conflict becomes most distinctly visible in the animal kingdom. For animals have the whole of the vegetable kingdom for their food, and even within the animal kingdom every beast is the prey and the food of another; that is, the matter in which its Idea expresses itself must yield itself to the expression of another Idea, for each animal can only maintain its existence by the constant destruction of some other. Thus the will to live everywhere preys upon itself, and in different forms is its own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all the others, regards nature as a manufactory for its use. Yet even the human race, as we shall see in the Fourth Book, reveals in itself with most terrible distinctness this conflict, this variance with itself of the will, and we find homo homini lupus.” (2011, Book 2: § 27)

Every animal must eliminate another to maintain its own existence, leading to the will-to-live feasting on itself. Schopenhauer argues that this conflict is also evident in human life, where individuals are in constant conflict with one another. Thus his above expression homo homini lupus, or "man is a wolf to man”.

Finally, considering the end of life, Schopenhauer saw old age and death as nature's verdict of condemnation on each particular manifestation of the will-to-live. He believed that the entire effort of each manifestation was bound to be in vain, as it was inherently meaningless and unfulfilling. According to Schopenhauer, if the individual were something that held intrinsic value or was absolute and unconditional, the goal of non-existence would not be at hand (a position would lead Mainlander to his concept of the ‘will to death’). This highlights the emptiness and futility of the continuous striving for success, power, and material possessions that is prevalent in human life:

“That man is nothing but a phenomenon, that he is not-the-thing-in-itself… is proved by the fact that death is a necessity.

And how different the beginning of our life is to the end! The former is made up of deluded hopes, sensual enjoyment, while the latter is pursued by bodily decay and the odour of death.

The road dividing the two, as far as our well-being and enjoyment of life are concerned, is downhill; the dreaminess of childhood, the joyousness of youth, the troubles of middle age, the infirmity and frequent misery of old age, the agonies of our last illness, and finally the struggle with death—do all these not make one feel that existence is nothing but a mistake, the consequences of which are becoming gradually more and more obvious?

It would be wisest to regard life as a desengaqo, a delusion; that everything is intended to be so is sufficiently clear.” (2004b, ‘The Emptiness of Existence’)

Conclusion

In conclusion, Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy was a unique and comprehensive worldview that encompassed a wide range of subjects such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. His philosophy was largely influenced by Eastern thought and was considered a response to the Enlightenment ideals of reason and progress. Schopenhauer argued that the true nature of the world is not governed by reason and logic, but by a blind and irrational force that he called the Will. This Will is the ultimate source of all human suffering and is the root of all desire and craving.

Much of Schopenhauer's philosophy is derived from the ideas of philosophical pessimism that he pioneered. Schopenhauer believed that life was essentially meaningless and that human existence was characterised by suffering and struggle. The constant striving for satisfaction, pleasure, and happiness leads to nothing but frustration, boredom, and dissatisfaction. He argued that the ultimate goal of life was the denial of the will to live in order to achieve temporary release from the cycle of suffering.

Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will had a profound impact on ethics. He believed that morality was based on empathy and compassion and that the highest good was to alleviate the suffering of others. He rejected the idea of egoism and utilitarianism and instead argued that the ultimate goal of life was to transcend the individual self and become one with the world as a whole.

In the field of aesthetics, Schopenhauer argued that art was a means of temporarily transcending the individual self and experiencing the world as a whole. He believed that the purpose of art was to offer a glimpse of the timeless and eternal, and that it was through art that one could find solace and meaning in an otherwise meaningless world.

Schopenhauer's philosophy was not without its critics. Many felt that his pessimistic worldview was too bleak and that his rejection of reason and logic was misguided. However, despite these criticisms, Schopenhauer's philosophy continues to be studied and discussed by philosophers and scholars today.

In conclusion, Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy was a unique and profound response to the Enlightenment ideals of reason and progress. His worldview was characterised by pessimism and a rejection of the traditional understanding of the world. Instead, he argued that the true nature of the world was governed by a blind and irrational force and that the ultimate goal of life was to transcend the individual self and experience the world as a whole. Although Schopenhauer's philosophy was not without its criticisms, it continues to be a relevant and thought-provoking perspective on the human condition and the meaning of life.

Reference List

Kant, I 2019, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. C Bennet, J Saunders, & R Stern, Oxford Classics, Oxford

Schopenhauer, A 2004a, The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer; Studies in Pessimism, Project Gutenberg, viewed 7 February 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10732/pg10732-images.html>

Schopenhauer, A 2004b, Essays of Schopenhauer, Project Gutenberg, viewed 7 February 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11945/pg11945-images.html>

Schopenhauer, A 2009, The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, trans. Christopher Janaway, Cambridge University Press, viewed 7 February 2023, <https://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/71402/frontmatter/9780521871402_frontmatter.pdf>

Schopenhauer, A 2011, The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 1 of 3), Project Gutenberg, viewed 7 February 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/38427/pg38427-images.html>.

Schopenhauer, A 2012a, The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 2 of 3), Project Gutenberg, viewed 7 February 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/40097/pg40097-images.html>

Schopenhauer, A 2012b, The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 3 of 3), Project Gutenberg, viewed 7 February 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/40868/pg40868-images.html#toc57>

Schopenhauer, A 2014, The Basis of Morality, Project Gutenberg, viewed 7 February 2023, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/44929/pg44929-images.html>

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