Deontology: The Will, Autonomy, And The Categorical Imperative

The Will

The Pure Will; That is, the will in itself as a Noun

The will in itself refers to the pure, unchanging aspect of the will that is not influenced by external factors or desires. It is the source of moral autonomy and freedom. According to Kant, the will in itself is not something that can be known or understood through experience, but is rather a concept that is inferred from the existence of moral responsibility. He believed that the will in itself is the foundation of moral law and that it serves as the ultimate criterion for determining the moral value of an action.

In contrast, Kant believed that the will as it appears in experience, what he called the "phenomenal will," is often influenced by various desires, inclinations and other external factors. These external factors can cloud the rational aspect of the will and lead to actions that are not morally good. He believed that the task of moral philosophy is to help individuals distinguish between the pure, rational aspect of the will and the external factors that influence it, so that individuals can act in accordance with the moral law.

Kant's concept of the will in itself is closely related to his idea of autonomy. Autonomy, for Kant, is the ability to act on the basis of one's own rational will, without being coerced by external factors. He believed that individuals possess autonomy by virtue of their possession of a free will and that moral responsibility is only possible when individuals act autonomously. By acting on the basis of their own rational will, individuals are able to determine the moral law for themselves and to act in accordance with it.

Kant writes that “Autonomy of the will is the property through which the will is a law to itself” (2019, p. 53). ‘Will’ or ‘the will’, in the Kantian and Post-Kantian (particularly German) tradition, refers to a faculty of the mind or of consciousness. The term can be interpreted from the German Wille as a verb - as in ‘desire’, ‘intention’ (ie. ‘good will [intent]’ or ‘I will [command] it so’ ), or as a noun - as in ‘consciousness’, ‘idea’, or ‘mental essence’ (ie. “good will [mind]” (Ibid. p. 9) or The World as Will and Representation [or Idea] (Schopenhauer 2011)).

It is the second sense, as a noun, that we are concerned with the term here. The will, in this sense, is that faculty of the mind which enables (and defines) our status as conscious, rational agents, and which is the basis of all Kantian ethics: “[the] principle of autonomy [facilitated by the will] is the sole principle of morals” (2019, p. 53). A rational subject is only rational insofar as they maintain this property, and cease to be immediately if they should lose it.

The Practical Will; That is, the will in the world as a Verb

The practical will expresses itself under two concepts. That of the pure practical will and the impure (or general) practical will.

The Pure Practical Will

Practical reason, also known as prudential reasoning or instrumental reasoning, is the process of using logic and critical thinking to determine the best course of action in a given situation. It is distinct from theoretical reason, which is used to gain knowledge about the natural world and understand the truth and knowledge. Theoretical reason is focused on understanding the nature of reality and the world around us, while practical reason is focused on making decisions and taking action in the world.

Immanuel Kant's theory of Pure Practical Reason states that human beings have the capacity to use reason to determine their actions without reference to environment. Pure practical reason is rooted in the nature of all rational beings. It is a property which cannot be ascertained by non-rational agents and which cannot be removed from a rational agent (ie. it is an apriori property). This property will come up in close reading regarding the categorical imperative.

General Practical Will

The general practical will is analogous to the concept of practical reason. According to Kant, the practical will as practical reasoning is the ability of an individual to use reason to guide their moral decisions. The general practical will is the source of moral laws, which are universally binding on all rational beings.

Practical reason can be used in many different fields, such as ethics, politics, and decision making. In ethics, practical reason is used to determine the moral rightness or wrongness of an action. It is the process of evaluating the moral implications of a decision or action and determining the course of action that is most likely to lead to the greatest overall benefit. In politics, practical reason is used to evaluate the potential consequences of different policy decisions and determine the best course of action. In decision making, practical reason is used to evaluate the potential outcomes of different options and determine the best course of action. Practical reason is thus a key component of ethical decision making.

Further, the concept of the will as practical reasoning relates to the concept of self-control; the ability of an individual to regulate their own behaviour and resist temptations or impulses, especially in the face of moral laws or duties. This is an important aspect of the will, which allows people to set goals, plan and achieve their objectives and make rational decisions.

My interpretation of Kant’s system of the will is diagrammed below:

Autonomy

For Kant, autonomy and rationality are the ultimate basis of morality and of human dignity. I need not like you, I may despise you, I may wish you come to harm, but I must respect your autonomy. I recognise that there is a principle, autonomy, within you, which I, and all others, must respect to allow for the formation of ethics.

But what is autonomy? For Kant, autonomy is not doing whatever you want (Nihilistic Libertarianism). Rather, autonomy is having the capacity to engage in reasoning regarding your condition and reasoning regarding the principles upon which you engage your life. It is consistent with your autonomy to place restrictive principles upon your own behaviour, such that you cannot do whatever you want. Therefore, proper autonomy is the ability to engage in reasoning, particularly reasoning regarding the decisions and principles which shape your life. In other terms, autonomy is not freedom from constraint, it is the capacity for self-determination. Autonomy is the ability to craft and self-impose a system of rules which you intend to fulfil, at all costs. It is this capacity which is defining of humanity and, for Kant, is the principal distinction between us and non-moral animals.

The etymological roots of the term ‘autonomous’ are the ancient Greek terms auto (‘of oneself’) and nomos (‘law’). In that context, the term differentiated between autonomous cities (approximate to democracies) and either colonies, dictates, or tyranies. Autonomous, in this regard, means self-legislating, and Autonomy thus means the ability to bring about or actualise the presence of such a state (the suffix ‘y’ meaning having the quality of the subject; ie. the quality of being autonomous). This is the specific meaning which Kant takes up in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2019) (henceforth ‘GMM’).

A ‘property’ is a characteristic of a specified object of inquiry, particularly one material to the inquiry. For example, if I say that a colleague (the object) is friendly (the characteristic); I am making a declarative assertion of some relevant characteristic as to my colleague. Analogously; when Kant asserts that autonomy is a ‘property of the will’, he makes a declarative assertion as to some relevant characteristic of the will. Specifically, he declares that the object of his inquiry (the will) maintains some characteristic relevant to his inquiry (autonomy). Properties need not be defining of their objects (and rarely are). More importantly, properties are generally considered ontologically dependent of a particular object. Ie. in this case, autonomy cannot exist outside the particular object of inquiry. Thus, autonomy must be constrained to a specified object (for Kant, the will) and cannot but be present where the will is present; and contrawise cannot be present where the will is not.

Thus, with the understanding that the will is the precondition for rationality in any such creatures, the prior quote [autonomy is 'the property of the will by which it is a law to itself' (2019, p. 53)] can then be interpreted as such: ‘Autonomy; the ability to enforce moral proclamations on oneself, is a subordinate feature of the will - that capacity which enables deliberation and rational consideration - and is an ever-present product of that capacity’. In other words, autonomy is (1) necessary for the authority of moral proclamations, (2) produced by rational deliberation, (3) inescapably subordinate to the will (insofar as it cannot be forced upon a will by any means), (4) inexorably tied to rationality and the capacity thereof. This interpretation can be supported by other important quotes from the text: as at p.16 (2019) sentence beginning ‘Hence nothing other than the representation of the law…’ (as to (4)) and pp. 22 - 23 (Ibid) - paragraph beginning “In addition, unless one wants to deny to the concept of morality truth and applicability…” (as to (1), (2), and (3)).

The final aspect of Kant’s assertion requiring explanation is his assertion that autonomy enables the will to be a ‘law to itself’. Prima facie, this expression can be understood by the aforementioned discussion of the nature of autonomy in the Kantian tradition. However, it is also important to consider the specific relation between autonomy, law, and the will.

As previously mentioned, autonomy, in the simplest Kantian sense, is the ability for self-legislation. In other words, it is the ability to produce and enforce (through the faculty of the will) moral proclamations as they pertain (at least initially) to oneself. A moral law (necessarily implied by self-legislation) in the deontological tradition represents a particular kind of proclamation. Moral laws take the form of absolute, universalizable commandments which bind the legislated to certain absolute duties or obligations. To give law to will thus means to apply absolute rules to a will (‘the mind’, ‘the faculty of consciousness’) the likes of which imply sets of absolute duties or obligations. Wherever this law is given by one’s will, to one’s own will (ie. where it is self-legislative), then the law is the product of autonomy and enables the sustainment of an autonomous (‘free’) will. Wherever this law is given by another’s will, and thus subjugates one’s own will (ie. where it is extra-legislative), then the law obtains the characteristic of tyranny and destroys the property of autonomy in the will it tyranisses.

The Categorical Imperative

From Pure Practical Reasoning to the Ultimate Maxim: The Categorical Imperative

This grounding for the categorical imperative is deeply discussed in Kant's Groundworks of the Metaphysics of Morals (2019) (aptly titled). That text defines practical reason as the faculty of knowledge that guides our actions. He asserts that this faculty must be guided by a priori principles, or moral laws, in order for it to be considered truly moral. He then relates that these moral laws must be grounded in the concept of the ‘good will’; a will which acts out of a sense of duty, rather than out of self-interest. For Kant, a good will is the only thing that can be considered good without qualification. He writes

“It is impossible to think of anything in the world, or indeed even outside it, that can be taken to be good without qualification, except a good will” (2019, p. 9)

Thus, Kant further remarks that all other qualities or actions are only considered good in relation to it, even those we commonly praise. As an example to this end, he references moderation of the passions (ie. emotional restraint), writing:

“Moderation in emotions and passions, self-control and sober reflection, are not only good in many respects, but they even appear to constitute a person’s inner worth [dignity]. Nonetheless, it would be remiss to call them good without qualification (however unconditionally they may be praised by the ancients). For without the principles of a good will they can become thoroughly evil, and the composure of a villian makes them not only more dangerous, but also immediately more despicable in our eyes” (2019, pp. 9 - 10)

This discussion of the good will and its relation to action later leads to Kant’s discussions of imperatives, first hypothetical and later categorical. ‘Hypothetical imperatives’ are commands that apply only in certain situations or under certain conditions. For example, the imperative ‘Go to work to avoid being fired’ only binds in the hypothetical (ie. not necessary) scenario where one cares to avoid being fired. All such propositions which take the form ‘do x to avoid y’ are likewise hypothetical as they presume (hypothesise) that the agent grants merit to x or wills to avoid y. Kant contrasts these with categorical imperatives, which bind not to any particular will, but to the very act of willing itself. These imperatives simply take the form ‘do x’, where ‘x’ is a necessarily merited act for any willing [rational] agent. Thus, Kant asserts that categorical imperatives apply unconditionally to all rational beings. Contrawise, he argues that hypothetical imperatives cannot be truly moral. This is because they are based on a self-interest (to merit x or avoid y) rather than a sense of duty (to have your act of willing presuppose x).

Kant also argues that the only way to arrive at such a categorical imperative is through pure practical reason, which is not based on any particular circumstances or desires, but on the nature of rational beings as beings with a necessary will (not any particular will, but a will at all). He states that the moral law is not something that can be discovered through observation or experience (as it does not reference any experience or hypothetical in the manner hypothetical imperatives do), but rather it can only be known through pure reason (which precisely considers no hypothetical). He concludes that the ultimate goal of morality is the highest good, which is the complete harmony of rational nature through the highest degree of freedom under the moral law.

Kant first presents the ‘categorical imperative’ (2019, p. 35) in its form of duty as such:

“Therefore, there is just one categorical imperative, and it is this: act only on a maxim that you can also will to become a universal law of nature… The universal imperative of duty [the categorical imperative] could also be expressed as follows: act as if the maxim of your action, by your will, were to become a universal law of nature” (2019, p. 35)

He states that this categorical imperative, the only categorical imperative, is an unconditional command that applies to all rational beings, regardless of their individual circumstances or desires. He thus explains that in order to determine whether an action is morally permissible, we must ask ourselves whether we would be willing to make it a universal law, and if the answer is no, then the action is not morally permissible.

From Maxim to Application: The Three Formulations, and the Perfect and Imperfect Duties

As previously stated, the categorical imperative is Kant’s fundamental principle of moral reasoning, central to his deontological philosophy. This principle is derived from the abstract, independent of personal preferences or desires. It considers the inherent moral worth of actions and not consequences of any particular action.

In moving from the pure or the formal to the practical moral considerations, Kant attempts to derive from the abstract moral law the maxim of duty. This maxim, which is not separate but rather subordinate to the moral law, provides the practical guidelines for moral engagement in the practical realm. In other words, it provides a practically digestible system which can be applied to the lives of rational agents and their interactions with other such agents.

The maxim of duty, often also called the categorical imperative, is presented in at least formulations by Kant. It is important to note, as he himself explicitly stated, that these three formulations are three interpretations of the same moral law. They are not three different moral laws. Keeping this in mind, let us review each in turn.

First Formulation - Maxim of Universalizability

Kant’s first formulation is the maxim of universalizability and has been previously mentioned. For ease of reading, I will restate it:

“act only on a maxim that you can also will to become a universal law of nature” (2019, p. 35)

This first formulation is so called as it is the first presented in Kant’s work. In itself, it plays a key role in the deduction of the second (and thus also third) formulation.

The universality and independence of the first formulation has important implications for ethical decision-making. In particular, it provides a means of resolving conflicts between personal interests and the interests of others, by appealing to the inherent and universal nature of reason in moral principles.

For example, consider the situation of a doctor who is faced with a choice between lying to a patient in order to spare the patient's feelings, and telling the patient the truth about a medical condition, which may cause the patient distress. According to the first formulation of the categorical imperative, the doctor must choose the action that could be consistently willed as a universal law that applies to all rational beings. In this case, this would likely mean telling the patient the truth, even if doing so may cause the patient distress, because the principle of telling the truth could be consistently willed as a universal law.

Second Formulation - Formulation of Humanity

The second formulation of the categorical imperative, also known as the Formulation of Humanity, or The Practical Imperative (as Kant calls it), is another key principle of Kantian ethics, and provides a more concrete expression of the moral responsibilities that all rational beings owe to one another. This formulation states that:

“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or anyone else's, never merely as a means, but also always as an end.” (2019, p. 42)

In other words, the second formulation of the categorical imperative requires that all rational beings be treated as ends in themselves, and never merely as means to an end. This means that one must always respect the inherent dignity and worth of all rational beings, and must not use others as mere instruments to achieve one's own goals or purposes.

This principle has important implications for ethical decision-making, as it requires individuals to consider not only the consequences of their actions, but also the way in which their actions impact the inherent dignity and worth of others.

For Kant, price (literally monetary price $) references the use value of an object. Things with price derive their value from our purposes or their utility to us, ie. as means for us to achieve some end.

Kant thinks that persons, not just humans but any hypothetical rational being or subject, have a secondary kind of value (alongside the price value of them as objects), that is, dignity. Dignity is a kind of intrinsic value and explains the intuitions or irreplaceability and non-interchangeability we have regarding other people. The value borne from dignity is not derived from usefulness to others and acts as an end in itself:

To say that a person is an end in themselves is just to say that they have unconditional (ie. intrinsic) value. That is, their value doesn’t depend on any contingent (transient) factor but is derived from the concept itself a priori. For Kant, it is irrational and thereby forbidden to destroy something of unconditional value for the sake of something merely conditionally valuable.

What does it mean to use a person? When I order a meal from a restaurant am I using the staff in the proper sense? No. The second formulation states you must not use a person ‘merely as a means’. Thus, you may use people as a means to achieve something so long as you also respect them as an end in themselves, ie. as a rational agent with the capacity to choose.

For example: When I order an uber, I am using the driver as a means to an end, but not merely as a means. I am not forcing them to accommodate me: They may reject my order, they may remove me from the vehicle during the trip, they have chosen to enter into this profession. I am not forcing them to be subservient to my will. Rather, we are both interacting with autonomy and mutual respect for the will of the other. If, contrary to this, I hold them at gunpoint or take the ride and leave without refusing to pay, I am forcefully subserving their will to my own, thereby I am disrespecting their autonomy, thus using them as mere means.

Third Formulation - Kingdom of Ends

Although there is some disagreement as to the number of formulations and the order thereof, for this writing I shall consider the third formulation to be Kant’s Kingdom of Ends formulation:

“…act according to the maxims of a member legislating universally for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (2019, 52)

“I understand by kingdom here the systematic union of various rational beings through common laws. Now, laws determine ends according to their validity for all universally. One can therefore (if one abstracts from the personal differences among rational beings, and likewise from all content of their private ends) conceive of a systematically connected while of all ends (of rational beings as ends in themselves, as well as the ends that each of them may set for themselves), ie. a kingdom of ends, which, according to the principles given above, is possible” (2019, p. 46)

Consider what an ideal society would look like. For Kant, such a society would only contain laws that autonomous agents would agree to (and would maintain). Further, these laws cannot contradict each other of course, ie. they all must be universalizable which is how this formulation represents the same underlying principal as the first formulation. In other words, this formulation asserts that a just society, or a ‘Kingdom of Ends’, would be one in which all members of the society treat each other as ends in themselves, and act according to universal moral principles that are consistent with this treatment.

The Kingdom of Ends represents the ideal (‘merely possible’) hypothetical community. It is a society in which all rules that apply to me are rules that I have imposed upon myself, ie. they are rules that totally respect my autonomy. In this, Kant is asking individuals to consider the moral implications of their actions as if they were universally applicable and consistently followed by all rational beings in the Kingdom of Ends.

This principle too has important implications for ethical decision-making, as it requires individuals to think about the long-term consequences of their choices. For example, an individual who is considering lying to achieve a personal gain must ask themselves whether lying would be acceptable if it were universally followed and became a law of nature. This is how this formulation derives from the first.

Likewise, in the Kingdom of Ends, moral principles would be universal and consistently followed by all members of the society, and the inherent dignity and worth of all individuals would be respected. This means that individuals would act in accordance with the categorical imperative, and would never use others as mere means to an end. Thus the third formulation also derives from the second.

Sixfold Separation of Duties

Beyond the three practical formulations of the moral law, Kant had a rich system concerning the further attitudes and properties of a person under particular kinds of duties required by that law.

Positive and Negative Duties

For Kant, a duty is considered positive if it mandates some action. Ie, you must maintain the dignity of others in all your dealings. Contrawise, a duty is negative if it forbids some action. Ie, you must not lie.

The rules produced by the categorical imperative are primarily negative in nature. In other words, in most instances, you may do as you wish so long as you don’t violate the autonomy of another. However, there are a few positive rules. In his writings, Kant specifically singles out two of these:

You have a positive duty to develop your abilities as a rational agent. To fail in doing so disrespects your own dignity
You have a positive duty to help others. Failing to do so disrespects their dignity.

However, even here, Kant says these positive duties are imperfect duties.

Perfect and Imperfect Duties and Duties to Self and Others

A perfect duty is a duty that must be engaged in without exception, for to do otherwise results in a contradiction when universalised (a contradiction in conception). For example, you must never lie (no exceptions). Because it is not universalizable to permit lying, this becomes a perfect duty to others. Another example is Kant’s prohibition on suicide (which treats oneself merely as a means to an end), which is a perfect duty to oneself.

The positive duties previously listed are imperfect duties. Imperfect duties are prescriptions of general ends, and fulfilling them is praiseworthy but failing them does not violate the categorical imperative. The first positive duty, to develop your capacities, is an imperfect duty to oneself. The second positive duty, to act benevolently, is an imperfect duty to others. Failing to act on imperfect duties results in a contradiction in will. In other words; it enrages us as rational agents to transgress the imperfect duties but not necessarily in ignoring them. To return to the examples; it contradicts our rational will to be belligerent to others but not to be apathetic to them. In the hyperrogatory case (where we go beyond duty), acting benevolent is above the requirement of the will. Thus, imperfect duties are duties of the will insofar as violating them contradicts the will. However, unlike the moral law, they are not moral duties since their status relies on the will and desires rather than our relationship to the concept of morality itself.

Reference List

Kant, I 2019, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. C Bennet, J Saunders, & R Stern, Oxford Classics, Oxford

Schopenhauer, A 2011, The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 1 of 3), Project Gutenberg,

viewed 23 October 2022, <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/38427/38427-pdf.pdf>.

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