An Inquiry into the Morality of Abortion

 

An Inquiry into the Morality of Abortion

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Assertion of My Axioms

A moral axiom is a basic principle or rule that is considered to be self-evident or universally accepted in a particular ethical or moral system. Perhaps the most common example of this is the phrase “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”. Moral axioms underlie all moral systems as the ‘foundation’ upon which all moral arguments ultimately rest. They are the metaphorical bedrock to which all (valid) moral arguments may be reduced, and the boundary of all discussion. 

One’s view of the nature of axioms will necessarily depend on a number of meta-ethical stances. I don’t say this to be obtuse. Rather, I want you, the reader, to be aware that the following view of axioms I will present and sustain throughout is by no means to be taken as universal or objective. Speaking of objectivity; if you believe that morality is a matter of objective inquiry (ie. in the style of Kant), you are likely to believe that axioms too (insofar as they are subjects of morality) can be objectively inquired into or derived. Alternatively, if you hold the view, as I sadly cannot avoid, that morality is a matter of subjective belief, it seems necessary that you believe axioms are subjectively asserted or constructed rather than found or derived. From this position it follows, in my view, that moral systems are incommunicable (the knowledge of them cannot be transferred), incommensurable (cannot exist in harmony), and objectively-indefensible (they cannot be defended by appeal to objective measures, nor even objective structures like logic). Now that I have laid out my view of axioms; please allow me to introduce the axioms which form my bedrock:

Axioms

Presupposed Axioms (PA)

1. A Moral Agent (MA) is a being that appears to have the capacity for Deliberate Moral Action and therefore has Moral Liability

1. Note; this does not in principle rule out species other than humans, nor does it necessarily include all humans

1. As in The Immediate Moral Argument for Veganism

2. For example, comatose people or those with intense mental deformity do not count as Moral Agents as in Moral Considerations Regarding Abortion & The Sleeping Victim Dilemna

2. Appears because it is impossible to eliminate the possibility of Philosophical Zombies or eternal Determinism

3. Capacity for Deliberate Moral Action instead of the typical Capacity for Preferences because I do not consider an expression of preference as sufficient for moral liability and I see moral liability as necessary for moral agency.

2. Moral Consideration ought only to be extended to beings who are both Moral Agents and who are capable of reciprocating moral values

1. This is a kind of rights-based approach to ethics. Ie. those Moral Agents who have the capacity for reciprocating moral values are imbued with a set of moral rights, the violation of which is immoral

1. For example, apparent psychopaths (as rare as they are) like Jerrod Murray or apparent amoralists like the tool-box killers or the torturers of Junko Furuta would not receive moral consideration (assuming they truly cannot reciprocate moral values)

Moral/Immoral Distinction (M/I)

1. An act is moral (good) if it promotes the flourishing of MAs

2. An act is immoral (bad) if it directly inhibits the flourishing of MAs; or if it unduly violates the autonomy of another moral agent

1. All violations of autonomy (ie. dominations of others will, force beyond consent) are undue unless conducted by a body of arbitration accepted (even implicitly so) as authoritative by all parties

3. An act may be amoral (neutral) if:

1. It indirectly / incidentally inhibits the flourishing of MAs

1. Note that Hyper-Complication of scenarios likely prevents moral judgement (ie. in the case of Macro-economic Systems)

2. It neither promotes/inhibits the flourishing of MAs

3. It is a due violation of autonomy as described above

Applied Axioms (AA)

1. MA’s ought to seek harmonisation with other MAs

1. Harmonisation between MAs is necessary for the flourishing of said agents and is thereby moral

2. That which directly inhibits the flourishing of MA’s is immoral

1. One ought always to tailor behaviour so as not to infringe on the autonomy of others, except as where denoted as due by an accepted body of arbitration

2. Bodily Harm, Production of Anarchy, Hyper-Atomisation and Moral Disinterest are all expressions of inhibition of the harmonisation of MAs and thereby immoral

3. Social Contractarianism is a highly efficient method of harmonisation between MAs and thereby a moral system.

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Argument Regarding the (Lack of) Moral Rights of the Foetus

The Foetus in Itself

First the morality of Abortion (without regard to its legality) will be considered. This is the specific consideration of the foetus itself without regard to the burden of the mother’s rights. For the purpose of this paper, abortion is defined as the termination or murder otherwise of a zygote, an embryo, or a foetus (prenatal child). 

My current position is that abortion is morally permissible until a certain stage of development in the general case. There will be edge cases that go both ways which will be considered. The separating factor for me between permissibility and immorality in abortion is entirely at the axiomatic level. This can be generalised as a Special Moral Agent / Life dichotomy where I do not care for Life in the general case but I do care for Special Moral Agents (ie. I permit the eating of animals but not the killing of people). I also maintain that certain proto-moral agents ought to be protected. Specifically beings with the meaningful capacity in their current state to become Special Moral Agents. Certain preconditions such as a conscious experience and an expression of preferences can be viewed as proto-conditions of Moral Agents. Importantly, I will never prioritise the survival of a proto-moral agent over a present special moral agent.

Consider a zygote, the typical product of the general combination of sperm and ova. In this stage of development there appears no proto-conditions for moral agency and certainly moral agency. As such, a zygote does not fulfil even the capacity for proto-conditions for moral consideration. Thereby it is permissible in all cases to abort zygotes.

Consider an embryo, that being the developmental stage after zygote and before foetus. In this stage of development there appears no proto-conditions for moral agency nor moral agency. As such, it is the same consideration as the zygote. Thereby it is permissible in all cases to abort an embryo.

Consider a foetus, which is essentially a pre-birth child - particularly in the latest stages of development. I first maintain that the act of birth does not meaningfully change a foetus. That is, the moment before birth is not morally distinct from the moment after (with regard to the child alone). As such, I find it morally equivalent if the foetus is in the womb (ie. at 35 weeks) or is born premature (ie. at 35 weeks) or at any stage of development. In this context, there will be only one primary consideration with regard to the foetus. Does the foetus display signs of a conscious experience? If this condition is not fulfilled then the foetus is not only absent from moral consideration, it is absent even the preconditions for moral consideration. If this condition is filled, then moral consideration may move forward. If the child is inferred to have a conscious experience (inferred because it’s impossible to guarantee consciousness in anybody else) then the child ought be considered as a special proto-moral agent. From my perspective this, in itself, makes abortion occasioned without duress in these cases immoral. To clarify, I mean that, in cases where the foetus exhibited a conscious experience (and thus becomes a proto moral agent), abortion is immoral unless required for the protection of the present moral agent (the mother).

The point at which a foetus attains a conscious experience is incredibly hard to determine, not the least because science in the first instance cannot actually investigate consciousness. Rather, science can only investigate the objects or structure which we assert or assume produce consciousness. Generally, though not universally, the seat of consciousness is assumed to be the brain. More specifically, the brain stem is typically identified as the first necessary prestructure for the origination of a conscious experience. However, even where this is present, it is generally also asserted that a specific pattern of communication between brain structures must be present to infer consciousness. This is merely to say that there is a world of difference between a dead brain (which has all the correct structures) and a functional brain (which has the structures and the activity). Thus, if we are to take this dominant view, a foetus needs both the correct brain structures (brain stem and early brain) and the correct brain activity to begin having a conscious experience. Under these assumptions; a cautious date of developmental cut off is between the 22nd and 24th weeks (just before the third trimester, ~5 - 5.5 months of gestation). As a publication in the Journal of Medical Ethics Relays:

“Gertler proposed 22-24 weeks gestation, on the basis that the neocortex begins producing EEG waves at this time. Underlying this proposal is the view that human cognition is the beginning of cognitive capability and the point at which protection of personhood should begin.”

(Jones 1998, p.239)

I believe this interpretation to be perfectly charitable. However, I understand this is a contentious issue which arouses emotion in many people. Therefore, if you wish to independently verify the author’s interpretation, the article to which they refer is found in Volume 95 of the Southern California Law Review 

(Gertler 1986) 

Note: Even past the point of moral consideration, abortion abortion is not necessarily impermissible, we must now grant consideration to the mother. 

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The Failure of General Bodily Autonomy Arguments

The Bodily Autonomy Argument

One famous argument for Abortion was put abortion was put forth by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her seminal 1971 paper "A Defense of Abortion". In that work, she posits that even if the foetus is considered a person with a right to life (this concession is very important for later criticism), a woman's right to control her own body and its life-support functions supersedes the foetus's right to life, thus making abortion morally permissible. Thomson famously employs the analogy of a person being forced to use their body as a life-support machine for another person, such as a dialysis machine for a person with kidney failure, to argue that just as it would be considered morally permissible to "unplug" and cause the death of the person using one's kidneys, it should also be considered morally permissible to abort the foetus.

Critics of this argument, as I am, have argued that there are morally important disanalogies between abortion and the kidney failure scenario. These might include: the foetus is the woman's child as opposed to a mere stranger, the act of killing the foetus as opposed to merely letting it die, and the woman's potential consent or responsibility for the pregnancy, if it was the result of voluntary intercourse.

Alternative scenarios have been proposed as more accurate and realistic representations of the moral issues present in abortion. For example, John Noonan proposes the scenario of a family being held liable for frostbite finger loss suffered by a dinner guest whom they refused to allow to stay overnight, despite the cold weather and the guest's indication of illness. Noonan argues that just as it would not be considered morally permissible to refuse temporary accommodation for the guest to protect him from physical harm, it should not be considered morally permissible to refuse temporary accommodation of a foetus. (Noonan 2013)

Another point of contention among critics is the distinction between artificial and natural means of preservation. Some argue that there is a difference between utilising artificial means, such as medical treatment or blood transfusions, and utilising natural means, such as gestation or breastfeeding. They argue that while a mother would be obligated to allow a baby to breastfeed in a scenario in which there is no replacement available, the same cannot be said of artificial means, such as blood transfusions. This distinction, they argue, highlights the difference between using one's body as a kidney dialysis machine and utilising one's body for the natural processes of gestation and childbirth.

I am not particularly favourable to some of these counter arguments but I nonetheless disregard the bodily autonomy argument. I am favourable to a few lines presented by  Richard J. Poupard (2007) and Francis J. Beckwith (1992) in two distinct papers. 

Critics

Richard J Poupard

As Poupard presents in his paper, under the section ‘My Body, My Choice?’, the principle of bodily autonomy posits that individuals have a right to control their own bodies and the actions that take place within them. Proponents of this principle argue that, in the context of prenatal parental responsibilities, this right is largely voluntary and, as such, it is morally permissible for a mother to deny the use of her body, even if such denial results in the death of her child.

Poupard challenges this argument through a thought experiment, the inferences of which I strongly agree with:

Suppose a woman who faces an unplanned pregnancy decides to give her child for adoption to another couple and agrees to allow the child use of her body during the period of gestation, but explicitly states that she is unwilling to care for the child after the birth event. Now, suppose this mother takes a vacation in a cabin in the mountains when a freak snowstorm strikes, closing all the roads in and out of the area for at least two weeks. The cabin has adequate food and water stores for the mother, but there is no baby formula, and there are no baby bottles or supplements available for a newborn child. As the storm strikes, the mother goes into labour and delivers a healthy baby. The only way the newborn can survive is to feed on the milk that her mother’s breasts naturally provide. There is no formula to feed her, and no means to give the child hydration except for breastfeeding.

Does the mother have any moral obligation to use her body (against her stated desire) to feed this child? If we were to follow Thomson’s argument and the lines of those following after her, we would be compelled to say that, although the mother is responsible for the existence of the child, she is not responsible for the child’s neediness or the circumstance that has placed that child in need, despite the fact that the mother can easily fulfil that need in a natural, healthy way. According to a line presented by Thomson supporter David Boonin (2003), the mother appears to have no obligation to share her body with her own child, even if the baby girl dies from dehydration.

Let us expand this though experiment a little more, as Poupard does:

Suppose that the mother has brought a young kitten with her to the cabin. The kitten would be in the same position as the baby girl. 

What if, instead of allowing her own child to drink her milk, the mother elects instead to give it to her young kitten? After all, she wants the kitten, and she has already stated that she did not wish to care for the child after the birth. She reminds herself of the slogan “My Body, My Choice” as she watches her child die.

If the authorities find her child dead from dehydration two weeks later, how would we judge her actions? What if we found the child dead, but the kitten alive, even well? Would we consider her actions powerful assertions of her right to autonomy, or see them as morally unconscionable acts of selfishness? It would be very difficult for the mother to justify allowing her own child to die based on her desire to keep her body to herself. Further, if you were to buckle the autonomy and say that the mother does, in fact, have an obligation to feed her child in this scenario, that would indicate a weakness of her claims to bodily autonomy in other situations. The strong moral intuition I have is that this thought experiment produces inferences that the right to bodily autonomy is not strong enough to override the moral obligations we have to our children, if they are indeed to be considered persons (as the my body, my choice arguments concede).

Francis J. Beckwith

In a more structured manner, Beckwith takes four lines of critique against Thomson’s violinist argument, all of which I find quite compelling and will outline as such.

(1) Against Volunteerism

As Beckwith explained, by using the violinist story as a paradigm for all relationships, which implies that moral obligations must be voluntarily accepted in order to have moral force, Thomson mistakenly infers that all true moral obligations to one's offspring are voluntary. However, as they then argue, and I agree, this is not the case. As Beckwith continues: 

Consider a scenario in which a couple engages in a sexual encounter that is fully protected by multiple forms of birth control, yet results in conception. Instead of opting for an abortion, the mother chooses to bring the pregnancy to term, but keeps it hidden from the father. After the birth of the child, the mother approaches the father, requesting child support, but he denies the request. The mother then takes legal action, and the court rules that the father is obligated to pay child support due to his biological relationship to the child. 

Such a scenario highlights the fact that child support laws, as codifications of a societal morality, often make the parental body an indirect resource for the child. Further, this recourse (ie. the parental body) is not based on any voluntary acceptance, but also on the understanding that sexual intercourse can result in the creation of another human being. This leads directly into another issue with Thomson's argument. That is, it ignores the natural relationship between sexual intercourse and human reproduction. Even if a couple has taken all reasonable precautions against having a child, they still have a potential special responsibility for it due to their biological relationship and the fact that they engaged in an act that could result in the creation of another being with a special moral status. Similarly, Thomson may fail to consider that special obligations, although not directly undertaken voluntarily, are necessary to preserve the rights of the vulnerable, the weak, and the young. 

(2) Defending the Family

Though I do not agree with this particular argument of Beckwith, it would be bad faith of me not to present it (and thus cherry pick). As Beckwith asserts, Thomson's argument is fatal to family morality. The idea that moral obligations must be voluntarily accepted in order to have moral force, as posited by Thomson, undermines the central belief of family morality which holds that an individual has special personal obligations to their offspring and family, that they do not have to other persons. This notion of volunteerism is counter-intuitive for many individuals who have found joy, happiness, and love in family life.

As Beckwith relays (1992, p. 112): Philosopher Christina Sommers also argues that Thomson's volunteerism is detrimental to family morality, stating that it means there is no such thing as filial duty, no special duty of a mother to her child, and generally no special morality of family or kinship relations. This is contrary to what many people believe, as they think that we owe special debts to our parents, even if we have not voluntarily assumed our obligations to them. They also believe that what we owe to our children does not have its origin in any voluntary undertaking and that we owe special consideration to our siblings, even at times when we may not feel very friendly to them.

The view that commitment to an individual is to have made a voluntarily implicit or explicit commitment to that individual is generally fatal to family morality, as it looks upon the network of felt obligation and expectation that binds family members as a sociological phenomenon that is without presumptive moral force. Social critics who hold this view of family obligation are aware that promoting it in public policy must further the disintegration of the traditional family as an institution. However, whether they deplore the disintegration or welcome it, they are bound in principle to accept it.

(3) A Feotus Right to Bodily Protection

A case can be made that the unborn entity does have a natural prima facie claim to the mother's body. This is because the unborn is a human being who is naturally dependent on the mother for survival, and the womb is the natural environment for this stage of human development. Furthermore, when the unborn becomes a newborn, it has a natural claim to care from its parents, regardless of whether the parents "wanted" the child.

Furthermore, if the unborn entity is fully human, as Thomson grants, it would be unjustifiable to deny the unborn's natural prima facie claim to the mother's body simply because the unborn is in an earlier stage of development. While it may be true that pregnancy and childbirth entail certain emotional, physical, and financial sacrifices on the part of the pregnant woman, these sacrifices are also present in parenthood in general, and do not justify terminating the life of the unborn child.

Beckwith cites Stephen D Schwarz here who also suggests that mothers have a natural obligation to care for their children. That is, to sustain them, to protect them, and especially, to let them live in the only place where they can now be protected, nourished, and allowed to grow, namely the womb. This natural bond between mother and child is not the same as the artificial relationship between the violinist and the person chained to them. Schwarz argues that Thomson's illustration undermines the deep natural bond between mother and child by reducing it to a brutal caricature.

Furthermore, Schwarz posits that the unborn entity has a prima facie natural claim to her mother's body. However, this claim is not absolute and may be outweighed by other important values, such as when a pregnancy significantly endangers the mother's life. In such cases, the continuation of the pregnancy would most likely entail the death of both mother and child, and it is morally justified to terminate such a pregnancy via abortion, as it is better that one human should live rather than two die. This argument highlights the nuanced and complex nature of the relationship between the unborn entity and the mother, and the moral considerations that must be taken into account in any discussion of abortion.

It can be argued that Thomson's argument concerning the violinist, which posits that moral obligations must be voluntarily accepted in order to have moral force, may not apply solely in cases of pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. However, it is worth noting that Thomson herself does not make this argument. Instead, she argues that the question of whether or not an individual has a right to life should not be based on the circumstances of their conception. Those who argue for the applicability of Thomson's argument in cases of rape may argue that just as a sperm donor is not responsible for how his sperm is used, a raped woman cannot be held responsible for the unborn human living inside her. However, this analogy is flawed as the sperm donor's relinquishing of responsibility does not result in the death of a human life, while the raped woman's may.

Furthermore, it can be argued that just as it is morally wrong for the sperm donor to kill the child he is supporting to right the wrong committed against him, it would also be morally wrong for the raped woman to terminate her pregnancy through abortion, except in cases where the pregnancy poses a significant danger to her life. In both cases, the killing of the child is not morally justified. While neither the sperm donor nor the rape victim has the same special obligation to their biological offspring as a couple who voluntarily engaged in intercourse, there is a more general obligation not to directly kill another human being, which is supported by Beckwith’s fourth ethical objection.

(4) Abortion is an Overt Act and Not The Withholding of Treatment

Thomson’s metaphor of the violinist represents an interesting proof that there are certain cases in which one has a moral right to withhold treatment, even when such withholding is lethal in nature. To consent to the violinist acts above duty, to withdraw does not contravene it. This is not so in the case of abortion. Abortion does not represent a withholding of consent but rather an application of force. Further, the child, if it is to be conceded as such (which I would not do so), has a right to life. As rights imply responsibilities on others, not to violate such rights, the mother does not act above duty in sustaining the child and, unlike the violinist case, she does contravene duty (once more, if the child is indeed a person, which is not my position) in the instance she aborts.

Beckwith presents this argument by citing another pro-life philosopher, Micheal Levin (1987, pp. 288-89). Levin presents a counterargument by highlighting the essential disanalogy between abortion and the unplugging of the violinist. In the case of the violinist, the person who withdraws assistance is not completely responsible for the dependency on him of the person who is about to die, while the mother is completely responsible for the dependency of her foetus on her. Therefore, the refusal to continue to aid in the case of abortion constitutes a killing, rather than simply the withholding of treatment. The moral responsibility of the mother in this scenario is much greater than that of the person hooked up to the violinist, as the mother is the one who has voluntarily chosen to engage in sexual intercourse, and is therefore responsible for the creation of the foetus.

Furthermore, the analogy between abortion and the withholding of treatment is further called into question when considering cases that parallel rape. In such a scenario, the person is not responsible for the creation of the foetus, and therefore should not be held to the same moral standard as the mother in the scenario of voluntary intercourse. If a person is obligated to sacrifice his life because his death would benefit another person, it would be unjustified to "withhold treatment" from an unwanted child and allow for its subsequent death.

Beckwith once more returns to Schwarz who asserts that abortion is not simply the withholding of support or treatment, but rather the active killing of a human person through means such as burning, crushing, and dismemberment. This distinction is important as it highlights that the moral implications of abortion are much more severe than simply withholding treatment. To euphemistically refer to abortion as the "withholding of support or treatment" is misleading and inaccurate, as it does not accurately convey the gravity of the act of terminating a pregnancy.

The arguments of these authors, and of Beckwith himself, lead me to conclude that, although there are instances in which withholding or withdrawing medical treatment is morally justifiable, abortion is not one of these. The moral responsibility of the mother in the scenario of voluntary intercourse and the active killing of the foetus through abortion distinguish it from the unplugging of the violinist. The analogy between abortion and the withholding of treatment is further called into question when considering cases that parallel rape, and the active killing of the fetus through abortion that is distinct from the withholding of treatment.

Certain consideration of the Mother

At the end of this discussion, and with my dismissal of bodily autonomy arguments in mind, it is now important to acknowledge that the concept of abortion as it pertains to a human host differs significantly from the idea of abortion in a vacuum. In order to establish that abortion, in general, is morally unjustifiable, one must take into account the fundamental principle of human liberty. The significance of this principle may vary depending on the particular moral framework being employed. In my own moral framework, human liberty is considered a crucial value, albeit one that is not directly prioritised. The principle of liberty as agency is essential for determining moral responsibility and is thus considered at a metaethical level.

With regards to my distinctions between moral and immoral actions, an action is deemed moral if it promotes the well-being of moral agents (MAs) or facilitates the realisation of the highest-order preferences among MAs. Conversely, an action may be considered amoral if it indirectly or incidentally hinders the flourishing of MAs. These distinctions are consistent with a utilitarian perspective. From this perspective, if the well-being of the mother is deemed to be greater than that of the foetus, then the act of abortion can be considered morally permissible. Conversely, if the well-being of the foetus is deemed to be greater than that of the mother, the act of abortion would be morally impermissible. It is worth noting that this analysis is based on act utilitarianism and does not take into account considerations of legality, which would be evaluated through the lens of rule utilitarianism.

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Special Cases

One Party Consent Variants

Abortion in the cases of one party consent appears to be a contentious issue. However, I believe through the processing of increasingly opaque scenarios and the relations to analogous cases, a general moral consideration can be achieved. I will consider cases of non-consensual conception (where the conceiving intercourse is rape). For further clarification, the kinds of abortions I will consider here are of a foetus at its earliest stages, within the first trimester, to avoid rebuttals which are not directed at my focus here but rather belong to the prior sections. If an individual considers abortion always immoral, I am not trying to convince them otherwise in this section, please either reference the prior sections or move on.

In what is sadly controversial, I will at every stage draw the same conclusion for the potential father as for the potential mother. I am deeply disheartened by what I consider blatant misandry in this topic. Particularly regarding the potential father's lack of consent to being a parent. I will reject any arguments which attempt to allow the potential father to be forced into parenthood without their consent and will continuously state (as I strongly believe) that such arguments are no better than analogous arguments that potential mothers who want abortion ought to be compelled against it for the sake of the father who wants the child. In other words, I will uphold the principle that, as in the case of sex, parenthood should require two party consent. Sex with one-party consent is rape, and parenthood with one-party consent is immoral. Should one party not-consent, the act is abhorrent. As with sex, it should only take the withdrawal of one person’s consent (at any point) for the act to be non consensual and terminated. To go against this principle is to condone the act of rape by correlary.

Nonconsensual Conception

Cases of Non-consensual Conception are among the most common and traditional defences of abortion. Although most people don’t conceptualise it this way, these are in-fact cases of abortion with (potential) one-party consent. Further, almost all people who condone any abortion will condone abortion in cases of rape.

Mother Victim

Begining with the primary conception of such cases; that being where a female (person with functioning uterine reproductive system) is raped (forced into intercourse against their will) and that rape results in (undesired) pregnancy. This is perhaps the strongest image of pro-abortion scenarios that immediately enters people's minds, and for good reason. There are many ways in which one can justify abortion in cases of such rape (although there are also ways people will justify it’s opposition, namely not to punish the feotus for the rapists sins). The scenarios I construct will be simplistic for the purpose of general application and to avoid as many incidental (non-relevant) features as possible. Also, regarding the caveats I will add at each stage, these are for the purpose of preempting rebuttals which attack (in bad-faith) non-essential parts of the argument, they are not me laying out conditions under which it would be okay to rape the woman (ie. if a women is drunk I don’t think it’s okay to rape her, I’m just preempting arguments from abhorrent fanatics who might blame her on that basis). Consider the following scenario:

1. A middle-aged woman is sleeping in her home

1. She is not drunk or intoxicated

2. She is a virgin and she is not and has not been promiscuous

3. She has not advertised herself or taken any action so as to draw attention to herself

4. She lives in a low-crime neighbourhood and has never engaged in relevant criminal activity

2. A man enters her home while she is still sleeping

1. He does not know the woman nor does she know him

2. The woman has done nothing to provoke the man

3. The man hits her on the head, waking her with a daze and causing her to scream

4. The man forcefully restrains her, gagging her and tying her to the bed

5. The man violents beats and rapes her over the course of several hours

6. The man leaves in the morning

7. A few days later the police are called for a welfare check and discover the beaten and raped woman still tied to the bed, drifting in and out of consciousness

8. The woman is taken to hospital and is in a condition of critical care for several weeks, the rapist is never caught

9. Roughly a month later, the woman is able to be discharged from the hospital. Soon after she discovers she is pregnant, and the rapist is the father, this causes her intense mental anguish

10. Roughly around the same time; she receives an anonymous letter in the mail from a man professing to be the rapist. He apologises profusely for his act and asks that she keep the child.

11. The following day she talks to a friend about the situation, the friend says that she should get an abortion if she thinks it’s best and should not take into account the rapist's request. Would it be immoral for her to get an abortion?

I do not believe this scenario requires much defence. All I shall say is this; if you consider abortion for non-medical reasons to ever be okay, it is probably in such a case. Further, I don’t think (practically) anybody would suggest the rape victim would have to take into account the rapists request. Further still, I think a fraction of that small fraction would also say the mother needs the rapist’s consent for the abortion. I think most people would consider such a requirement as abhorrent, disgusting, and a slap in the face to victims of sexual violence. This conviction will become the basis of my arguments. Therefore, please hold onto such emotions while I flip the genders.

Father Victim

People who stick to the traditional ‘my body, my choice’ motto for pro-choice movements have long done meaningful work in the advancements of medical liberty. However, sometimes we need to remember that slogans are meant to be useful lightning rods for causes, not causes themselves. Sometimes you need to let go, lest those rods become electric chairs. What I will present is one such case. I ask such people not to jump to judgements and remember that, ‘my body, my choice’, need not apply when the victim’s choice has been removed:

1. A middle-aged man is sleeping in his home

1. He is not drunk or intoxicated

2. He is a virgin and He is not and has not been promiscuous

3. He has not advertised himself or taken any action so as to draw attention to himself

4. He lives in a low-crime neighbourhood and has never engaged in relevant criminal activity

2. A woman enters his home while he is still sleeping

1. She does not know the man nor does he know her 

2. The man has done nothing to provoke the woman

3. The woman hits him on the head, waking him with a daze and causing him to scream

4. The woman forcefully restrains him, gagging him and tying him to the bad

5. The woman violents beats and then rapes him over the course of several hours

6. The woman leaves in the morning

7. A few days later the police are called for a welfare check and discover the beaten and raped man still tied to the bed, drifting in and out of consciousness

8. The man is taken to hospital and is in a condition of critical care for several weeks

9. Roughly a month later, the man is able to be discharged from the hospital. Soon after he is told the rapist is pregnant, and he is the father. This causes him intense mental anguish

10. Roughly around the same time the rapist is caught through DNA analysis of blood she left at the scene when the skin on her knuckles split while beating him. The police tell the man that it is his choice whether the woman be allowed to keep the child, considering that he was raped and violated and did not consent to the act. The rapist apologises profusely for her act and asks that she be allowed to keep the child.

11. The following day he talks to a friend about the situation, the friend says that he should have the woman get an abortion if he thinks it’s best and should not take into account the rapist's request. Would it be immoral for the man to do so?

1. If the man does not request the abortion be carried out, or if it is not permitted, are you willing to condemn him as the legal guardian of this unwanted child? Should he be expected to provide financial support to such a child?

First regarding the scenario itself. I very specifically copied the original scenario and simply swapped around the pronouns and made a few necessary alterations. I did this so as to make the scenarios as close to identical as possible. I should not have to do this to demonstrate the principle but I do for one, disgusting reason. That is, the downplaying of sexual violence perpetrated against men, especially when it is perpetrated by women. 

Unfortunately, there are large groups of people who believe that the rape of a man, particularly by a women, is not as bad as the inverse scenario or is somehow more permissible. Male rapists are often seen as some of the lowest criminals, and are frequently tortured and murdered extra-judicially for their crimes. Female rapists, while still considered criminals (or in some cases not even so), are nowhere near as demonised. This is likely a result of the dominating sexist (misandrist) view that men are inherently violent, stoic, emotionless creatures. And a corresponding sexist (misogynistic) view that women are weak, fragile, emotional creatures. I reject this wholeheartedly and urge others to do the same. 

Finally, to anyone who thinks it’s not possible for a man to be raped by a women, I want you to know that it takes a deep strength within me not to wish for your being assaulted and/or raped and/or killed. I consider you to be as abhorent as those who think that all female victims of assault were ‘asking for it’ or those that think acts such as marital rape are ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’; kindly go to hell.

Back to the scenario’s meaning. Although most people will wholeheartedly agree with the woman victim case (going so far as to condemn or threaten those who don’t), most (non-draconian) people will seize up in the father case. I believe this to be the result of a few factors: (1) The prevalence of bodily autonomy arguments pertaining to women’s choice in abortion, (2) The false and misandrist conception of men as emotionless or stoic, (3) The fear of being condemned for siding against the woman even in spite of her horrendous acts. Firstly, these are not all bad reasons, in particularly (1) is caused by the real (and serious) reality that most victims of sexual assault are woman and it is also woman (generally) who are most at risk of losing their medical liberties. However, I would urge advocates to look to the underlying principles of their advocacy and not the coats of paint on top. 

Abortion advocates are advocating for medical liberty, for the right to choose whether one wants to be a parent. Although this normally means the right for a woman to choose whether or not to abort a foetus, they are in complete opposition in cases such as I just outlined. Please, commit to the principles underlying and not the topcoat. I warn you; if you say the father-victim has no right to order the abortion, you have only incidental reasons to justify abortion in the mother-victim case. Consider the following responses:

1. The Anti-Abortion Set

1. Abortion is always immoral

2. Abortion in the mother case is immoral

3. Abortion in the father case is immoral

2. The One-Party Condition Set

1. Abortion is permissible if one party consents

2. Abortion in the mother case is permissible

3. Abortion in the father case is permissible

3. The My Body My Choice set

1. Abortion is permissible if the foetus-host consents

2. Abortion in the mother case is permissible because the mother is the host

3. Abortion in the father case is immoral because the father is not the host

All three sets are coherent (not internally contradictory) but set three has some undesired (for the typical advocate) consequences. The primary reasons advocates allow for non-medical abortions are to prevent mental and financial hardships, on the grounds that these constitute unnecessary suffering to the mother. These principles are sound, however, they are not actually coextensive with the My Body My Choice Set. That is, the condition of the mother being the host (the Body) is not the only way birth can produce mental and financial hardship. If we came across a ‘my body my choice’ extremist, they would have to accept the following hypotheticals:

1. If the doctor could teleport the child out of the mother and raise it in a vat, the woman would have no choice whether the child be aborted or not

2. If the child were developed from the mothers eggs (taken without her consent) but implanted in another woman, the mother would have no choice whether the child be aborted or not

However, most advocates would probably not be okay with accepting these scenarios, particularly if it meant the mother was still liable for the mental and financial burden of the child once it was ‘born’. Rather, they would say that the mother should still have the choice whether or not to raise the child, even when she is not the host of the foetus. This is perfectly consistent with the underlying principle of advocacy, but it is not consistent with the ‘My body my choice’ principle because, in the vat case, the foetus is not being hosted by the mother. In the reverse-surrogate case, the foetus is being hosted by another woman. 

Nonetheless, in the second (more extreme case) I still think most advocates would allow the biological mother to order the abortion of the reverse-surrogate, an act which would be in direct breach of the ‘my body, my choice’ principle. As such, I once again urge advocates to hold to the underlying principles and not their slogans. Finally, let me draw the analogy I have been setting up this whole time and say that; the reverse-surrogate case is identical to the father-victim case, let me restate them side by side:

1. A child is developed from a mothers egg, which is taken without her consent. This egg is implanted in another woman who desires to keep the child against the mother’s wishes

2. A child is developed from a fathers sperm, which is taken without his consent. This sperm is implanted in another woman who desires to keep the child against the father’s wishes.

Now I will say, very firmly, if you accept abortion in the first case then, on pain of contradiction, you must accept the second. But even this scenario doesn’t reflect the full horror of the father victim so let us get even stronger:

1. A woman is sensely beaten and raped, following this an egg is taken without her consent. This egg is developed and implanted in another woman who desires to keep the child against the mother’s wishes.

2. A man is sensely beaten and raped, following this his sperm is taken without is consent. This sperm is implanted in another woman who desires to keep the child against the father’s wishes.

Let me be as clear as possible: Unless you would say to the first woman that she has no right to order the abortion, and that she must live as an unconsensual mother following her rape and assault, you must also say that the man in the second case and in the father-victim case is permitted to order the abortion. 

Sex-Selective Abortions

Another special issue is the case of sex-selective abortions, on which I do not have a set position but which nonetheless merits consideration, particularly if we are to advocate for abortion at will up to the ~third trimester. Thus, I will try and lay out the facts as best possible without inputting moral discourse in this section.

Sex-selective abortion, also known as gender-selective abortion, is a practice that involves terminating a pregnancy based on the predicted sex of the foetus. This practice is often associated with cultures that value males over females and is most commonly observed in countries where there is a strong preference for male offspring. This practice is driven by a variety of factors such as patriarchal societies, cultural and traditional beliefs, and economic pressures.

The use of modern technology such as ultrasound has made it possible for parents to determine the sex of a foetus early in pregnancy. This has led to an increase in the number of sex-selective abortions in countries where the practice is prevalent. In some cases, the selective abortion of female foetuses has led to a significant imbalance in the sex ratio at birth, with as many as 130 males born for every 100 females in certain populations. This has led to a phenomenon known as "missing women" which refers to the number of females who would have been born but for the selective abortion of female foetuses.

The practice of sex-selective abortion is highly controversial and raises several ethical and moral questions. Critics argue that sex-selective abortion is a violation of the rights of the unborn and that it perpetuates gender discrimination. They argue that it is a form of violence against women and that it perpetuates the notion that girls are less valuable than boys. On the other hand, some argue that it is a matter of reproductive rights and that individuals should have the freedom to make choices about their own bodies and families.

It is worth noting that sex-selective abortion is illegal in many countries and is considered as a form of gender discrimination. Despite this, it still persists in some parts of the world, particularly in Asia and Eastern Europe. This is due to the fact that laws alone are not enough to change societal attitudes and cultural beliefs that lead to the practice of sex-selective abortion.

The impact of sex-selective abortion on society is significant and far-reaching. An imbalance in the sex ratio can lead to a shortage of marriageable women, which in turn can lead to increased competition for available women, increased rates of domestic violence, and increased rates of human trafficking. Additionally, sex-selective abortion can lead to the devaluation of women in society, further exacerbating gender inequality. This can lead to social and economic consequences such as a lack of women in the workforce, reduced economic growth, and a lack of female representation in politics.

The shortage of women in certain regions due to sex-selective abortion can also lead to other problems. For example, in China, the one-child policy and the cultural preference for male children have led to a severe imbalance in the sex ratio. This has led to a shortage of women, which in turn has led to an increase in human trafficking and forced marriages. Additionally, the shortage of women has led to an increase in crime, as men without partners may turn to criminal activities as a means of providing for themselves.

The practice of sex-selective abortion is not limited to certain countries or cultures and has been observed in various parts of the world. However, the severity of the problem and the reasons behind the practice vary from one country to another. For example, in some parts of India, the practice of sex-selective abortion is driven by economic pressures, as parents may feel that they cannot afford to raise a girl child. In contrast, in China, the practice is driven by the cultural preference for male children and the one-child policy.

In order to address the problem of sex-selective abortion, it is important to understand the underlying societal factors that contribute to the practice. This includes tackling patriarchal societies, and attempting to change cultural beliefs.

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Ambiguous Consciousness: The Implied Sleeping Victim Dilemma

The rebuttal from ambiguous consciousness goes something like this:

1. Science can not discover, determine, identify, or explain consciousness

2. Philosophy cannot discover, determine, identify, or explain consciousness

3. It is immoral to kill a conscious being

1. The act of killing requires some impetus or special moral reason to be permitted. Otherwise, we ought to not kill conscious beings.

1. Personal discomfort (alone) is not a special moral reason to kill

4. It is not clear whether foetuses are conscious beings

1. From (3a) we ought to aer on the side of caution or from (3a.i) we do not have a sufficiently justified reason to kill a being which may be conscious.

5. Therefore we ought not permit the killing of foetuses (abortions).

Unsatisfying Answer

Now, I would object that I don’t care about any conscious being qua conscious being. I do not value the consciousness of any particular thing; plant, animal, human, or otherwise, for two important reasons: 

1. I cannot know that any other thing is conscious, so it seems an incredibly shaky foundation for morality

2. Consciousness alone is not sufficient to produce moral sympathy and impetus in me. Ie. I do not care about the killing of other conscious things (ie. animals). Rather, it is the killing of conscious things like me that I care about. By like me I don’t mean human, I mean apparent moral agents. As I have previously stated, that means particular humans may be excluded and particular animals included.

So from my rejection of premise 3 I would avoid the rebuttal. However, this is not particularly satisfying and, because I don’t believe mine are common moral intuitions, and because the rebuttal is interesting and made in good-faith, I will engage with it from a more common perspective.

Engaging Answer

The argument is internally consistent (there are no contradictions between the premises) however I think that it invites hypocrisy (contradiction between belief and action) through corollaries that most people do not accept (reductio ad absurdum). The greatest of these I will present by argument through analogy, and then conclude that as most will not accept one they ought not accept the other (or are compelled to accept both).

Consider the following scenario:

1. A person, through no fault of their own, is one day afflicted by a sudden stroke which causes them to slur speech, stumble, and suddenly fall unconscious in a public area. Nearby people rush to their aid and call an ambulance

2. An ambulance arrives and the paramedics determine the person is alive but unconscious and suffering from an ischemic stroke (blockage of artery in the brain due to embolism). They quickly place the person on oxygen and rush them to the hospital. 

3. At the hospital, the person is given an emergency Thrombectomy to remove the embolism clot mechanically in an attempt to restore oxygen and blood flow to the brain. Although the surgery is successful in removing the clot, the person is determined to have fallen into a coma; showing no movement of the eyes (not locked-in syndrome), no movement of the limbs, and no expression of speech (a 3 on the Glasgow Coma Scale).

4. The person’s parents (they have no partner or children) are called into the hospital and told the unfortunate news. The person will be placed on life support with their consent. Although, the doctors are honest that due to the severity of the coma (lowest possible responsiveness) and the cause, it is not known whether the person will ever leave a comatose state.

Now the question. At what point would it be permissible for the parents to request the removal of life support? Ie. How long would the coma have to go on before it’s okay for them to terminate the individual? Let’s be clear here, if you turn off their life support, you are killing them, that is not up for question. What is up for question is whether you are killing a conscious thing and whether that matters.

My intuition, and I think a relatively common one, is that the parents are entitled to choose when the person has persisted long enough on life support in this comatose state. Ie. they should be permitted to terminate them whenever they deem it to be a lost cause. Importantly, at no point can it be determined that the person is not actually conscious. Rather, the consciousness is always ambiguous.

Now let me compare this coma patient to a foetus as a foetus (ie. not regarding the mother or other person’s circumstances). We don’t know if either are conscious, this is the key feature of both scenarios and is what is being considered for the rejection of abortion. However, it would be inconsistent to allow the termination of one (Coma Patients) but not the Other (especially when there are no unique negative health impacts to the family of Coma Patients; compared to possible health impacts with birth). So what will it be? Condemn the parents and keep the coma patient alive until they die of old age? Or give up the argument against abortion and give the parents their choice?

The Sleeping Victim Dilemma

I will now be honest and admit that this line of thought produces an undesirable dilemma I shall call the sleeping victim dilemma. Put simply, the dilemma asks the question; at what point does a deep sleep become a coma? Or, more expanded, why is it immoral to kill sleeping people if it brings no harm to sentient beings? Further, why is it okay to kill coma patients but not sleeping people? How long do they have to be asleep before (it becomes a coma and) we can kill them?

This dilemma is damn hard, seriously hard. I truly don’t see any way to avoid it. One initial counter is to say that the sleeping person is expected to get consciousness back. However, this is actually a form of the future potential argument and has the following problems:

1. How can you know this is not the case for Coma patients? Is this not why taking one off life support can be so emotionally hard? The thought that maybe tomorrow they’ll finally wake up?

2. How can you know this is the case for sleeping people? What if they fell into a coma when they went asleep?

3. How can you hold this opinion and accept the coma-foetus analogy and still accept abortion? Aren’t foetuses just coma patients who (with much greater certainty than coma patients) will wake up? Therefore you should say that Abortion is wrong. 

Another response is to say; “I value that which has had consciousness and will later have it again”. This would rule out foetuses if you accept the coma analogy since they have no or ambiguous consciousness. However it is actually just a form of special pleading. Since, ‘that which has had consciousness and will later have it again’ is actually just an expansion of ‘sleeping person’. Therefore, it is fallacious, generally bad faith, and to be rejected.

I do not know any particular way to avoid this dilemma and I fear that I too am prey to it. Therefore, as I cannot step outside the bounds and because I cannot tredge through it, I must concede my discussions here.

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Reference List

Beckwith, FJ 1992, Personal Bodily Rights, Abortion, and Unplugging the Violinist, viewed 24 January 2023,

<https://web.archive.org/web/20100816072853/http://homepage.mac.com/francis.beckwith/Thomson.pdf>

Boonin, D 2003, A Defense of Abortion, Cambridge University Press, England

Gertler, GB 1986, ‘Brain birth: a proposal for defining when a fetus is entitled to human life status’, South California Law Review, vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 1061-78, <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11655850/>

Jones, DG 1998, ‘The problematic symmetry between brain birth and brain death’, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 237-242, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377672/pdf/jmedeth00315-0023.pdf>

Levin, M 1987, Feminist and Freedom, Transaction Books, New Jersey

Noonan, JT 2013, The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts

Poupard, RJ 2007, Suffer The Violinist: Why The Pro‐abortion Argument From Bodily Autonomy Fails, viewed 24 January 2023, <https://web.archive.org/web/20110716152144/http://www.equipresources.org/atf/cf/%7B9C4EE03A-F988-4091-84BD-F8E70A3B0215%7D/JAA025.pdf>

Thomson, JJ 1971, A Defence of Abortion, viewed 24 January 2023, <https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/Phil160,Fall02/thomson.htm>