Enlightened Hedonism and Epicureanism

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What is Hedonism

Hedonism broadly refers to any system which considers pleasure as an intrinsic good. More specifically, it refers to any system which considers pleasure as the only good. This distinction is relevant as the former definition could theoretically apply to systems like Utilitarianism whereas the latter can only apply to more stereotypically hedonic views.

Description and Prescription

As with the similar field of egoism, a crucial distinction must be presented between the descriptive and the prescriptive views. A view is descriptive if it aims to describe some actual state of affairs in the world. Contra-wise, a view is prescriptive if it aims to actualise some alternate or possible state of affairs which may not actually be present in this world. Consider the following two statements which highlight this distinction:

In 2021 there were 193 murder victims in Australia (ABS 2022)
In 2021 nobody should have been murdered

A person can hold both statements without contradiction because they are of a different nature. The first statement is a description of what actually occurred. The second statement is a prescription of what should have occured. Key words or phrases like: ‘were’, ‘actually’, and ‘[was/is] the case’ can act as heuristics for identifying descriptive statements. On the opposite end, terms like: ‘should’ and ‘ought / ought not’ can act as heuristics for identifying prescriptive statements.

Psychological / Descriptive Hedonism

Psychological hedonism is a descriptive view which suggests that people are motivated by a desire to increase pleasure and avoid pain. It is often connected to psychological egoism, the belief that people only act in ways that will bring them happiness. According to psychological hedonism, all actions are motivated by a desire for pleasure, even if they don't actually result in pleasure. However, some people argue that there are cases where people's actions can't be explained by a desire for pleasure, such as when they act selflessly or out of concern for others. Critics also argue that there may be other motivations besides pleasure that influence people's actions and that the theory of psychological hedonism doesn't take these into account. Additionally, some people believe that the theory of psychological hedonism should be tested through scientific experimentation rather than being accepted or rejected based on philosophical arguments alone. Nonetheless it is important to note that this theory is entirely descriptive and has no normative component.

Normative Hedonism

Ethical hedonism, also known as normative hedonism, is the idea that the right course of action is determined by the amount of pleasure and pain it will cause. This theory is distinct from psychological hedonism, the purely descriptive view. Ethical hedonism is a form of consequentialism, which means that it evaluates the rightness of an action based on its consequences. Ethical hedonism can be divided into egoistic and altruistic versions. The egoistic version states that each person should only aim to maximise their own pleasure, while the altruistic version, also known as classical utilitarianism, suggests that the sum total of everyone's happiness should be maximised, including the agent's pleasure as one factor among many. Ethical hedonism has faced criticism for ignoring values such as justice, friendship, and truth, and for being overly demanding in situations where an individual must sacrifice their own happiness for the sake of others. It has also been criticised for failing to consider the personal nature of moral duties, such as the importance of promoting the happiness of loved ones.

Strains of Hedonism

It is not possible for me to produce an extensive work on hedonism here. Nonetheless, it would be careless of me to not at least broach some of the nuances of that topic. First, let me present a distinction between the stereotypical naive hedonism and a more enlightened form of hedonism.

Naive Hedonism

Naive hedonism is any form of normative hedonism which accepts the following premise without further specification: “The right thing is that which brings greatest pleasure”. This form of hedonism is often conjoined to naive egoism, such that the premise may be synonymised in most cases to: “The right thing is that which brings me greatest pleasure”. Any form of hedonism which accepts either of these premises but then goes on to clarify, to specify kinds of pleasures, or to provide nuance in any other way I call enlightened hedonism. This distinction is not necessarily to degenerate one over the other, but simply to bring to attention that there are more than one species of this philosophy. Indeed, even though naive hedonism is the stereotypical image conjured up in the mind, it is not actually the most common philosophical hedonic position. Rather, that would be any of the strains of enlightened hedonism.

Enlightened Hedonism

As aforementioned, enlightened hedonism refers to any philosophy which accepts the hedonic premise (given above) but then goes on to provide further nuance. It is to naive hedonism what enlightened egoism is to naive egoism. As an example; an act utilitarian might hold the following views:

What is right is determined by the outcome with maximal utility

On the assumption that that outcome does not preclude the further maximisation of utility, ie. by destroying further possible outcomes

Utility is synonymous with human happiness, however abstracted it may be in the particular scenario

Such a utilitarian would also be a hedonist, as their ethics seem to be guided by pleasure and the avoidance of pain. However, they are not necessarily a naive hedonist as their consideration of utility necessarily considers future outcomes (ie. 1a ). Indeed, many influential utilitarian philosophers accept hedonic premises and yet few are outright naive hedonists. For example; perhaps the most influential classical utilitarian, John Stuart Mill, believed that (1) happiness or pleasure was the ultimate end [a strain of the hedonic premise] but also that (2) there are different species of pleasures with different moral worths:

“If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.”

(Mill 2004)

This is indeed a refined form of hedonism built entirely on the foundations of utilitarianism. However, it would be uncharitable of me not to point out the obvious counter-example. Jeremy Bentham, the tutor of JS Mill, and father of all modern utilitarian was a self-avowed naive hedonist, remarking:

“Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin [a children’s game] is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either” (Bentham n.d.)

Thus we see that both naive and enlightened hedonism have a rich tradition, especially in the utilitarian fields. However, my only interest here was to demonstrate that there are more species of hedonism than the libertine stereotype of debaucherous chaos.

Epicureanism - Negative Hedonism

With the discussion of naive and enlightened hedonism touched upon, I will now turn to another distinction, between positive and negative hedonism. The archetypes of these two strains I find more interesting than the former two, although I will only be examining the latter kind.

The distinction between positive and negative hedonism arises from a difference in interpretation over the following agreed upon statement:

Hedonism intends to guide the hedonist into a life with the greatest possible pleasure and the least possible pain

It may be said that the positive hedonist takes the absolute approach and the negative hedonist the relative approach. Put more simply, the positive hedonist views pleasure as an active experience that can only be conveyed in itself and therefore must be sought after in itself to maximise its involvement in a life. Contrawise, the negative hedonist views pleasure rather differently, not as the absolute pleasure of an action, but as the disparity between the pleasure of an act and the pain required to achieve it. Hence, negative hedonists more often seek simple pleasures, the likes of which do not require the endurance of much pain. This is in contrast to their maximalist ‘rock-star’ counterparts which seek to experience the greatest degree of pleasure, so long as it overrides the pain required to endure. Put simpler still; positive hedonists seek pleasure, negative hedonists avoid pain. Analytically, we can distinguish them using the following method:

Assume there are two experiences which will provide pleasure.

These experiences are mutually exclusive, such that you may only engage in one.

These scenarios can be examined by the following formulae, where:

f() = relative pleasure of an experience

p() = the absolute pleasure of a given experience

s() = the absolute pain (‘suffering’) of a given experience

In scenario one: f(x) = p(x) - s(x)

In scenario two: f(y) = p(y) - s(y)

For the positive hedonist, if:

f(x) <= 0 and f(y) <= 0, then neither scenario will be engaged in
p(x) > s(x) and p(y) < s(y), then scenario one will be engaged in
p(y) > s(y) and p(x) < s(x), then scenario two will be engaged in
f(x) > 0 and f(y) > 0 and p(x) = p(y), either scenario will be engaged in
f(x) > 0 and f(y) > 0 and p(x) > p(y), scenario one will be engaged in
f(x) > 0 and f(y) > 0 and p(y) > p(x), scenario two will be engaged in

For the negative hedonist, if:

f(x) <= 0 and f(y) <= 0, then neither scenario will be engaged in
f(x) > f(y), then scenario one will be engaged in
f(y) > f(x), then scenario two will be engaged in
f(x) <= 0 and f(y) <= 0 and f(x) = f(y), either scenario will be engaged in

With this analysis out of the way, I can now introduce perhaps the most famous proponent of negative hedonism, Epicurus.

Epicureanism

Epicurus was an ancient Greek philosopher who founded the school Epicureanism; a movement to help people attain satisfaction through negative hedonism. He believed the purpose of philosophy was to achieve a state of ataraxia (peace and freedom from fear) and aponia (absence of pain).

Epicurus rejected the other prominent philosophies of his time, notably Platonism, Cynicism, and Stoicism, the last of which were particularly hostile to the Epicureans. Alongside the rejection of these other schools came some quite unorthodox beliefs, for the time. His school allowed women and slaves to join which was previously something associated with degenerates and the ever disparaged cynics. Similarly novel, he taught that people should act ethically not out of a fear of punishment or a hope of reward from the gods, but because acting immorally would lead to guilt and prevent them from achieving ataraxia.

Strict Physicalism

Epicureans, after their founder, believe that the senses are the only reliable source of knowledge about the world. This belief is in large part a legacy from Epicureus own admiration of Democritus who is notable for promoting physical atomism. This belief is typically held as exclusive such that it is a strict form of physicalism. Strict physicalism is the view that either (1) there currently exists nothing but material entities, or (2) there can exist nothing but material entities, or (3) non-material entities may exist but we cannot know of them and they have no impact on our lives. This philosophy also often falls into the deterministic camp. However, the Epicureans seem to have a strange way of avoiding this determinism (or at least so they believed). As we can read in the later poet Lucretius (a Roman Epicurean) in his De Rerum Natura (2012) the Epicureans believed in the concept of ‘atomic swerve’ (Ibid, p. 69). This is the idea that atoms have the power to randomly deviate from an otherwise expected path due to no apparent cause. It is generally then purported that this enables free will in an otherwise deterministic world. However, it is not clear whether such arguments are particularly strong or persuasive

Avoiding Pain

Perhaps the more famous, and more relevant for this writing, trait of the Epicureans is their ethical beliefs. Almost all, if not all, of Epicurus’ teachings on ethics relate in some way to pleasure or pain. This makes sense as he is often considered and potentially self-identified as a kind of hedonist. Consider for example, the Tetrapharmakos (Laertius 2018), a purported summary (written by ancient Biographer Diogenes Laertia) of the first four of the forty Principal Doctrines (n.d.) (Epicurus own summary of the tenets of Epicureanism):

“Don't fear god,
Don't worry about death;
What is good is easy to get,
What is terrible is easy to endure” (Laertius 2018)

The term ‘Tetraparmakos’ literally means ‘fourfold remedy’, in this case the remedy for anxiety or for a troubled mind. Consider as well the following excerpts of the aforementioned Principal Doctrines (n.d.):

“3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.”

“8. No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.”

These two sets of extracts quite clearly substantiate the commonly held position that the Epicureans were negative hedonists. That is, they sought the avoidance of pain and the achievement of tranquillity, which is itself the highest form of pleasure, and not the presence of any such pleasure greater than its requisite pain.

No Fear of Death

In a similar vein to their avoidance of pain; the Epicureans held a particularly interesting and quite staunch view as to the favorability of death. Keep in mind article 2 of the Tetrapharmakos (“don’t worry about death” (Laertius 2018)). Epicurus believed that the root of most anxiety, itself the greatest form of mental suffering, is the irrational fear of death or the irrational fear of things associated with death (ie. divine retribution or punishment in an afterlife). Considering that the Epicureans were strict physicalists and frequently railed against religion and an afterlife, they did not care about the latter concerns. On death itself, however, the Epicureans (ie. (Lucretius 2012, pp. 139-140 & pp.148-150)) and Epicurus himself wrote quite extensively. For example; in his brief Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus instructs:

“Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us [humans], for good and evil imply awareness, and death is the privation of all awareness; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an unlimited time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. For life has no terror; for those who thoroughly apprehend that there are no terrors for them in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the person who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer.” (Epicurus, n.d. (a)) (Emphasis Added)

Similarly in his Principle Doctrines:

“2. Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.” ((Epicurus, n.d.)

We thus see that, for the Epicureans, death ought not trouble the wise mind. Rather, death is a thing which can impact no living person, and ‘when death is come’, no living person will be there to face it. This is not to say that one should live lavishly and step into an early grave, for as is remarked later in that same letter:

“It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of merrymaking, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest disturbances take possession of the soul.” (Epicurus, n.d. (a))

In this way, the Epicurean view can be summarised with the common expression ‘Live life, and live it to its fullest extent”. However, what specifically does this ‘fullest’ extent look like? If it is not just rampant debauchery, then what is it? Luckily, the Epicureans are thorough on that issue too.

The Fourfold Pleasures View

Partly in the Principle Doctrines and partly in the Letter to Menoeceus, which are just two of the surviving works amidst hundreds of lost works by Epicurus, the fourfold separation of pleasures begins to arise. In traditional epicurean philosophy, pleasure and the absence of pain are the ultimate ends. However, not all pleasures are measured equally. For, as the argument goes, the attainment or the pursuit of some pleasures is either greatly unfulfilling, highly addictive, or requires much pain. Therefore; they sought to separate the pleasures into three (or four) all-encompassing camps, presented below:

As Epicurus writes in the aforementioned letter:

“We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled.” (Epicurus, n.d. (a))

Apart from the aforementioned method of distinguishing them based on the pain or other anxiety endured to attain them, another method of distinguishing them is based on the possibility of their fulfilment. Natural desires, both necessary and unnecessary, have a limit of fulfilment. For example, a person can eat until they are full. A person can drink until they are drunk. A person can shelter until they are comfortable. Unlike these, the unnatural or vain desires (of which there are only unnecessary instances) have no point of fulfilment. A person who seeks after fame can never achieve ‘fame’ ; they can only pursue it. A person who seeks after power can never achieve ‘power’ ; they can only pursue it. A person who seeks after money has no end in mind but only the pursuit itself. In this way, as Epicurus writes, these desires are based on ‘empty belief’ as they neither refer to any particular nor do they have any particular end. Thus they bring only the anxiety associated with unfulfilled desire and are to be accordingly shunned and removed wherever they appear.

Critiques of Hedonism

General

Normative hedonism is a moral theory that holds that the highest good is pleasure or happiness, and the right action is the one that maximises pleasure or happiness for the agent and others. This theory has been influential in Western philosophy, with proponents such as Epicurus, John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy Bentham, but it has also faced numerous criticisms.

One of the main criticisms of normative hedonism is that it fails to take into account other important moral values, such as justice, fairness, and moral virtues. According to hedonism, the only thing that matters is pleasure or happiness, which means that other values such as justice or fairness can be disregarded if they do not contribute to pleasure or happiness. This leads to the possibility of situations in which it is considered morally acceptable to treat others unfairly or unjustly as long as it brings pleasure or happiness to the agent or others.

Another criticism of normative hedonism is that it does not adequately distinguish between different types of pleasure or happiness. Some pleasures or happiness may be morally problematic, such as those derived from the suffering of others or from engaging in harmful or immoral activities. Normative hedonism does not provide any guidance on how to distinguish between these types of pleasure or happiness, which means that it could potentially justify actions that are morally wrong or harmful.

A further criticism of normative hedonism is that it does not account for the long-term consequences of actions. According to hedonism, the right action is the one that maximises pleasure or happiness in the short term, but it does not consider the long-term effects of these actions on the agent or others. This means that hedonism could justify actions that have negative long-term consequences as long as they bring pleasure or happiness in the short term.

A related criticism of normative hedonism is that it does not take into account the moral value of personal relationships and the role that they play in human happiness. According to hedonism, the highest good is pleasure or happiness, and the right action is the one that maximises it, regardless of the relationships involved. However, many people find that their personal relationships are a major source of happiness and fulfilment, and that the quality of these relationships is more important than the quantity of pleasure or happiness that they bring. Normative hedonism does not adequately recognize the moral value of these personal relationships or their role in human happiness.

In addition to these criticisms, normative hedonism has also been challenged by other moral theories that propose alternative conceptions of the highest good or the right action. For example, some theories argue that the highest good is something other than pleasure or happiness, such as moral virtue or knowledge, and that the right action is the one that promotes this higher good. Others argue that the right action is determined by moral duties or obligations, rather than the maximisation of pleasure or happiness.

In conclusion, normative hedonism is a moral theory that holds that the highest good is pleasure or happiness and that the right action is the one that maximises it. However, this theory has faced numerous criticisms, including that it fails to take into account other important moral values, does not adequately distinguish between different types of pleasure or happiness, does not consider the long-term consequences of actions, and does not adequately recognize the moral value of personal relationships. As a result, normative hedonism has been challenged by other moral theories that propose alternative conceptions of the highest good or the right action.

Those specific to Epicureanism

Both Epicureanism and general hedonism place a strong emphasis on pleasure and happiness as the ultimate goal of human action, and both view pleasure and happiness as the key to a fulfilling and worthwhile life. However, there are also some important differences between Epicureanism and other forms of hedonism. For example, Epicureanism places a greater emphasis on the importance of moderation and self-control, while hedonism is often associated with a more unrestrained pursuit of pleasure. Epicureanism also emphasises the importance of virtues and the role they play in achieving ataraxia, while hedonism tends to focus more on the maximisation of pleasure or happiness.

Nonetheless, there are still critiques specific to Epicureanism:

The emphasis on ataraxia: One criticism of Epicureanism is that the emphasis on ataraxia or tranquillity as the highest good may lead to a life that is too passive or inactive. Some argue that a meaningful and fulfilling life requires more than just the absence of pain and anxiety, and that it also requires engagement with the world and the pursuit of challenging or meaningful goals.
The view of pleasure: Another criticism of Epicureanism is that its view of pleasure as a mental and physical state of well-being may be too narrow or overly subjective. Some argue that pleasure is not just a matter of personal feeling, but also includes external goods or activities that bring joy or satisfaction to an individual.
The role of virtue: A further criticism of Epicureanism is that its emphasis on virtue as a means to achieving ataraxia may be too individualistic. Some argue that virtue also requires a concern for the well-being of others and a commitment to social justice, which may not be fully captured by Epicureanism's focus on personal well-being.
The absence of a larger moral framework: Some critics of Epicureanism argue that the philosophy lacks a larger moral framework or perspective that can provide guidance on more complex or difficult moral issues. In particular, Epicureanism may not provide adequate guidance on moral issues that involve conflicts between the pursuit of pleasure or happiness and other moral values or duties.
The exclusion of negative emotions: Another criticism of Epicureanism is that it may exclude or minimise the value of negative emotions, such as sadness or grief, which are an integral part of human experience. Some argue that these emotions serve important functions and can contribute to a more meaningful or fulfilling life.

Overall, these criticisms suggest that Epicureanism may be too narrow or limited in its understanding of pleasure, virtue, and the role they play in a fulfilling and meaningful life.

Reference List

Bentham, J n.d., The Rationale of Reward, Liberal Arts Instructional Technology Services, viewed 28 December 2022, <https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/jsmill/diss-disc/bentham/bentham.xr18.html>

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022, Recorded Crime - Victims 2021, ABS, viewed 28 December 2022, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/crime-and-justice/recorded-crime-victims/latest-release>

Epicurus, n.d., Principal Doctrines, trans. RD Hicks, viewed December 28, <http://classics.mit.edu/Epicurus/princdoc.html>

Epicurus, n.d. (a), Letter to Menoeceus, trans. RD Hicks, viewed December 28, <http://classics.mit.edu/Epicurus/menoec.html>

Laertius, D 2018, ‘Book X’, in The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Project Gutenberg, viewed 20 December 2022, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/57342/pg57342-images.html>

Lucretius, 2012, On the Nature of Things, ProQuest Ebook Central, viewed December 28, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/UOW/detail.action?docID=1900207>

Mill, JS 2004, Utilitarianism, Project Gutenberg, viewed 28 December 2022, <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11224/pg11224-images.html#CHAPTER_II>

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