A Defence of Marijuana Usage
ACT[ua]L
Date: 24/11/22
> Image Above is Generated Using Stable Diffusion with Prompt “A Defence of Marijuana Usage” (With additional refining tags ‘realistic proportions, highly detailed, smooth, sharp focus, 8k, ray tracing, digital painting, concept art illustration’)
Background
Marijuana (alternatively ‘cannabis’) is a psychoactive plant of the entheogen class (Entheogen, Wikipedia). It shares that class with a number of dangerous deliriants; notably Datura, Salvia Divinorum and Hawaiian Baby Woodrose, as well as the common psychedelics Peyote and Psilocybin (Entheogen, PsychonautWiki). The drug itself typically refers to a preparation of the flowers and leaves of the Cannabis plant (Cannabis (drug), Wikipedia). Though there are a number of varieties in the Cannabis family, Cannabis Sativa, and Cannabis Indica, are the most popular varieties (Cannabis, PsychonautWiki). Further, all prominent strains produce similar subjective experiences, only differing in subjective intensity. This true Cannabis strains should be differentiated from other cannabinoid-derivatives, notably synthetic cannabinoids which are traditionally chemical analogues of Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) (Synthetic Cannabinoid, PsychonautWiki) with less reference to the secondary composer cannabidiol (CBD).
Composition
Cannabis is composed of over 480 chemically active substances. Of these; the two most impactful are THC and CBD. Of those two; research appears to indicate that THC is the more psycho-active (which explains the greater composition of THC over CBD in synthetic Cannabinoids). It should be noted that, although THC is psychoactive, THC in no way composes a significant (or even noticeable) part of cannabis.
THC interacts with cannabinoid (CB) receptors in the body. These receptors are primarily found in the brain (in the neurons) but are also located in peripheral tissues of the body connected to the peripheral nervous system. At initial use; users often report little to no noticeable effect even at regular doses. This resistance typically maintains for the first handful of concurrent usages. This phenomena is attributed to the under-sensitisation of these cannabinoid receptors in the brain. That is to say; the body has not yet adjusted to metabolise THC through the cannabinoid receptors and thus the THC cannot produce the regular psycho-active effects. This effect is similar to the resistance developed by regular users; though it is easily overcome with regular use (until point of tolerance).
Absent this effect; THC appears to be a powerful CB antagonist, which in turn inhibits a number of messenger systems in the brain. This inhibition is what likely leads to the alteration in cognition experienced by users. Through the same receptors, THC acts in a similar manner to a Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI). This leads to an increase in free dopamine, in dopamine release in the brain and in the presence of dopamine in the synaptic gap. This leads to the subjective feeling of euphoria in users.
It should be noted that, although cannabis is considered a psycho-active substance, cannabis itself is not a psychedelic. Of the roughly 483 identified compounds that compose the plant, THC is one of only a few that are actually psycho-active. In theory, this should make it essentially impossible to intake enough cannabis to experience psychedelic or deliriant effects. Of course, in practice this is not at all the case, and cannabinoid extracts can have powerful psychedelic effects (thus the risk for long-term psychosis). One proposed explanation for this is termed the ‘Entourage Effect’ (Entourage Effect, Wikipedia). This proposes that, although the compounds in isolation are not psychedelic, the combination of them inhibits and antagonists sectors of the brain independently such that they produce similar effects to low-level psychedelics and which synergise with the psychedelic effects of THC.
Effects
All effects below are taken from the Psychonaut Wiki; see that reference for in depth descriptions of each effect (‘Subjective Effects’, PsychonautWiki). Note that all discussed effects are subjective; ie. they give reference to a subject (the user) and cannot be translated with certainty into any object measure (this includes language):
Physical effects
Visual effects
Cognitive effects
Auditory effects
Multi-sensory effects
Legality and Morality
Before any discussion as to the righteous or vicious nature of any practice can be considered, a rich conception of those conceptions and their relation to similar concepts is required. Virtue (or Right) and Vice are predicates subordinate to the concept of morality. Where they present in law, their presentation is only incidental. There do exist predicates in an analogous relation to legality; I mean [statutory] Justice and [statutory] Injustice (that is; acting according to or not according to the Law). However, these predicates, under most interpretations, are distinguishable from the prior predicates of morality. That is to say; an act's ethical status has no intrinsic bearing to its moral status. Immediately I must note: ideally these concepts would be unified. Ideally the law would prescribe that which is moral, and ideally that which is just would be virtuous and vice versa. However, this relationship is ideal and thus necessary incidental.
This perspective may seem convoluted and radical, however it can be easily defended by appeal to an endless string of both real and hypothetical scenarios where the concepts of Right and Legal are in (strict) disagreement. I won’t even bring up the classical 20th century cases like Nazi Germany, one need only consider that the following acts were legal, and some still are in particular regions:
Rape Precipitating Marriage
Spousal Rape
Child Abuse
Torture of Prisoners
Genocide of Outgroups
Stoning of the Sexual Minorities
Female Circumcision
The following question may then be asked; are these acts moral? Unless one is a hard cultural relativist, I predict you will staunchly say they are immoral. Yet, they are all legal. Is this not clear evidence for the simple claim that legality does not prescribe morality. Further still, consider that if we did humour that position, contradictions in morality would appear! Are the legal systems of countries not often in contradiction with one another? Honour killings are punishable by life in prison in Australia, yet they are completely legal in Pakistan. This would be a true contradiction if the two were under one system. Yet, it is not as they are under two systems; that is, they are not internally contradictory.
Contrasting this, morality is of one concept, and one law, and subsequently of one system. Thus there can exist no contradiction in morality unless the very concept itself is illogical. Otherwise, one would fall to the Principle of Explosion and would always act both Rightly and Wrongly at once. No, morality admits of no contradiction, and morality admits of no master. Indeed morality is the master of all action, and all rational actors are its subjects. You have no intrinsic obligation to follow the law, you have every obligation to follow morality. You may break the law, you must never act immorally. This statement again seems radical but once more is trivial. It can be proven as such:
P1. That which is moral is obligatory
P2. That which is immoral is forbidden
P3. That which is amoral is neither obligatory nor forbidden
C. You are forbidden from acting immorally, and obliged to act morally
P4. That which is legally prescribed is not equivalent to that which is moral
P5. That which is illegal is not equivalent to that which is immoral
P6. There is no system of prescription which subjugates morality
C. You are not obliged to act in a legal manner except where it incidentally aligns with that which is moral
Therefore; in short, we cannot deduce the ethical status of any act from its legal status. Any attempt to do so is illogical and fallacious and ought to be rejected with utmost prejudice. Such attempts characteristically take the following forms and should be disregarded:
P1. The Law is an expression of our morality
P2. You are obliged to act morally
C. You must follow the Law
This argument is valid but it is not sound. P1. is not always or even usually true. Thus it is to be rejected unless P1 can be demonstrated for the case under consideration; ie. unless you can demonstrate the act is immoral. If you can do that, you just ditched the concept of legality anyway and thus defeated your own argument. In other words, argue the ethical status of the act, do not bother with its legal status.
Descriptive Persuasion: Economic, and Societal
Note: no descriptive statement could ever persuade a rational agent who has no system of ethics (outline the is/ought fallacy). Nonetheless, descriptive statements are useful, indeed they compose most of political and rhetorical debate. This is not because the statements carry any moral weight (indeed they couldn’t) but because most people's ethical concerns have practical considerations built in. For example; if a person seeks to maximise happiness in a society (that’s the ethical assumption), then we can discuss practical (descriptive) measures to achieve this. However, if a person doesn’t care about anything (ie. they have no system of ethics), then no descriptive statements could convince them of any course of action. This is further shown by the operative division between description and prescription. Descriptions outline states of affairs in an actual (or a hypothetical) world. Prescriptions outline states of affairs that ought to be actualised. Insofar as any action presupposes a sufficient reason for it’s actualisation and insofar as any action (ideally) seeks to actualise an end, any action is necessarily prescriptive and belongs first to the prescriptive (ie. ethical realm).
Economic
First, consider some defences from economic benefit. This argument is driven entirely by descriptive claims which can be either confirmed or denied. However, it should again be emphasised that a person can accept all the economic benefits I shall present and still maintain their ethical fanaticism, nor could I convince them otherwise.
Consider first the positive impacts of drug decriminalisation. In this context, positive means an increase in economic benefit - contrasted with a reduction in economic costs. The legalisation of any illicit drug almost certainly results in an increase in demand, at least initially, as barriers to access are removed. This increase in demand may lead to a higher price per unit, although it may not where legal risk is factored into price. This higher price then results in a higher supply (presuming the drug is reasonably elastic). These increases represent an additional form of economic activity.
Even further, once the drug is legalised, the government can place an excise tax on the sale of the substance (similarly as they do with tobacco) to both reduce the demand to a desirable level and produce a large amount of otherwise uncollected tax revenue.
With regards to case studies, an article published in the BBC outlined the potential economic boosts of legalising cannabis specifically to the UK economy as calculated by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) (BBC News 2018). The article, citing the IEA, reports that legalisation would generate roughly £1 billion ($1.36 billion AUD) in tax dollars alone through the implementation of a recommended excise tax. Similarly, following the legalisation of marijuana in Canada, the nation collected $32 million CA ($34.23 million AUD) from the federal portion of the excise tax from April 2019 to March 2020 (MJBizDaily 2020). Given that this portion is only 25% of the overall excise tax, this implies that the total excise tax for that 12 month period is $128 million CA ($136.93 AUD). Finally, with regards to the US, a study by Harvard economist Jeffrey A. Miron estimated an increase in tax revenue of at least $46.7 Billion USD ($62.62 Billion AUD) following the decriminalisation of all drugs and the placement of an excise tax in line with those on tobacco and alcohol. (CATO Institute 2010)
Consider next the apparent reduction in economic costs from drug decriminalisation or legalisation. This reduction is associated primarily with the cost of drug law enforcement and incarceration for drug-related offences. Currently, the United States has a federal drug control budget of $40.4 Billion USD ($54.4 Billion AUD) (Real Reporting Foundation 2021). Half of this budget is related to drug treatment, the other half is dedicated to activities such as domestic law enforcement or interdiction of incoming goods. Even so, this results in approximately $20 Billion USD (~$27 Billion AUD) spent federally in drug prohibition efforts. Importantly, this figure only considers the federal cost of drug enforcement and therefore does not even consider the amount spent by the states regard drug law enforcement. Likewise, this figure doesn’t consider the cost of imprisonment for drug-related crimes, which now comprise nearly 45% of all federal prisoners, 25% of local jail prisoners, and 15% of state jail prisoners (Drug Policy Alliance n.d). As such, the total cost of drug prohibition in the US (federal and state) is significantly higher than the above-referenced number. In this way, even forms of decriminalisation over full legalisation are likely to drastically reduce government spending in this area in nations that currently outlaw drug use.
Societal
Next, consider the argument of societal benefit. This argument is broadly characterised by the belief that a regulated substance produces less harm than a prohibited substance. This phenomena appears to be substantiated regarding both hard drugs and softer analogues like alcohol. As an example; during the period of US prohibition on alcohol, the consumption of harder liquors like gins or high-proof moonshine became more widespread. This is likely because such substances concentrate the effect and require fewer goods to be transported illicitly to produce similar levels of intoxication. A similar “potency effect” (Biedermann, N 2017) can be observed contemporarily with hard drugs
Over time, in nations where the consumption and distribution of drugs such as cannabis are illegal, there is a noticeable increase in the concentration of such drugs. Analysis on cannabis samples in the US published in the journal of Biological Psychiatry (Elsohly et al. 2016, pp.613–619.) estimates that the THC content has increased from ~4% in 1995 to 12% in 2014. This is significant because THC is the psychoactive component of cannabis and high doses have been linked to adverse health effects like early-onset psychosis (D'souza et al. 2004, pp.1558–1572.). Similar increases in potency have been observed in other drugs, such as MDMA in Europe. A recent report by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA 2016) estimated the average MDMA tablet contains approximately 125mg of a psychoactive active substance compared to ~70mg in 2000. This is relevant because higher doses are more likely to lead to accidental overdose or adverse effects from drug-related injuries. The trend in potency is displayed below (EMCDDA 2016, p.9):
Ethical Reasons
Stepping outside the descriptive realm, defences of any practice belong to ethics-proper. As previously outline; the scope of morality is all action taken or otherwise produced, occasionally even unintentionally, by a moral agent. Therefore, any and all actions belong to the realm of ethics. Stronger still, all actions belong solely to the realm of ethics. In this regard; a formal defence of any action is completely insufficient without an ethical discussion.
Ethical systems are complex and widely ranging. With the exception of purportedly objective systems of morality (of which Divine Command Theory and Deontology are exemplars), it seems that all systems of ethics are equally justified. This leads to two meta-ethical quandaries: (1) you can’t logically convince someone to change ethical systems, (2) you can’t communicate across ethical systems. Because of this; any ethical argument presented from the perspective of only one super-structure should be completely impotent to adherents of another (unless the arguments coincidentally hit different ethical aims across the systems). With this understanding, there are two broad rhetorical paths one can take: (1) abandon trying to communicate to adherents of other systems, or (2) systematise ethical systems and present a defence from each perspective. I will attempt to do the latter.
To begin, a clear dichotomy can be made between teleological (goal-oriented) and deontic (rule-oriented) systems. The systems of Deontology, Divine Command, Rights-Based, and (potentially) Contractarianism belong to the former. The derivatives of Consequentialism (notably Utilitarianism) belong to the latter. With regard to the teleological systems; their ethical arguments do not belong to this section but rather to the prior section. Utilitarian considerations can be entirely relegated to the economic and societal descriptive arguments presented thus far. Therefore, this section will consider only the deontic systems.
Immediately, I will excuse myself from Divine Command theory as the system is too vague, gnostic, pluralistic, and dynamic for my systematising abilities. This leaves the systems of (1) Deontology, and (2) Rights-Based Social Contract Theory. These systems can be distinguished as static and dynamic respectively. Deontology is a static ethical system. Its tenants are set and its rules do not change with context, actor, or period. Rights-Based systems can be static (especially divine-Rights systems) but are more often plastic (exemplified by constructionist rights approaches). Social Contract systems are inherently dynamic. They are non-fixed and open to immediate and rapid change with context, actors, and periods. The distinction between these systems is important as, with the exception of Deontology, it is impossible to describe a definitive set of precepts for plastic and dynamic systems (as there are none). This means that my arguments must take the form: ‘It appears that rights-based systems value x’, or ‘most current societal contracts appear to value’. These arguments are conditional in nature, and there is no contradiction in opposing them from within the system. This is because, unlike with deontology, non-static systems admit of change and of plurality. The strength of these arguments can only resonate with a supporter of the system who the conditionals attach to. For example; if I were to argue that the principle of free speech should disbar hate-speech laws, my argument could only be persuasive to someone who believes in the principle of free speech.
Deontology
The system of deontology was developed by Immanuel Kant. Though present in most of his texts, the most relevant works are Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2019)and its subsequent Metaphysics of Morals (1991). Broadly, this system is characterised by an absolutist ethical stance. That is, the belief that certain actions (but not beliefs in this case) are wrong in concept and thus must always be wrong in actuality. This is because the actions necessitate the breaking of certain inviolable ethical rules. The most important of these rules, indeed Kant thought the fundamental and objective originator of all rules, is the Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative is an a priori ethical rule we are all bound to, regardless of our acceptance of it, in light of our status as rational agents. Kant presents at least three interpretations of this rule. Note: he explicitly states these are three formulations of the same a priori principle and not three different rules:
“I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (The Universal Law)
“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” (The Dignity of Humanity)
“Act in accordance with the maxims of a member [legislator] giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (The Kingdom of Ends)
All Deontological rules follow from this one principle. Thus, for the deontologist, nothing can be right which contradicts it, nor can anything be wrong which does not. Let us consider the case for marijuana use under the categorical imperative.
Recreational marijuana use is a conceptual derivative of recreational drug use and thus shares in that concept and any reducible ethical status put unto it. Let us investigate the following question: “Does the (willing) consumption of a drug violate the categorical imperative?”
First we shall expand the question to avoid linguistic confusion:
“Does the willing consumption of a [self-administered] drug [by a being capable of consent] - that is, in this sense, a mind altering substance - contradict the supreme law of morality as presented by Kant and by the dominant interpretations of his self-identified followers?”
Immediately, there are two ethically relevant portions in the statement:
The drug is consumed willingly
The object is question [drug] is mind altering
As to (1) “The Drug is Consumed Willingly” we can further expand. The term ‘consumed’ implies the drug is being artificially introduced and is likely not present in the body (ie. it is extra-personal). The term ‘willing’ clarifies there is no violation of one’s own will. It also implies the taker can consent to the consumption; this clarifies the statement is not regarding addicts or irrational agents.
With clarification out of the way, let us now run the question through each formulation:
“I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”. Is this act universalizable? An act is not universalizable if it results in a contradiction in conception by destroying the very maxim upon which it is based. For example; the maxim ‘lie whenever it benefits you’ is not universalizable. This is because, if everyone lied, no person would be believed. If no person is believed, no person can lie (as lying relies on the discrepancy between belief and reality). Thus universalisation destroys the maxim. Is this the case with the drug example; it doesn’t seem so. It is impossible to prove a negative of course but I cannot conceive of any way it contradicts the formulation.
“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”. Does the act violate the dignity of an agent involved? First we should clarify that, as the drug is self-administered, the only agent involved is the drug-taker. Further, any questions as to drug acquisition (which would involve other agents) are separate from the drug consumption. Kant certainly thinks it’s possible to violate your own dignity; that is, to treat yourself as a mere means. This is why he prohibits suicide - he sees it as utilising your life as a mere means to reprieve from suffering. Does this act treat yourself as a mere means? The answer is, it might. If the drug being consumed destroys your sentiance, your subjectivity, your rationality, or your personhood (ie. if it produced identity death) then yes it would be treating yourself as a mere means. However, if the drug induces a mind altering state without damage to one’s status as a rational agent (ie. if the dignity and the ends / the subjectivity / the autonomy of yourself remains intact and is respected) then no you would not be treating yourself as a mere means. In the latter case, of which I think essentially every drug, certainly every common recreational drug, falls, there is no violation of this formulation.
“Act in accordance with the maxims of a member [legislator] giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends”. Is the consumption of a mind-altering substance inherently in contradiction with a kingdom of ends? That is, would a society of autonomous agents agree to permit such an act on the basis that it would maximise or not contravene autonomy. It certainly seems so.
As such, at least in my cursory glance, with the exception of mind-eliminiting (as opposed to mind altering) substances, there is no immorality to the recreational consumption of a drug from the deontological perspective.
Rights-Based Social Contracts
First it must be clarified that, if something is an ethical right, it cannot be disbarred even, and especially, if it leads to ‘bad’ outcomes (though technically these couldn’t be bad outcomes because a rights-based approach would not consider the outcome). Therefore, I will preempt any arguments of the kind ‘marijuana leads to crime’ or ‘marijuana makes you lazy’. These arguments are wildly misguided and could not possibly be aimed at any proponents of civil rights. No more than saying ‘free speech lets people say slurs in public’ is an argument against free speech. If something is a right, and you truly believe that, you shouldn’t be convinced by any descriptive argument. If you are, you didn’t believe in the right in the first place.
With that clarification, it should be specified what a [normative] right is and what it is not. A right, in this ethical sense, is not a legal entitlement (a civil right). An example of a civil right is the ‘Right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures’ found in the US Bill of Rights (4th Amendment) (United States 1972). These kinds of rights can be sharply contrasted with normative rights, often called human rights (because they belong to all persons regardless of whether an arbitrary state recognises them). Exemplary documents of normative rights include the UN’s “Declaration of Human Rights” (United Nations n.d.) and parts of the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” (Conseil Constitutionnel n.d.) (Excluding article 3, and 12-14). Another way to emphasise this distinction between descriptive and normative rights, for it is crucial to understand, is to note that the former are granted by a body and can be retracted by that same body, the latter are inalienable (can’t be taken away) and a-priori (you automatically have them).
Let us now consider the question: “Do you have the right to recreationally intake a mind-altering substance?”. I will do this with reference to the Right of Cognitive Liberty. Cognitive Liberty is the ability to achieve and maintain self-determination over one’s own mental processes, mental states, cognition and consciousness. It is generally derived from the right to freedom of thought (Article 18 of the UN DOHR (n.d.)). However, in practice it is a far more extensive protection against interference. Neuroethicist Wrye Sententia constructed the term as a response to the increasing ability of technology to examine and alter mental functions (2004). They saw this as a pressing danger and a preach of fundamental privacy, the likes of which requires an extensive rights-based response. On these grounds they interpret the right as producing two important inviolable principles:
As long as their behaviour does not endanger others, individuals should not be compelled against their will to use technologies that directly interact with the brain or be forced to take certain psychoactive drugs.
As long as they do not subsequently engage in behaviour that harms others, individuals should not be prohibited from, or criminalised for, using new mind-enhancing drugs and technologies.
If Sententia is right is his interpretation, and if this right of cognitive liberty is truly derivative of a right to freedom of conscious (including freedom of thought, belief, religion etc.), then any adherent of that latter concept is bound also to adhere to this former. Thus, they would have to admit that, presuming no harm is produced, no person ought be stopped from recreationally using marijuana. Further, as rights within a system cannot contradict, if this right implies the permission of that act, no other right may disbar it.
Against Counter Arguments
Though I believe the ethical case thus far presented is strong enough, I will strengthen it by pre-empting and rejecting a number of bad counter arguments (on their own terms) I have yet to consider. Note: this list is not exhaustive.
Against the intrinsic immorality assertion
This position asserts that the consumption of drugs; that is, mind altering substances, including marijuana, is intrinsically immoral.
This argument is false in the first instance, at least from the position of Deontology and Rights-Based or Contractarian Systems (see the prior section on ethics). In the second instance, the espouser almost certainly engages in special pleading or is hypocritical. Consider that, in holding this position, you must also disbar the consumption of Alcohol, of Tobacco, of high dose Caffeine, of antihistamines, of cough suppressants, of high dose painkillers and opioids, of barbiturates, of antipsychotics, in short of most modern medicines. Most medicines are mind altering in some sense, many far more than a light entheogen like cannabis
Against the unethical production argument
This argument asserts that the consumption of drugs like marijuana is immoral because their production involves unethical practices.
This can be tackled three ways: (1) the production is not intrinsically exploitative. You can easily grow and prepare marijuana yourself. (2) the ethics of a substance’s production is a separate consideration to its consumption insofar as the two can be separated. Ie. if there was a stockpile of unethically produced goods which are no longer being produced, it would not be immoral to use them as their use (now that they’re out of production) no longer facilitates immoral practices. (3) the production of most goods consumed in the first world involves unethical practices; you must move to disbar most cosmetics, electronics, technology, clothing, and other consumer goods or face contradiction.
Against any naturalist fallacies
Naturalist arguments take the following form: an object ‘x’ is bad (typically taken to mean unhealthy) because it is unnatural.
All such arguments are fallacious and illogical, and should be rejected with utmost prejudice. There is no greater threat to order, morality, and logic than the permittance of such fallacies, I implore you to shoot them down with haste and scold their users. I highlight this argument not because it is particularly applicable to marijuana but because it is commonly, for some reason, launched at synthetic drugs. It is infuriating to hear and should enrage any self-respecting person. If you find this argument persuasive, go and eat some hemlock and refuse synthetic anti-toxin treatment.
Against the gateway drug argument
The gateway drug argument, a particular favourite against marijuana, takes the following form: Marijuana use acts as an entry-way to the use (and abuse) of harder drugs, particularly other depressants like heroin.
This argument is generally made in good faith and should be honestly and openly discussed as it is a through and through descriptive claim, without need for sophistry or biassing emotions. Whilst still a much debated topic; there is substantial evidence to suggest the theory, at least in its common form, is inaccurate. To support the theory, one must show that:
A population who otherwise would not engage in hard drug use does so once access to cannabis is expanded. This is because the theory posits that marijuana leads to harder drug use, not simply that marijuana is comorbid with harder drug use (which is almost certainly always going to be the case). If a heroin addict does marijuana, or if someone intending to do methamphetamine happens to do marijuana first, this is not support of the theory (as no causal link is displayed, only a correlative link).
To further my position; consider the following research papers which follow my line of argumentation by emphasising that a causative link must be shown and noting that such a link has thus far not been demonstrated (Cleveland & Wiebe 2008) (Agrawal & Lynskey 2014) (Morral, McCaffrey & Paddock 2002). To the contrary, most purported causal factors can be shown to have underlying variables influencing both.
Against the unhealthy argument
Put simply; something being unhealthy is not grounds for it being immoral. Nor is unhealthiness sufficient for illegality. Further, marijuana is much healthier than similar legal drugs, most notably alcohol.
Alcohol is cytotoxic, neurotic, carcinogenic, dangerous to foetuses (causing FASD which affects between 1-5% of US births), to organs, and to the central nervous system. Cannabis, as far as the research suggests, is none of these things.
In 2021, Alcohol resulted in the deaths of 1559 people in Australia alone (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2021). This includes deaths due to overdose (acute alcohol poisoning), and due to long-term-alcohol abuse precipitating chronic disorders. Compare this to the rates for cannabis: 0 from overdose, 0 from long-term abuse. Though cannabis was identified as a contributing factor for external morbidities (far less than alcohol), particularly car crashes, it has not been identified as a primary cause in any cases. (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2022). Even factoring in under use (11% of Australians used cannabis in the 2021 year (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2021) and under-reporting, it is absurd to suggest that these drugs are equally dangerous or unhealthy or that cannabis is more unhealthy than alcohol.
Against the addiction argument
Cannabis is not chemically addictive. That is, it does not produce dependence pathways in the neuro-topology which lead to physical dependencies. In this regard, it stands in sharp contrast to harder drugs like heroin and even legal drugs like alcohol and nicotine. Because of this, there are no physically precipitated withdrawal symptoms for discontinuation of marijuana use. This can be contrasted with potentially fatal conditions like delirium tremens or acute heroin withdrawal produced by alcohol and heroin respectively.
Marijuana can be psychologically addictive, in the same sense that any non-chemically addictive substance can become. Ie. It is in the same class of things like caffeine, endorphins, adrenaline, and melatonin. In short, it is not dangerously addictive and should not be rejected on these grounds.
Against the economic argument
The argument is incorrect. See the prior section “Descriptive Persuasion: Economic, and Societal”
Against the deterrence argument
Even if the law is a deterrence, which has not been sufficiently established for acts the likes of which are viewed as trivial by the community (ie. speeding, increasingly marijuana use), you must establish that the act to be deterred is immoral (ie. worthy of deterrence).
Against the crime argument
The argument is fallacious. See the prior section “Legality and Morality”
Against the populist fallacy
Populist fallacies, also known as appeal to popularity, take the following form: “an act or position is correct because it enjoys widespread support”. This argument is especially popular in the fields of aesthetics (‘everyone loves this painting… therefore it must be great art’) and religion (‘How likely is it that x number of adherents are wrong?). It is also completely fallacious and illogical. Except in ethical systems that consider consensus, ie. some forms of contractarianism, consensus is no way to decide on the ethical status of an act. I will again refer you to my section “Legality and Morality” for intuitive examples against this view; one such being that within the last few centuries the popular view of the status of indigenous and black individuals has changed radically. This is all to say that a group opinion has no objective bearing on the rightness or wrongness of any act. It does not become good because many people think so and vice versa.
References
Agrawal, A & Lynskey, MT 2014, ‘Cannabis Controversies: How genetics can inform the study of comorbidity’, Addiction, 109(3): 360–370
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2021, Causes of Death, Australia, ABS, viewed 30 November 2022, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/health/causes-death/causes-death-australia/2021>
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2022, Alcohol, tobacco & other drugs in Australia, viewed 30 November 2022, <https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/alcohol/alcohol-tobacco-other-drugs-australia>
BBC News 2018, Legalising cannabis 'would raise £1bn in tax for the UK', BBC News, viewed 30 November 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-44648817>
Biedermann, N 2017, How Prohibition Makes Drugs More Potent and Deadly: Nils Biedermann, FEE Freeman Article, viewed 30 November 2022, <https://fee.org/articles/how-prohibition-makes-drugs-more-potent-and-deadly/>
Cannabis, PsychonautWiki, viewed 30 November 2022,
<https://psychonautwiki.org/wiki/Cannabis#Strains>
Cannabis (drug), Wikipedia, viewed 30 November 2022,
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